MEADVILLE/LOMBARD THEOLOGICAL SCHOOL

REDUCTIONISM AND THE METHOD OF CORRELATION OF PERSPECTIVES

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF MEADVILLE/LOMBARD THEOLOGICAL SCHOOL
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF MINISTRY

BY
IAN STROUD EVISON

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
MARCH, 1980

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

THE EMERGENCE OF THE PROBLEM OF THE CORRELATION OF PERSPECTIVES

Occasionally when doing historical research one has the delight of uncovering the moment in which a new movement comes into being, where creativity and circumstance coalesce. I was tracing a reference made by Seward Hiltner in the book Pastoral Care in the Liberal Churches when I had this good fortune.[1] In 1925 Richard Cabot, a specialist in cardio-vascular problems and a Boston Unitarian, wrote an article, "A Plea for a Clinical Year in the Course of Theological Study."

> I live next door to the Episcopal Theological School in Cambridge. I see the students going in and out or playing baseball on the green turf below my windows. I hear their morning chapel bell. Naturally, I am led to wonder about them and their problems. I've wondered whether their call to the ministry has meant in every case a call to preach or whether to many it is not rather a call to carry the gospel of Christ to fellow men in trouble of mind, body or spirit....
>
> But for this, I found on inquiring..., the theological schools provide no training and no practice. It has been assumed apparently that skill and ability to help people in trouble could be learned by practice while in the seminary--that men either had it by nature and instinct or lacked it--but that in any case it could not be learned.
>
> Against this assumption I put the experience of

---

[1]James Luther Adams and Seward Hiltner, eds., Pastoral Care in the Liberal Churches (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1970), p. 277.

medical students and medical practitioners....[2]

Following from these wonderings Cabot gathered together a number of students to discuss the matter. He was then asked by the theological school to lead a course in the subject which he did with the help of a fellow doctor, Alfred Worchester of Waltham, Massachusetts. Eventually, in cooperation with a minister, Russell Dicks, he ran an experimental clinical year at his hospital, Massachusetts General in Boston. On the basis of this they wrote in 1936 the book, The Art of Ministering to the Sick.[3] After that what had begun as an experiment mushroomed into a powerful movement.

In fifty years of growth the pastoral care movement has changed, though to a surprising degree an observant reader of Cabot's 1925 article could have discerned the major strength, and corresponding weakness, which have remained characteristic of the field to this day. The two were born together. Cabot asked an inspired question: is not the support and encouragement given to patients by ministers rather like the support given by good doctors? The answer, of course, is "Yes" and "No." To the extent that good ministry is like good medicine the answer is "Yes." To this extent ministry can be enriched by borrowing from the knowledge and experience of doctors. To the extent that

---

[2]Richard C. Cabot, "Adventures on the Borderland of Ethics: A Plea for a Clinical Year in the Course of Theological Study," The Survey 55 (December 1, 1925): 275.

[3]Richard C. Cabot and Russell L. Dicks, The Art of Ministering to the Sick (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1936).

the role of the minister is unique the answer is "No." Borrowing will make ministry into something other than itself, causing ministers to lose their unique identities as ministers. Ministry can be enriched when ministers borrow, but it is difficult to discern when by borrowing the unique gifts of the minister are diluted.

In the years following Cabot's initial experiments, the arena of discussion was transformed by changes in medicine. In the late thirties and early forties many of the leading German and Austrian psychiatrists emigrated to America. As a result of their influence the lore of New England doctors about methods of encouraging patients and dispelling melancholy became the medical specialty of psychiatry. As the study by ministers of the clinical methods of doctors became the study of psychotherapeutic methods, the stakes in the gamble Cabot had proposed were raised. There seemed to be far greater potential effectiveness in the new methods than in the traditional lore, but for this very reason the temptation to borrow inappropriately was heightened. The appeal of the new methods--methods Cabot, incidently, could never accept--was huge with all the good and bad this entailed. An entire new line of development in ministry was opened.

As Cabot surmised, many have found that their call is not to preach but to help troubled individuals. The traditional role of ministers in the care of souls was rediscovered and given a new interpretation in light of the new psychology. The American Protestant emphasis on preaching

was balanced by a renewed interest in individual ministry. In the past thirty years courses in psychology, and in pastoral ministry, have become as big a part of the seminary curricula as theology and preaching.

The Unitarian Universalists particularly have been quick to appropriate psychological perspectives for reasons as much theological as practical. For liberals the attraction of the Social Gospel movement had pulled redemption earthward. Redemption came to be understood as a reality progressively actualized in this life with the aid of our efforts. Psychotherapy was a tool by which that could be accomplished.[4]

Further, to many religious liberals the findings of science are virtually a continuation of revelation. It was almost a religious obligation to give heed to new modes of understanding what it is to be human. Many, like Cabot, objected to the new theories of depth psychology because the theories seemed to undercut the sovereignty of reason. Yet, this objection could not have been allowed to jeopardize the final acceptance of the theories. The commitment to openness in general and openness to science in particular was too great. This is captured in the 1934 report of the Commission on Appraisal.

> The genius of the Unitarian movement has been its power to adapt the vocabulary and practices of a religion whose roots are sunk deep into the past to new knowledge, new conditions, new situations. If this genius should fail us now, the time will have

---

[4]The Commission of Appraisal of the American Unitarian Association, Unitarians Face a New Age (Boston: American Unitarian Association, 1936), pp. 47-49.

come to write "finis" to the story of Unitarianism.[5] And this genius has not failed us. Unitarian Universalist ministers and lay people have adapted themselves at least as well as the general population to the new theories. In our denomination as elsewhere, the field of pastoral care has been rejuvenated by what has been learned from psychology.

However, as might have been foreseen, the very success in this area has given rise to a problem in the past ten years. Psychology has tended to eclipse theology. The power of the psychotherapeutic methods to help people solve their problems has been seductive to ministers. This is most apparent in the modern descendents of the clinical training programs suggested by Cabot. They have provided a locus for the appropriation of psychological insights and techniques. Paul W. Pruyser, a clinical psychologist at the Menninger Foundation, made the following observation about the ministers and pastoral care students with whom he worked:

> They manifested, and sometimes professed, that their basic theological disciplines were of little help to them in ordering their observations and planning their meliorative moves....They did not quite trust their parishoners' occasional use of theological language and their presentation of theological conflicts. The issues of faith were quickly "pulled" into issues of marital role behavior, adolescent protest against their parents, or dynamics of transference in the counseling situation. There seemed to be an implicit suspicion of the relevance of theology, both to any client's life and to the method and content of the pastor's counseling process....It is a jarring note when any professional person no longer knows what his basic science is, or finds no use for it.[6]

---

[5]Ibid., p. 3.

[6]Paul W. Pruyser, The Minister as Diagnostician (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1976), pp. 27-28.

Many ministers have become amateur psychotherapists and have lost their own independent self-definitions as ministers.

This situation presents a very interesting problem for Unitarian Universalists who pride themselves on their ability to borrow and appropriate. It is a problem created not by resistance to new knowledge or by inability to assimilate it. It is created by assimilation that has been too successful. It is the problem of being overcome by that which has been assimilated. A method is needed which will help to relate psychological and theological perspectives without one being drawn up into the other. This is the question for this thesis:

> By what method can theological and psychological perspectives be correlated in making pastoral diagnoses so that the benefits of both are gained and the integrity of each is preserved?

I take as my starting-point the appropriateness, but not the sufficiency, of the explanation of all human phenomena by the human sciences.

My challenge is, taking this as the starting-point, to elaborate a method of relating theological and psychological understanding, and to arbitrate the claims to truth made by each. I do this because if the theological grounding of ministry is again going to be seen as the basis of the uniqueness of ministry, then ministry can be established as something unique if and only if theology itself has something unique to add.

The center of the constructive part of my thesis will be a reconstruction of the method of <u>correlation of</u>

perspectives first suggested by Seward Hiltner. To separate psychotherapy from pastoral care, I will distinguish between psychology as a language of finitude and theology as a language of transcendence. As practitioners of a psychological discipline, psychotherapists see people as formed by natural forces and reformable by manipulation of natural forces, that is to say, as finite creatures. As practitioners of a theological discipline, pastoral counselors see people as having goals and purposes beyond themselves, that is, as infinite. To show the relation of the two perspectives I will show that neither is complete in itself. Concern with changing people must include some degree of consideration for the purpose of change. Likewise, concern with the purpose of life must always be connected to concern for the ways in which those purposes may be carried out.

CHAPTER I

THE METHOD OF CORRELATION OF PERSPECTIVES IN PASTORAL CARE

At present the method of correlation, which Tillich set forth as a framework for explicating the relationship between theology and the secular disciplines, is being reconsidered and revised by David Tracy, Don Browning, and others. Both Tillich's method and the critiques of it are subjects of interest to the field of pastoral care because the method of correlation has provided the theoretical basis for the way those in the field have understood their relationship to the secular helping professions and the framework within which they have articulated this understanding to the other professions and to the society at large. The pastoral care community first turned its attention to Tillich's method of correlation in the forties and fifties. During that era Tillich turned a large part of his energies towards the theological understanding of interpersonal relationships and of the individual human psyche, and away from the transformation of society. Between 1948, the year he finished The Protestant Era, and his death in 1965, Tillich worked to apply his method of correlation to the relationship between theology and psychology.[1] The

[1]Wilhelm and Marion Pauck, Paul Tillich, 2 vols.

revisionist critiques of this method point to this contribution as something which needs to be studied again--and reformulated.

Stated simply, perhaps simply to the point of distortion, Tillich's method of correlation consists of juxtaposing questions arising out of the world situation and formulated by the secular disciplines with answers arising from the Christian message and formulated by theology. Tillich's system as a whole is an application of this method. He states at the beginning of his systematic theology:

> The following system is an attempt to use the "method of correlation" as a way of uniting message and situation. It tries to correlate the questions implied in the situation with the answers implied in the message.[2]

Tillich worked on developing and applying his method of correlation from the time he wrote his first book in the twenties, The System of the Sciences.[3] However, the concept was basically solidified in the early period when his concern was with revolution and social change in Germany. It will be argued here that this method, formulated in the midst of one situation, fitted less than perfectly the situation of pastoral care in America a quarter of a century later. The important thing to note at the moment is that

---

(New York: Harper and Row, 1976), vol. 1: Life, 222-227, 320. I rely on this work as my primary source for understanding Tillich's life.

[2]Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, 3 vols. (Chicago: U. of Chicago Press, 1951), 1:8.

[3]Tillich, The Protestant Era (Chicago: U. of Chicago Press, 1948), p. xxvi.

Tillich's method of relating psychoanalysis to theology is indeed a straightforward application of his method of correlation. He says in 1959, for instance, that:

> The interpretation of man's predicament by psychoanalysis raises the question that is implied in man's very existence. Systematic theology has to show that the religious symbols are answers to this question. Now, if you understand the relation of theology and depth psychology in this way, you have grasped the fundamental importance, the final and decisive importance, of all this for theology. There is no theistic and non-theistic existentialism or psychoanalysis. They analyze the human situation. Whenever the analysts of the philosophers give an answer, they do it not as existentialists. They do it from other traditions, whether it be Catholic, Protestant, Lutheran, humanist, or socialist. Traditions come from everywhere, but they do not come from the question.[4]

This statement of the relationship of psychology to theology accomplished two things. In the first place, it highlighted the need that psychologists have of theologians. And in the second place, it pointed out to theologians that however hostile psychologists might have been to religion, they made a contribution to theology in the way they posed the question implicit in the modern situation. These were both tasks which needed doing when Tillich became involved in the pastoral care field in America, and for the time Tillich did them well. His formulation of the issues both drew from and responded to the positions of the Barthians, on the one hand, and the secular positivists, on the other. Thus he was able to steer between criticisms coming from two directions.

However, in the intervening years criticism of

---

[4]Tillich, Theology of Culture (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 125.

Tillich's method of correlation has begun to come from a third direction. It is a criticism which first developed within the heart of liberal pastoral care, in the work of Seward Hiltner, and, as mentioned earlier, subsequently developed more fully. This criticism is that Tillich was not taking sufficiently seriously either the challenge or the contribution of the secular disciplines.[5] When Tillich schematized the relationship between theology, on the one hand, and the humanities and sciences, on the other, by saying that the latter may only provide questions about the ultimate nature of reality, he restricted the scope of the contribution of the humanities and sciences in a way that is both unwarranted and unrealistic. As early as 1954, Seward Hiltner posed this criticism as a tentative question. It is appropriate to quote him at length, since he presents in embryonic form much that was developed later and which will be of primary importance here.

> Not everything is yet clear about Tillich's use of the key term "correlation" to describe his theological method....[T]o what extent is correlation a two-way method? Tillich apparently solves this problem by indicating that theology deals with matters of ultimate concern and other disciplines with preliminary concerns. But this does not solve the problem. No one can say in advance when the emerging knowledge or insight is going to be ultimate or only preliminary. Nor does it seem sufficient to say that the sacred may erupt from the profane. Knowledge or insight of the utmost importance to theology may emerge at any time from a discipline that seems far removed from theology, and it hardly seems fair to say that the discipline has no

---

[5]Tillich uses the term "philosophy" for my term "secular disciplines," reviving the ancient, more general, definition of the term. Since that usage is not common, I think it confusing. I admit that it is also inadequate to call all disciplines other than theology "secular."

> claim to what it has discovered.
>
> We believe that a full two-way street is necessary in order to describe theological method....[I]f psychiatry, for example, enables us to help someone to turn a corner and thence move on into the faith, how can we avoid saying that our culture has given the answer to a problem posed by faith--provided we believe that our understanding of faith is never known apart from such actual concrete processes?
>
> In the hands of Tillich there are great virtues in the word "correlation" as a key to theological method. In lesser hands we may wonder about the term, perhaps especially concerning methodology in the function-oriented branches such as pastoral theology.[6]

It is essentially this same criticism of Tillich's method of correlation that David Tracy has developed in recent years. Both say that the secular disciplines must be acknowledged both as a source of answers and as a source of questions. This reformulation has the effect of suggesting the necessity of setting up a more complete parallelism between theology and the secular disciplines. The same criticism can be stated either from a systematic or from an apologetic point of view. From a systematic point of view the criticism is that since the secular disciplines provide answers to questions about the ultimate nature of existence, a method which fails to account for this fact is inadequate. From an apologetic point of view the same criticism can be stated by saying that a theologian has inadequately understood the power and the extent of the claim of the secular disciplines in the modern world if he or she asserts that the secular world has found no answers of its own. As Bonhoeffer is remembered for having said, the modern world is a world come of age.

---

[6]Seward Hiltner, Preface to Pastoral Theology (New York: Abingdon Press, 1958), p. 223.

The modern world has, after its fashion, found answers, perhaps incomplete, but sufficiently complete that the church in general and academic theology in particular has become peripheral. As lamentable as this situation might be, it is the situation in which the Church must proclaim its message.[7]

To the extent that there is a difference between the positions of Hiltner and Tracy, it is a difference of emphasis. Hiltner seems most concerned that Tillich's formulation of the method of correlation is apologetically inadequate to the situation in which the church must proclaim its message. Hiltner is concerned that in the practice of his ministry a minister is confronted with the hard fact that psychiatrists provide people with answers and that there is no a priori way of arguing that someone has missed something by listening to the answers of the psychiatrist rather than the message of the Church. Tracy also begins his criticism existentially, but for him the criticism arises from an understanding of the existential position of someone doing systematic theology today rather than from an understanding of the position of someone in the "function-oriented braches such as pastoral theology," as is the case

---

[7]Obviously, for a Unitarian Universalist there are difficulties in assuming that the Church is exclusively the Christian church and that the message is exclusively that of Christ. I assume that Unitarian Universalist ways of broadening these concepts in the appropriation of Tillich are well enough known that I do not need to take on the burdens of these arguments here. I also assume that it need not be argued at length that what is said here about the movement of the Church toward the periphery of society is a phenomenon affecting the Unitarian Universalists as much, if not more, than the Baptists or Methodists. What the idealists among us might hesitate to admit, the statisticians prove.

with Hiltner. The point on which Tracy focuses is that a systematic theologian must now consider answers from a variety of sources, not that the answers of the Church are not the only answers available today to people who are searching. However, it would be wrong to over emphasize this contrast. The positions are very close, remarkably close considering that the two men come from different generations and backgrounds.

Tracy, like Hiltner, objects to Tillich's formulation of the method of correlation on the ground that Tillich fails to recognize, as he must, that in the modern world answers to life's questions, even to the deepest ones, come from a variety of sources. I again quote at some length.

> The fact is that Tillich's method does not call for a critical correlation of the results of one's investigation of the "situation" and the "message." Rather, his method affirms the need for a correlation of the "questions" expressed in the "situation" with the "answers" provided by the Christian "message." Such a correlation, in fact, is one between "questions" from one source and "answers" from the other.... [O]ne cannot but find unacceptable this formulation of the theological task of correlation. For if the "situation" is to be taken with full seriousness, then its answer to its own questions must also be investigated critically. Tillich's method cannot really allow this.... We are indebted to Tillich's brilliant reinterpretation pointing out the heavy debt which existentialist analyses of man's estranged situation owe to classical Christian anthropology. Yet no one (not even a Christian theologian!) can decide that only the questions articulated by a particular form of contemporary thought are of real theological interest.[8]

In accord with this criticism of Tillich, Tracy draws from two sources for his theology, traditional Christian sources

---

[8]David Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order (New York: Seabury Press, 1975), p. 46.

and the secular disciplines.[9] In liberal or, if one would prefer, post-liberal thought, it is becoming common to level against Tillich a criticism approximating that of Hiltner and Tracy. Tracy calls this the revisionist criticism.[10]

The revisionist criticism of Tillich's formulation of the method of correlation is basically well grounded, although the matter is more complicated than one might guess from reading the passages from the works of Hiltner and Tracy quoted above. Tracy concludes that it was Tillich's position that only the questions posed by contemporary thought are of "real theological interest."[11] Hiltner concludes that he asserts that secular disciplines have "no claim" to the answers discovered.[12] Hiltner is more accurate than Tracy here, but both are imprecise in important ways. It would be easy to conclude that Hiltner and Tracy were right from the simple statement of the method of correlation as a juxtaposition of the questions from the philosophy (in the older, more general, sense) and the answers from theology, but this overlooks the precise meanings Tillich gives to the terms "philosophy" and "theology."

Tillich's use of these terms cuts across the normal understanding of philosophy and theology, similar to the way the theological understanding of the "Church" is both

---

[9]Ibid., pp. 32-34.

[10]Ibid., p. 32.

[11]Ibid., p. 46.

[12]Hiltner, Preface to Pastoral Theology, p. 223.

narrower and broader than the "institutional church." In fact, this is a very good analogy since the tensions and ambiguities are very similar and give rise to similar misconceptions. Tillich states that there can be no disagreement between a philosopher and a theologian, since the former can only formulate questions coming from the situation and the latter can only give answers.[13] But he does not mean that there are not, or should not be, disagreements between representatives of the discipline of philosophy and representatives of the discipline of theology. The key to this apparent contradiction is that someone from the discipline of theology often, unbeknownst to himself, falls into the role of being a philosopher and should do so. And similarly, someone from the discipline of philosophy often, unbeknownst to himself, falls into the role of being a theologian and should do so.

Tillich's assertion that arguments do arise between philosophy and theology when a representative of one discipline takes on the role of the other is the better-known part of his position on this matter. Tillich begins by asserting that theology and philosophy are completely separate. "Philosophy deals with the structure of being in itself; theology deals with the meaning of being for us."[14,15]

---

[13]Tillich, Systematic Theology, 1:27.

[14]Ibid., p. 22.

[15]When Tillich says this he means philosophy in the narrower sense, but the same arguments apply more generally.

An argument between a philosopher and a theologian can only arise if a theologian has taken up the subject of the structure of being, or a philosopher has taken up the subject of its meaning. Otherwise there is no common ground on which the argument can take place. As Tracy noted, Tillich often is able to uncover masterfully the reliance of a philosophical position on the sources coming from the Christian tradition. As a further development of this same analysis Tillich showed that the reason that a philosophical position like existentialism comes into disagreement with theology is that it is itself at least implicitly a theological position.[16] He sometimes used this analysis to undercut the arguments of philosophy against theology and to impose for theology a place for itself in intellectual life. However, at least in his Systematic Theology, his position is complex. After Tillich asserts the complete separation between theology and philosophy, he qualifies his position. Tillich does not want to say that a philosopher never can legitimately have answers to the questions arising from existence. Nor does he wish to say that all arguments between philosophers and theologians are illegitimate.

After Tillich states the divergence between theology and philosophy, he raises again the convergence:

> The divergence between philosophy and theology is counterbalanced by an equally obvious convergence.

---

[16] Tillich, A History of Christian Thought (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967), pp. 539-541.

From both sides converging trends are at work.[17] From the side of theology that convergence takes place since study of the meaning of being is necessarily drawn into a study of the structure of being. The affirmation of faith in being is inextricably bound up with an understanding of being. A theologian can not just say "yes" but must say "yes" and "no" in turn, according to his or her understanding of a situation.

> Instead of turning away from his existential situation, including his ultimate concern, he turns toward it. He turns toward it, not in order to make confession of it, but in order to make clear the universal validity, the logos structure, of what concerns him ultimately. And he can do this only in an attitude of detachment from his existential situation and in obedience to the universal logos. This obligates him to be critical of every special expression of his ultimate concern. He cannot affirm any tradition and any authority except through a "No" and a "Yes." He cannot join the chorus of those who live in unbroken assertions. He must take the risk of being driven beyond the boundary line of the theological circle.[18]

To say "No," as any theologian must to a degree, is to push oneself partially into the role of philosopher. The obverse of this, the aspect much more interesting to Tillich personally, is that a philosopher finds himself or herself of necessity becoming to a degree a theologian.

> ...[L]ike every human being, he exists in the power of an ultimate concern, whether or not he is fully conscious of it....There is no reason why even the most scientific philosopher should not admit it, for without an ultimate concern his philosophy would be lacking in passion, seriousness, and creativity....Every creative philosopher is a hidden theologian (sometimes even a declared theologian). He is a theologian in the degree

---

[17]Tillich, Systematic Theology, 1:24.

[18]Ibid., p. 25.

> to which his existential situation and his ultimate concern shape his philosophical vision.[19]

The sharp distinction between theology as a study of meaning (being for me) and philosophy as a study of structure (being in itself), still stands. However, having explicated more carefully the meaning of "theologian" and "philosopher," it is clear that there is, and must be, a continuum between them. Any avowed theologian is, in part, philosopher because he or she must sometimes say "No," and any avowed philosopher is in part a theologian since he or she must sometimes say "Yes." Contrary to Tracy's assertion, Tillich allows for the possibility that the answers posed by philosophy are of "real theological interest." Contrary to Hiltner, Tillich does not assert that a philosopher has no claim to the questions arising from being.

How is this understanding of Tillich's analysis of the convergence between theology and philosophy to be integrated with the revisionist critique of Hiltner and Tracy? As Tillich's position is complex, so is the answer to this question. The criticisms turn out to be essentially correct. Tillich did have a prejudice against the answers coming from the secular disciplines, and this prejudice ought not to be perpetuated today in theology. But it is a prejudice which needs to be understood in historical perspective. If Tracy and Hiltner have missed the mark in their criticisms, it is because they considered Tillich's method of correlation abstracted from the situation in which Tillich wrote his theology. It might be obscure to

---

[19]Ibid., pp. 24-25.

say, but true none the less, that Tillich's formulation of the method of correlation is itself an example of correlation. When Tillich asserted the truth of his method, he asserted the truth for a particular situation. As any other theological assertion, it is balanced between "the eternal truth of its foundation and the temporal situation in which the eternal truth must be received."[20] A method is not a mechanical tool which produces a theology.[21] It is a theological assertion designed to make it possible to cope with a certain situation, with certain facts or aspects of reality.

> Whether or not a method is adequate cannot be decided a priori; it is continually being decided in the cognitive process itself. Method and system determine each other. Therefore, no method can claim to be adequate for every subject. Methodological imperialism is as dangerous as political imperialism; like the latter, it breaks down when the independent elements of reality revolt against it.[22]

A method is bound to some extent to the subject to which it is being applied. Theological method is a way of doing theology, but it is also a reflection on theology already done, and done in a particular situation. A method is something to be applied "at passion and risk,"[23] and which is changed in the application. This means that in evaluating a method it must be seen as something in tension with a particular situation. When Tillich's method of correlation

---

[20]Ibid., p. 3.

[21]Ibid., p. 8.

[22]Ibid., p. 60.

[23]Ibid., p. 8.

is evaluated in conjunction with the situation he addressed, the reason for his bias against the answers from secular disciplines becomes clear, and the positions of Hiltner and Tracy seem more in continuity with Tillich's than in contrast. Further, and more importantly, it makes clear that in fomulating today a method of correlation of perspectives for theology and psychology there must be two sorts of understanding: one theoretical and the other existential.[24] Thus a brief examination of the relation of Tillich's method to the situation in which it arose is in order.

It is Tillich himself who introduced the "situation" of theology as an important theological concept.

> The pole called "situation" cannot be neglected in theology without dangerous consequences. Only a courageous participation in the "situation," that is, in all the various cultural forms which express modern man's interpretation of his existence, can overcome the present oscillation of kerygmatic theology between the freedom implied in the genuine kerygma and its orthodox fixation.[25]

The theologian's understanding of the "situation" to which

---

[24]It might be objected that the terms "psychology," "philosophy," "science," and "secular disciplines" are hopelessly imprecise ways to designate those types of understanding opposed to theological or religious understanding. It has become increasingly clear in recent years that the differences between the sciences or between types of psychology are as important as their similarities. This problem will be touched upon in the second chapter. My approach will be to show distinguishing characteristics rather than formulate an encompassing definition. This is similar to the approach some have taken to the problem of defining religion (William James, Varieties of Religious Experience [New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1925], pp. 26 and 27, and Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order, pp. 92-94). This parallel is not surprising since one way of characterizing religion and religious understanding is as the inverse of secularism and secular understanding (Mircea Eliade, Patterns in Comparative Religion [New York: Sheed & Ward, Inc., 1958], p. xiv).

[25]Tillich, Systematic Theology, 1:5.

his theology must speak is a wholistic understanding. It transcends both the question of the adaption of theology to particular empirical findings of the sciences and the question of what theological positions might have the broadest appeal.[26,27]

A very succinct way of stating the way Tillich saw the situation of faith in modern culture is proposed by Wilhelm and Marion Pauck: he saw a "split between a faith unacceptable to culture and a culture unacceptable to faith."[28] On the level of thought this same division is reflected in the split between, on the one hand, orthodoxy or neo-orthodoxy tending to supernaturalism, and, on the other, liberalism or humanism tending towards positivism. Tillich views both of these extremes as dangers to be avoided. He formulates the task of theology today this way:

> "The Christian message and the modern mind" has been the dominating theme of theology since the end of classical orthodoxy. The perennial question has been: Can the Christian message be adapted to the modern mind without losing its essential and unique character? Most theologians have believed that it is possible; some have deemed it impossible either in the name of the Christian message or in the name of the modern mind.[29]

Dominating all Tillich's works is a determination to steer a path between pairs of extremes. This determination is captured well in his description of himself as "on the

---

[26] Ibid., p. 4.

[27] Ibid., p. 10

[28] Wilhelm and Marion Pauck, Paul Tillich, 1:235.

[29] Tillich, Systematic Theology, 1:7.

boundary." The extremes he sees are variously stated, but they are closely related: orthodoxy and positivism, belief and unbelief, heteronomy and autonomy.

Tillich changed the focus of his concerns from social to individual problems because it seemed that there was a better prospect of making progress against the latter than the former in the cynical, indifferent and inward-turning climate he found after World War II.[30] To Tillich the antagonism between theological and psychological understandings of human problems was a further instance of theology finding culture unacceptable and culture finding religion unacceptable. The two extreme positions which, in this situation, he sought to avoid were the rejection by psychoanalysts of religion on the grounds that it was illusion, and the rejection by ministers of psychoanalysis on the grounds that it was not Christian. Of the former he says:

> Freud's theory of projection, like every other theory of projection since Feuerbach, confuses two things: that which is projected and that at which it is projected--"the picture" and the "screen." There can be no doubt that the concrete material out of which the images of gods are made is rooted in healthy as well as distorted experiences, in childhood and later. But this does not mean that the screen, namely, the ultimate of being and meaning, the ground and aim of existence, is itself projection. The question, therefore, for theology and psychotherapy is not the removal of the screen, but the interpretation and purification of the symbolic expressions of our relation

---

[30]Three sources give slightly different accounts of the same change: Wilhelm and Marion Pauck, Paul Tillich, 1:219-232; Tillich, "Beyond Religious Socialism," Christian Century 64 (June 15, 1949): 732-733; Tillich, "On the Boundary Line," Christian Century 77 (December 7, 1960): 1435-1437.

to it.[31]

Of the latter extreme he says (remember that Tillich treats together existentialism and psychoanalysis, tracing both to a common root):

> There is no theistic and non-theistic existentialism or psychoanalysis. They analyze the human situation. Whenever the analysts or philosophers give an answer, they do it not as existentialists.[32]

Both theology and psychoanalysis are legitimate and necessary, Tillich argues. He uses his method of correlation negatively to argue, on the one hand, that psychoanalysis (qua psychoanalysis) can say nothing concerning the ultimate nature or meaning of reality and, on the other, that theology (qua theology) can make no assertions about the empirical nature of reality. Correlative to this are the positive assertions that psychoanalysis can turn to theology for answers to questions of meaning and theology can turn to psychoanalysis for an empirical understanding.

That Tillich took an interest in psychotherapy and pastoral care is an example of kairos, something happening in the fullness of time. The pastoral care movement was in its formative stages in the forties and struggling to make a place for itself. Richard C. Cabot and Russell L. Dicks published The Art of Ministering to the Sick in 1936 on the basis of their innovative work in clinical training of

---

[31]Tillich, "Psychoanalysis and Religion by Erich Fromm," Pastoral Psychology 2 (June 1951): 63-64.

[32]Tillich, Theology of Culture, p. 125.

ministers at Massachusetts General Hospital and that was the first major landmark in the field.[33] The journal Pastoral Psychology began publishing in 1950 and was soon joined by Seward Hiltner.

Today it is hard to realize the state of the pastoral care movement when Tillich became involved with it and the value of what he contributed. And to realize these things is important, since one was formed by the other. In the late forties and early fifties both social science and German theology were new and foreign subjects to many in America. Today, when the basic concepts of psychology and neo-orthodox theology have become common knowledge, it is almost amusing to see how alien they were thirty years ago. For example, Hiltner commonly spoke to his readers about these subjects like this:

> Buy Tillich. Don't let your intellectual anxiety put him on the shelf until, in some distant day which will never come, you feel "up" to him.[34]

Here the book in question is The Courage to Be. Tillich said that to him it read like a novel and people today are more likely to agree with him than with Hiltner.[35] The most important contribution of the pastoral care movement was to appropriate from the social sciences insights about human nature and, more importantly, the scientific attention to

---

[33]Richard C. Cabot and Russell L. Dicks, The Art of Ministering to the Sick (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1936).

[34]Hiltner, "Man of the Month: Paul Tillich," Pastoral Psychology 3 (December 1952): 66.

[35]Wilhelm and Marion Pauck, Paul Tillich, 1:226.

detail.[36] The social sciences were set in the role of a new source of revelation.

> Psychiatrists, psychologists of various kinds, social workers, and many others have much from which we can learn. No number of the journal Pastoral Psychology should be without a reminder that we walk humbly before any one who has insight into human beings....[37]

Today the early articles in Pastoral Psychology seem primitive in their use of psychology and theology, still struggling with faculty psychology and Calvinist moralism. Then the attempt to revive long dormant Protestant traditions in pastoral counseling by teaching a scientific empirical point of view was revolutionary. Hiltner and others like him had, quite rightly, very high hopes.

> The type of thinking which is most characteristic of our century...is the psychological....If we can use every bit of sound psychological knowledge we can get and view it within a theological context, we have a chance to become major apologists for the Christian faith in our century.[38]

However, those who wished to win a place for a revived field of pastoral care were fighting a difficult struggle. The movement was pinched between clergy who were suspicious and massively ignorant of what was then called depth psychology and psychotherapists who had themselves only just begun to earn some respect as professionals and who viewed religion as an illness to be cured.

---

[36]Hiltner, "Theology and the Institutional Chaplain," Pastoral Psychology 2 (February 1951): 24.

[37]Hiltner, "Mr. Hiltner Accepts," Pastoral Psychology 1 (May 1950): 6.

[38]Hiltner, "Theology and the Institutional Chaplain," Pastoral Psychology 2 (February 1951): 38.

Tillich performed the tasks of legitimation, explanation and appropriation in both directions.. He spoke often to audiences of psychotherapists and doctors, and contributed to their professional journals. He became personal friends with a number of leading psychotherapists, Karen Horney, Erich Fromm, and Rollo May. Tillich had learned from Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, and Dostoyevsky to be a biting critic of conventional morals and behavior. The psychotherapists found this a refreshing change from the conventional moralism they had come to expect from the church. Tillich performed much the same function in the other direction also. He devoted speeches, articles, and major sections of later books to explaining the importance of Freud to ministry and theology, at the same time opposing Freud's doctrinaire atheism. In doing all this Tillich performed a great service. It was said after his death that to psychotherapists and pastoral counselors he was "like a flashing streak of brilliance and lightning on the dark horizon of post-World-War-II theology and pastoral psychology."[39] He spoke across the boundary between two extremes and that was exactly what was needed.

This, then, is the situation in which Tillich elaborated his method of correlation and his theological evaluation of psychotherapy. Looked at as an attempt to speak the message in that situation, Tillich's effort can

---

[39]Wayne E. Oates, "The Contribution of Paul Tillich to Pastoral Psychology," Pastoral Psychology 19 (February 1968): 16.

be judged successful. However--and this is the caveat under which the cogency of the revisionist criticism becomes manifest--this does not mean that Tillich's formulation of the issues today, thirty years later, is adequate to the present state of the fields of psychotherapy and pastoral care. Then the problem was to bridge a gap of ignorance and mistrust between two fields. Tillich wrote to a time when, in his words, the "louder and more impressive voices" were those who denied "either in the name of the Christian message or the name of modern man" that it was possible to bridge this gap (see p. 22).[40] The situation has changed today. There are the orghodox few who are completely opposed to psychotherapy or to religion, but their numbers are small. Chaplaincy has become a recognized part of modern health care (if begrudgingly recognized) and study of psychology has become a part of most seminary curricula.

A good way to mark the change in the situation to which theology speaks, between Tillich's time and today, is the difference between the starting-points of Tillich and Tracy in their theologies. Tillich saw, as we mentioned, that his greatest challenge was to avoid naturalism and supernaturalism, the two sides of the sciences vs. religion debate. Tracy, in contrast, finds today that the extremists on these issues have become so rare he need not even address them!

> It has now become clear that the centuries-old dispute between "religion" and "science" is now largely past

---

[40] Tillich, Systematic Theology, 1:7.

> history. Except for fundamentalists in both fields, the emerging consensus is so clear as almost to have become cliche.[41]

For Tillich the basic modern situation to which theology had to address itself was a world divided between religious and non-religious people, at the extremes between the orthodox and the positivists. For Tracy the modern situation is also one of division, but of division within people. For him, at the very least, the orthodox and positivists have become unsure of themselves--the basic situation of the theologian is existence in tension between two loyalties.

> Authentic theological attempts at revision do not really stem from a too often meretricious desire for "relevance." The reality of the situation is both more simple and more basic: when all is said and done, one finds that he can authentically abandon neither his faith in the modern experiment nor his faith in the God of Jesus Christ. Anyone who experiences at all such a seemingly unenviable condition finds the attempt to theologize pure necessity.[42]

During the past thirty years both the modern world and religion in the modern world have become less sure of themselves, less sure of their self-sufficiency.[43] Along with this both theologian and scientist are more willing to admit that their views of the world are somewhat arbitrary and are not founded on a purely empirical basis. This transformed situation dictated a transformation in the apologetic task. For Tillich it was most important to find ways to open often

---

[41] Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order, p. 94.

[42] Ibid., p. 4. For contrast, see the Tillich quotation cited on p. 22 above.

[43] Tracy puts forth this argument in the first chapter of Blessed Rage for Order, "The Pluralist Context of Contemporary Theology," pp. 3-21.

antagonistic modern people to the message. For Tracy the task is to heal the split of divided loyalties in persons.[44]

The aim of the remainder of this chapter is to construct a new criticism of Tillich's method of correlation as he applies it to the relationship of theological to psychological understanding of human behavior. This criticism builds on the first two sections: the exposition of Tillich's method and the comparison and contrast of the situation of theology when Tillich wrote and today. My basic criticism is that, while Tillich's argument that psychology has ontological presuppositions was effective in opening the ears of a psychotherapeutic community which thought itself self-sufficient, it does little for those caught between the claims of psychological and theological perspectives, who feel loyalty to each.

Paul Tillich commented on the relationship of psychology and theology at various places in his later works. He never dealt with the subject as comprehensively and cohesively as he dealt with the subject of the relationship of socialism and theology. On a theoretical level the most comprehensive treatment is an essay, "The Theological Significance of Existentialism and Psychoanalysis" from the Theology of Culture.[45] On a practical level his most thorough treatment is in The Courage to Be, a chapter titled

---

[44]Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order, pp. 3-14.

[45]Tillich, Theology of Culture, pp. 112-127.

"Pathological Anxiety, Vitality, and Courage."[46] Two sources of secondary interest on the subject are the second chapter of Love, Power, and Justice, "Being and Love,"[47] and a 1960 article in Pastoral Psychology, "The Impact of Pastoral Psychology on Theological Thought."[48] The formulation of the structure of the relationship between psychology and theology which emerges from these works continues to be the most prevalent in the pastoral care movement.

However, while many of Tillich's theological insights and historical observations continue today to be valuable, his understanding of the relationship of psychology to theology, largely accepted in the field, has become more restricting than enabling. Tillich's main aim was to gain a hearing for psychological perspectives in the religious community. He succeeded rather well in this by means of, often startling, observations about the history of psychological and theological ideas. Yet once he managed to gain the attention of both sides, he had surprisingly little to say about exactly how the two are to relate. He is credited with holding that it is the task of the psychologist to formulate questions about the ultimate nature of reality and the task of theologians to answer them. While criticism

---

[46]Tillich, The Courage to Be (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952), pp. 64-85.

[47]Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), pp. 18-34.

[48]Tillich, "The Impact of Pastoral Psychology on Theological Thought," Pastoral Psychology 11 (February 1960): 17-23.

arose partly because his critics might have misunderstood his position, even correctly understood, he was not as helpful as might be hoped. Since today is a time when the concern of theology is more to balance conflicting loyalties than it is to make itself relevant, Tillich's inability to indicate how psychology and theology do relate is a major inadequacy.

When Tillich discusses the relation of psychology to theology, he has in mind, as always, two sets of adversaries: the naturalists and the supernaturalists. On the one hand:

> Medicine, above all psychotherapy and psychoanalysis, often claims that healing anxiety is its task because all anxiety is pathological. Medical insight and medical help--this is the conclusion--are the way to courage to be; the medical profession is the only healing profession.[49,50]

On the other hand:

> Since they [ministers and theologians] do not see the differences [between pathological and non-pathological anxiety] they are unwilling to look at neurotic anxiety as they look at bodily disease, namely as an object of medical help.[51]

Today there is even more general agreement than there was when Tillich wrote that these are ills to be avoided. However, for Tillich, the dangers of these two extreme

---

[49]Tillich, like many, tends to consider only neurotic illnesses when he speaks of mental illness. Thus, he assumes that someone will feel anxiety when they are mentally ill. This is untrue.

[50]Tillich, The Courage to Be, pp. 70-71.

[51]Ibid., p. 73. It might be cogently argued, that even for Tillich, such extreme positions were important as foils against which he could develop a position. See, for instance, the papers of the Gallahue Conference of 1960, published as Constructive Aspects of Anxiety, eds. Seward Hiltner and Karl Menninger (New York: Abingdon Press, 1963).

positions so dominated the horizon of thought that he tended to overdraw contrasts. This is probably why he is accused of excessively restricting the contribution of psychology even when his systematic position is not restrictive.

Tillich sets about his solution to the problem of the role of theology by arguing with great force that any scientific position and any theological position must, at least implicitly, presuppose an ontological position.

> Ontology precedes every other cognitive approach to reality. It precedes all sciences, not always historically, but always in logical dignity and basic analysis....The best method for discovering it today is a careful analysis of the writings of leading anti-ontological philosophers or of anti-philosophical scientists and historians. One will easily discover that on almost every page of the writings of these men a certain number of basic ontological concepts are used, but surreptitiously and therefore often wrongly. One cannot escape ontology if one wants to know! For knowing means recognizing something as being.[52]

When Tillich wrote this he was arguing against, on the one hand, the logical-positivists like Ayer who rejected ontology because it was not empirical, and, on the other hand, the more conservative of the neo-orthodox, like Barth, who rejected it on the grounds that it was not Biblical. Tillich had a special skill for drawing out the implicit ontology of a position and relating this to its historical antecedents in philosophy and theology.

Corresponding to the two extremes of supernaturalism and naturalism which he identifies, Tillich tries to articulate a philosophical anthropology which mediates between two extremes. On the one hand, he avoids a super-

---

[52]Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice, p. 20.

naturalist position in which it would be denied that human behavior is enmeshed in a network of natural causes. On the other hand, he wants to avoid what he called the view of extreme existentialism, which asserts that human behavior is to be understood exclusively by the network of natural causes.[53] He agrees that the human condition is estranged, but he denies that humanity is trapped in estrangement. Likewise, he denies the translation of this view into scientific method, that that is real which can be viewed in separation, as an object separate from other objects, as an "empty field into which sense impressions enter and prevail according to the degree of their intensity."[54] Tillich draws heavily on the description of the human predicament by existentialism and psychoanalysis--"in time and space, finitude and estrangement"--but rejects Sartre's assertion that this predicament is all there is to the human situation.[55]

Tillich pulls together these strands with the assertion that human life is existentially estranged but essentially unified. In theological symbols this can be interpreted by saying that, in spite of existence in sin, humanity remains essentially good, a creature of God. Thus, for Tillich existentialism and psychoanalysis have a very important role to play in analyzing existential existence. Yet the very terms alienation, estrangement, and healing bespeak a

---

[53]Tillich, Systematic Theology, 1:116.

[54]Tillich, The Courage to Be, pp. 135-139.

[55]Tillich, Theology of Culture, p. 117.

wholeness remembered or hoped for.

> With respect to the healing process, he [Freud] knew something about the healed man....And in so far as he was thus convinced of the possibility of healing, this contradicted profoundly his fundamental restriction to existential man. In popular terms, his pessimism about the nature of man and his optimism about the possibilities of healing were never reconciled in him or in his followers....
>
> We can make the same criticism of Sartre's pure existentialism and his sensitive psychological analysis....Sartre says man's essence is his existence. In saying this he makes it impossible for man to be saved or to be healed....But here also we have a happy inconsistency. He calls his view existentialist humanism. But if he calls it humanism, that means he has an idea of what man essentially is, and he must consider the possibility that the essential being of man, his freedom, might be lost. And if this is a possibility, then he makes, against his own will, a distinction between man as he essentially is and man as he can be lost: man is to be free and to create himself.[56]

In this way he forced, or believed himself to have forced, the recognition by the psychoanalysts and existentialists of essential being, unified and unconditioned.

If there were so he would have accomplished a great deal. He would have found within existentialism an entry into essence beyond existence. He would have found within the psychoanalytic understanding of behavior an opening into that which is beyond psychoanalytic understanding, beyond the libido perpetually seeking satisfaction. It was Tillich's opinion that this is exactly what he found. Tillich thus finds himself justified in concluding that psychoanalytic understanding of human behavior applies only to some behavior.

> Only a perverted life follows the pain-pleasure principle. Unperverted life strives for that of which it is in want, it strives for union with that which is separated from it, though it belongs to it. This

---

[56]Tillich, Theology of Culture, pp. 120-121.

> analysis should remove the prejudice towards libido, and it can give criteria for the partial rejection of Freud's libido theory. In so far as Freud describes libido as the desire of the individual to get rid of his tensions, he has described the perverted form of libido....Freud describes man's libido in its perverted, self-estranged stage.[57]

If this is granted, a direct path is opened for solving the problem of the relationship of psychological understanding of human behavior to theological understanding and of psychotherapy to pastoral counseling.

Tillich elaborates this position in The Courage to Be. He builds a distinction between pathological and non-pathological behavior on the distinction between existential and essential being.

> He who does not succeed in taking his anxiety courageously upon himself can succeed in avoiding the extreme situation of despair by escaping into neurosis. He still affirms himself but on a limited scale. Neurosis is the way of avoiding nonbeing by avoiding being....He who is not capable of a powerful self-affirmation in spite of the anxiety of nonbeing is forced into a weak, reduced self-affirmation. He affirms something which is less than his essential or potential being.[58]

This distinction between pathological and non-pathological anxiety follows closely a distinction between the functions of a minister and a physician.

> Some principles for the cooperation of the theological and medical faculties in dealing with anxiety can be derived from our ontological analysis. The basic principle is that existential anxiety in its three main forms is not the concern of the physician as physician...; and, conversely, that neurotic anxiety in all its forms is not the concern of the minister as minister.[59]

---

[57] Ibid., p. 120.

[58] Tillich, The Courage to Be, p. 66.

[59] Ibid., p. 73.

For Tillich there is one category of behavior that can be identified as appropriately understood psychologically, and another which requires theological understanding. From this he derives the distinction between the functions of a psychotherapist and a pastoral counselor.

Unfortunately, the distinction which Tillich makes between behavior which may be understood psychologically and behavior which must be understood theologically does not hold. Tillich is likewise mistaken in interpreting Freud to be only explaining some behavior and in thinking that an a priori distinction can be made clinically between pathological behavior which is open to psychological interpretation and non-pathological behavior which is not.

While it is true that Freud's theoretical work had its basis in the treatment of pathological behavior of patients in his Vienna practice, he intended his theory to be a theory of all behavior and of cultural phenomena.[60] This is not to say that Freud's psychology, or any psychology, provides an adequate or comprehensive understanding of behavior. Freud's theories provide a psychological perspective on all behavior, not just on pathological behavior.

Tillich's attempt to correlate psychological and theological modes of understanding behavior breaks down when he proposes a common philosophic anthropology, and on the basis of this proceeds to attempt to divide between those behaviors which are the concern of the therapist and those

---

[60]Paul Ricoeur, The Conflict of Interpretations (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974), pp. 121-123.

which are the concern of the minister. He is unsuccessful because each case of anxiety can be looked at as pathological or as existential even according to his definition of pathological. He says a person is neurotic if he or she affirms something which is less than his or her "essential or potential being."[61] All affirmations fall short of a person's potential. That is a characteristic of human finitude. He says: "[t]he neurotic personality...has settled down to a fixed, though limited and unrealistic, self-affirmation."[62] Here again it must be noted that all self-affirmations are to some degree limited and unrealistic. The self-affirmation of any person--even of the "healthiest" of persons--is molded and distorted by personal and cultural ways of viewing things. Conversely, no behavior is absolutely unrelated to reality. Even the severely mentally ill are generally somewhat related to reality, even essential reality. Thus each problem ends up being equally the domain of the therapist and the minister. Thus, pastoral care is again left needing a way to distinguish its role.

Seward Hiltner begins to develop such a way when he spoke about "correlation of perspectives." According to him both science and theology can apply themselves to the understanding of a phenomenon, and each has something to bring to a wider understanding. However, he does not develop this approach. He leaves it as a series of hints and suggestions

---

[61]Tillich, The Courage to Be, p. 66.

[62]Ibid., p. 68.

in Preface to Pastoral Theology. To provide a substantial understanding of theological and psychological perspectives and of how these perspectives relate, further resources are needed. It is for this that in the next chapter I will turn to Paul Ricoeur.

CHAPTER II

REBUILDING THE METHOD OF CORRELATION

PART I:

THE CONTRAST OF PERSPECTIVES

The Two Parts of Correlation: Division and Reunion

Broadly speaking, there are two things that are necessary for establishing a method of correlating the perspectives of psychotherapy and pastoral care: a characterization of the distinctiveness of each perspective and a mode of relating them. It is difficult to give equally strong solutions to both problems. If one makes a very strong distinction between pastoral care and psychoterapy, as one might following from the neo-orthodox tradition of Karl Barth's early writings, it becomes difficult to articulate how the two complement one another.[1] If, on the other hand, one argues strongly their relationship, as have Howard Clinebell and others, then distinguishing the two becomes difficult.[2] The challenge

---

[1]Karl Barth, Ludwig Feuerbach (Mimeographed, Meadville/Lombard Library), trans. J. L. Adams, 1955.

[2]Howard Clinebell, Basic Types of Pastoral Counseling (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1966). He defines pastoral counseling as "the utilization, by a minister, of one-to-one or small group relationship to help people handle their problems of living more adequately and grow toward fulfilling their potentialities. This is achieved by helping them reduce the inner blocks which prevent them from relating in need-satisfying ways." (p. 20)

of correlation is to articulate a relationship between pastoral care and psychotherapy which is neither separation nor merging, and, more than this, to separate them in a way which makes it more possible to understand their connection, and connect them in a way that makes it more possible to understand their separation.

The fact that both pastoral counselors and psychotherapists have in the past twenty years moved into the same territory, the institutions of American health care, has made it politically and practically necessary to divide the roles clearly. The effort to correlate perspectives has entered into the broader struggle of pastoral care for professional status, for a presence in hospitals and mental institutions, and for a voice in decisions about patient care. However, the question of the division of roles is not a narrow practical one. It is rather a very important theological question as it manifests itself in a particular setting. On a general level it is the question of how modern knowledge and theology can be brought together. This same question has enlivened liberal theology from Friedrich Schleiermacher's Speeches on Religion to David Tracy's Blessed Rage for Order.[3,4]

The aim of this chapter is to treat the first half of the problem of correlation, to distinguish beteen the role

---

[3]Friedrich Schleiermacher, On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers (New York: Harper & Row, 1958), pp. 1-21.

[4]Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order, p. 44.

of ministers in the care of individuals, and the role of psychologists, psychiatrists, and psychotherapists. The name that will be given to the former will be pastoral care and to the latter psychotherapy. It is extremely difficult to say anything on the subject of distinguishing the two without becoming controversial. Indeed, even to have proposed this use of the terms "pastoral care" and "psychotherapy" requires explanation. There is precedent. Yet the main reason is that there is a need for generic concepts to be used in attempting to distinguish roles. At this stage in the analysis the terms have only intentional content: they are assigned the role of intending the distinction of roles. It is an open question whether any normative or even any descriptive content can be given the terms. That depends on whether a distinction of roles can be specified.

The term psychotherapy is often defined more narrowly to mean strictly the therapy of the psyche by psychological means. This is the sense in which Freud used it beginning with his "Studies in Hysteria" (1895).[5] The suggestion of a broader definition comes from the derivation of the word (psycho/therapy) and from the fact that its original sense was the treatment of the psyche by any means (surgical, chemical, or psychological).[6]

The term pastoral care also has more than one common

---

[5]Sigmund Freud, "Studies in Hysteria," The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, trans. J. Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1960). 2:3-17.

[6]A Dictionary of the Social Sciences, eds. J. Gould and William Kolb (New York: Free Press, 1964), p. 556.

meaning: the use of secular psychotherapeutic methods by ministers,[7] a particular perspective on ministry as a whole,[8] as well as the meaning adopted here, that which the minister does in the care of individuals. The chief argument against making pastoral care into a generic term for ministry to individuals seems to be that it is important to avoid the implication that the principles learned about individuals have no application to other aspects of ministry like preaching and social action.[9] This might have once been a danger, but it is no longer.

As might be guessed from the fact that there is such a controversy even about terminology, there is great disagreement concerning the roles of psychotherapy and even pastoral care. It would at this time be impossible to define them strictly in a way that would be acceptable for all purposes. Fortunately, the task that needs to be done for the method of correlation is more modest. It is not necessary to define comprehensively the roles but only to find a means to distinguish them.[10] The approach here is the same as Tillich's in that the difference between pastoral care and psychotherapy will be derived from the difference between their associated theoretical disciplines, pastoral theology and the empirical social sciences.

The contrast between the approach used here and

---

[7]See footnote 2, above.

[8]Hiltner, Preface to Pastoral Theology, pp. 19-20.

[9]Ibid., pp. 18-19.

[10]William James, Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 28.

Tillich's is that Tillich began his analysis by distinguishing between psychological and theological situations or problems and I begin mine by distinguishing between psychological and theological methods of explanation. Tillich's basic argument was that (1) some situations (problems in Tillich's terminology) are psychological and some are theological,[11] (2) the former can only be understood from a psychological perspective and the latter from a theological one, (3) and thus it is the role of a psychotherapist to intervene in the former and a pastoral counselor in the latter. The problem with this argument is that no a priori distinction can be made between problems which are psychological and ones which are theological. Psychology provides a means of understanding all behavior as does theology. However, there is more hope of distinguishing between behaviors which need to be understood from one point of view rather than another. This makes the distinction more ethical than phenomenological. I distinguish between the roles by arguing that (1) psychological and theological methods of explanation facilitate differing types of intervention, (2) though the methods of explanation can be applied to any situation sometimes it is the mode of intervention informed by the one that is needed, and sometimes the other, (3) and thus it may be concluded in agreement with Tillich that it is the role of a psychotherapist to intervene in the former and the pastoral counselor in the

---

[11]The confusion of terminology among the terms "problem," "situation," and "phenomena" arises from the fact that I am not ready to assume, with Tillich, that the orientation of pastoral counseling should be exclusively towards solving problems.

latter.

In taking this approach I follow an important shift in method initiated by Seward Hiltner. Hiltner borrows the idea of a method of correlation for relating psychology to theology directly from Tillich, but in Hiltner's work the method of correlation becomes the method of correlation of perspectives. In making this change Hiltner is shifting the arena in which the problem of approach is to be decided from that of phenomena or situation being interpreted to that of the method by which the interpretation is to be accomplished, as is being done here. This is a reversal of the major tradition in the philosophy of interpretation, a tradition following from Schleiermacher through Dilthey, Husserl, and the early work of Heidegger. It is true that Dilthey developed the concept of Weltanschauungslehre and made the problem of perspective or world-view into an important philosophic question, but with an important difference.[12] For Hiltner the question of perspective pertains to the method of interpretation and for Dilthey it pertains to the object of interpretation.

While Hiltner's intention in speaking about perspective is to force a relativism into the discussion between theology and psychology, Dilthey's intention was quite different, one might say opposite. In speaking about world-views Dilthey is opposing religion, poetry and metaphysics, which can only

---

[12]Wilhelm Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 8 Leipzig: Reimer, 1914), pp. 75-118. English translation: Dilthey's Philosophy of Existence (New York: Bookman Assoc., 1957).

comprehend an aspect of existence, to his position, objective idealism, in which one can intuit the whole and thus in a sense pass beyond the historicity of perspectives.[13] Following Dilthey, Husserl came to an understanding of the perspectival nature of all previous philosophy. This was not, as for Hiltner, a positive discovery suggesting the virtue of tolerating differences. It was a negative discovery suggesting that all previous philosophy was worthless and that Western thought had plunged into a crisis of relativism:

> It may well be that the proposals presented in the world-renowned scientific works of philosophy in ancient and modern times are based on serious, even colossal intellectual activity...but, for the moment, nothing in them is recognizable as a basis for philosophical science, nor is there any prospect of cutting out, as it were, with the critical scissors here and there a fragment of philosophical doctrine.[14]

Husserl pointedly calls his philosophy the science of phenomenology and tries to build a non-perspectival basis for philosophy in "pure" description.

When Tillich speaks of correlation and not correlation of perspectives he is following in this tradition. He preserves the hope of somehow grasping an understanding of the whole beyond the understanding of aspects and thus falls in what Ricoeur calls the Romanticist school of hermeneutics. It is clear from the references Tillich makes to phenomenology and "pure" description that he shares with Dilthey and Husserl the hope of finding a non-perspectival basis for

---

[13] Ibid., pp. 115-118. English edition, pp. 69-74.

[14] Edmund Husserl, Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), pp. 557-568.

philosophy.[15] As he describes in his autobiographical book, My Search for Certitudes, a major preoccupation of Tillich's intellectual life was to resist the relativism he presumed to be implicit in a perspectival understanding of truth.[16]

When Hiltner speaks of correlation of perspectives he is breaking with the Romanticist school of hermeneutics and with Tillich. He carries on the substance of the previous discussion of perspectives but reverses the sense. On the whole this is a very positive move. By parting with Tillich's view, and with the very problematic theory of realms of being which Tillich is forced to import as an alternative to a perspectival understanding of truth, Hiltner orients the pastoral care field in a much more fruitful direction than would otherwise have been the case. Yet, the change in direction Hiltner initiates is also dangerous, particularly since he does not make the changes self-consciously. In American pastoral care especially there is a danger that a division of roles between pastoral care and psychotherapy based on a correlation of perspectives will become a sloppy eclecticism, 'you do your thing, I do mine' raised to the level of a professional modus operandi. This would be, and is where it is now practiced (usually with the most liberal intentions), bad ministerial practice and dangerous psychotherapy.

---

[15] Tillich, Systematic Theology, 1:106-107 and 3:17.

[16] Tillich, My Search for Certitudes (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1967), pp. 20-24.

It seems prudent to consider the perspectival approach as a problem before adopting it as a position. In accord with this, the remaining part of this chapter is divided into three sections. In the first, Tillich's theory of realms of being, its place in his thought, its difficulties, and the possibilities in his thought for moving beyond it will be discussed. In the second, Paul Ricoeur's model of meaningful action as a text will be introduced as a basis for a critical correlation of perspectives. And in the third, the perspectives of psychotherapy and pastoral care will be distinguished. Overall, two questions govern the discussion. The first is: how can one account for the possibility of multiple valid explanations for a single phenomenon? The second is: how are the psychological and theological modes of explanation different?

Tillich and the Realms of Being

The fulcrum of Tillich's method of correlating the roles of pastoral care and psychotherapy is his claim that some behaviors are theological and therefore can only be interpreted by theology. The previous chapter was a critique of this claim. Tillich's definition of psychological behavior--an avoidance of being--can be applied to all behavior as could his definition of religious behavior--an affirmation of being. This suggests the need for a perspectival approach in which all behavior could be looked at from both the perspective of theology and from the perspective of psychology. However, it is important not to propose hastily

such an approach.

Is it logical to think that there could be two valid interpretations of a single behavior?[17,18] The answer to this question depends on what one means by interpretation. If one follows, as Tillich did, in the Romanticist tradition of interpretation, the answer is no. In this tradition interpretation is the method of understanding the intention of another, a means of recognizing "what a foreign subject means or intends on the basis of all kinds of signs in which psychic life expresses itself."[19] This understanding of interpretation is very closely analogous to deciphering a message. The foreign subject "intends" something, some one thing, and interpretation is the process of discovering that which is intended. Interpretation and intending are thus, according to this definition, connected by that which is the content both of the intending and the interpreting. Just as deciphering seeks the one message sent, so interpreting seeks the one thing which is intended. There can only be one valid interpretation. This would be so even if a word

---

[17]"Interpretation" in a narrow sense means explanation. More generally it means a way of viewing. One may look at explanations as prior to ways of viewing (the raw materis for them) or, with equal validity, the ways of viewing may be seen as prior (explanations being the means by which a way of viewing is justified or corrected). See Wilhelm Dilthey, The Essence of Philosophy (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1954), pp. 33-36.

[18]A very broad definition of "behavior" is used here: any sign (in the general sense, not opposed to symbol) which can possibly become the object of interpretation. Practically it can include anything which could be described in a verbatim.

[19]Ricoeur, "The Model of the Text," Social Research 38 (Autumn 1971): 529.

that did not suggest conscious intentions, like "display," were made the corollary of interpretation.

Given that this conclusion follows from Tillich's definition of interpretation, it is quite understandable that he resists the notion that all behaviors can be interpreted psychologically. By a simple syllogism it would follow that none can be interpreted theologically. Clearly he could not accept that conclusion. He must argue that some behavior cannot be interpreted psychologically if he is to preserve a credible domain for theological interpretation, that is to say, for pastoral care.

Yet it is incongrous for Tillich, of all theologians, to be arguing such a position. It put him in the position of saying that there are some human behaviors that cannot be interpreted by the natural sciences. This implies that there are some questions of animal behavior that are outside the matrix of natural causation. One cannot help but think that Tillich himself must have been uneasy with this position. He is given to self-interrogations of this nature:

> This brings us to the question of whether the normal self-affirmation of the average man is not even more limited than the pathological self-affirmation of the neurotic, and consequently whether the state of pathological anxiety and self-affirmation is not the ordinary state of man. It has often been said that there are neurotic elements in everybody and that the difference between the sick and the healthy is only a quantitative one.[20]

Admittedly, he is stating this position in order to disagree with it, but his saying this does indicate that he saw good

---

[20]Tillich, The Courage to Be, p. 67.

reasons for holding that all behavior could be understood psychologically.

Some measure of the extent of the predicament caused by the claim of psychology and other sciences to explain all religious phenomena can be read from the incongruity of Tillich's position on the issue with the rest of his work. Tillich is virtually appealing to a 'God of the gaps', brought in to explain that which is scientifically inexplicable when he himself is a vociferous critic of this position.[21]

German theologians beginning with Schleiermacher had been much more inclined to accept Hume's rejection of theological positions built up upon the literal veracity of miracles than had their English-speaking counterparts.[22] From the time of his arrival in America to his death Tillich worked hard to purge Anglo-American theology of any tendency that was still present to search for gaps in nature. Thus, even though he carefully qualifies and circumscribes his claims, it is surprising to see him argue that there are some behaviors which the science of human behavior cannot explain.

Tillich defends his division between psychological and theological reality, and integrates it into a more encompassing division of reality into realms in a section of the third volume of his system titled "The Multidimensional Unity of Life."[23] He treated the general topic of the

---

[21]Tillich, A History of Christian Thought (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1967), pp. 454-458.

[22]Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1928), pp. 62-68 (Proposition 13).

[23]Tillich, Systematic Theology, 3:11-29.

divisions of realms the way he treated the division between psychological and theological reality. Throughout he reifies the concepts of inorganic reality, organic reality, psychological reality, and spiritual reality in a manner reminiscent of gnostic reification of principalities and powers.[24] Indeed, the analogy between Gnosticism and Tillich's realms of being could be profitably pressed a long way. Gnosticism has been described as "a realism of the image," and that describes precisely the error that Tillich makes in projecting categories of explanation (chemical, biological, etc.) onto the world. Tillich resembles no one so much as Augustine, who in his earlier years opposed the Gnosticism of the Manichaeans but in the latter years was drawn towards Gnosticism in opposing the contrary heresy of Pelagianism.[26]

Unlike much of the rest of his system, which Tillich worked out early in his career, the theory of realms of being shows the stamp of having been developed in the later part of his life. It is encumbered with responses to positions developed in the late fifties and early sixties, all in Tillich's eyes tending to reduce religion. His essay

---

[24]The discussion of reification in Tillich's work only refers to the manner in which he reifies the realms of being. Reification differs from objectification in that reification implies some degree of forgetting of the relationship of a concept to consciousness, relating it only to the world. The broader subject of the reification of concepts related to illness is very complex and is intertwined with the history of the concept of evil. (Illness is derived from the Old Norse word illr meaning bad.)

[25]Ricoeur, The Conflict of Interpretations, p. 273.

[26]Ibid., pp. 276-281.

on personality from the late forties included in The Protestant Era contains none of the later preoccupation with separating theological reality, and, for this, it is all the stronger.[27] While it would be unfair to say that the theory of realms of being was developed exclusively as a response to the intellectual climate prevailing at the time Tillich wrote his third volume, it is fair to say that the theory served as a response. Tillich was still swimming against the tide of the prevailing theological estimation of science, but the tide had changed. In the thirties in Germany when he was a religious socialist, his opponents were theologians who blindly dismissed scientific analysis of the state of the world. In the fifties and early sixties his opponents were scientists who blindly dismissed theology and theologians who came too close to accepting this dismissal. In response to this reversal of intellectual climate Tillich moved to emphasize opposite aspects of his overall systematic position.

Both the testimony of Tillich's biographers and evidence internal to his discussion of the theory of realms indicate that he was exasperated by the domination of American intellectual life by the methods and perspectives of the physical sciences themselves modeled on nuclear physics.[28] In philosophy the prime examples were the logical positivism

---

[27]Tillich, "The Idea and Ideal of Personality," The Protestant Era, pp. 115-135. This essay contains a number of very interesting strands which disappear in his later writings on theology and psychology. The most interesting is the suggestion of "a subtle psychology [which] analyzes the hidden impulses of the human soul sub specie aeternitatis" ("from the point of view of the eternal").

[28]Wilhelm and Marion Pauck, Paul Tillich, 1:246-285.

of Ayer and Russell, and the process philosophy of Russell's former collaborator, Whitehead. Both quickly gained influence among theologians in process and empirical theology. Tillich was accused by philosophers and scientists of being illogical and unscientific, and by theologians of being non-scientific.

To Tillich both science, which tended to reduce religion to physical phenomena, and theology, which made of physical phenomena a source for theology, were materialism of a disturbing sort.

> If the whole of reality is reduced to inorganic processes, the result is the non-scientiric ontological theory which is called materialism or reductionist naturalism. Its peculiar contention is not that there is matter in everything that exists--every ontology must say this including all forms of positivism--but that the matter we encounter under the dimension of the dimension of the inorganic is the only matter. ...Materialism, in this definition, is an ontology of death.[29]

In response to this Tillich directed his argument against the excesses of materialism. This brought him closer to idealism, holding an idealist position that concepts have reality separately from thought. The direction of his analysis had shifted a precise one-hundred and eighty degrees from that which it had been during his years of deep involvement in religious socialism.[30] In response to excessive materialism Tillich proposed the division of reality into realms (or, as he would have had it, proposed that reality was divided into realms).

---

[29]Tillich, Systematic Theology, 3:19, emphasis Tillich's.

[30]James Luther Adams, Forward to Political Expectation, by Tillich (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), pp. vi-xx.

Tillich carefully explained that he recognized the danger in speaking of reality as being divided into levels of being, though his explanation of the danger he sees raises more doubts about his position than it settles. His understanding of the physical sciences does not seem to have been very current. He says that he can understand how vitalism "produces passionate and justified reaction from physicists and their biological followers."[31] This would be like saying to a modern biologist that you can see how he might justifiably doubt the existence of unicorns. Vitalism had not been a live issue among natural scientists since Hans Driesch wrote in the first two decades of the century. To suggest that vitalism was a common, though incorrect, position among scientists was to praise it by faint damning.

The controversy concerning the levels of reality, or as Tillich renames them, the realms of reality, was more correct in the nineteenth than in the twentieth century.[32] The debate about whether reality is ultimately chemical, physical, or biological, or about whether particular phenomena are chemical, physical, or biological was replaced by the general consensus that it is valuable to look at reality as chemical, as physical, and as biological. The popularity of interdisciplinary approaches to academic study and research

---

[31]Tillich, Systematic Theology, 3:14.

[32]Mircea Eliade, Patterns in Comparative Religion (New York: Meridian Press, 1958), p. xiii. It is interesting to see what another writer, a generation younger, says on the subject. He regards the question of the division of reality as a dead issue and speaks of perspectives on reality. Both are arguing against the reduction of religion.

is proof on the practical level that there is wide acceptance of the value of looking at phenomena from a variety of perspectives.

Tillich discussed the question of debate about levels of reality as though the question of the reduction of religion to a natural phenomenon were but one instance of a general problem of dividing levels of reality proper to the various disciplines. It was not. In the sciences the discussion of the divisions in reality had, even in the fifties, been largely replaced by discussion about the relative usefulness of various perspectives on reality. In dividing among realms of natural phenomena Tillich provided a solution where the scientific community no longer saw a problem. Tillich's division of reality into realms needs to be understood as a theologian's solution to a theologian's problem: the threat to faith posed by the reduction of sacred realities to natural phenomena.

Tillich started out his division by recognizing the ambiguity of the concept of <u>levels</u> inherited from scholastic theology and proposes instead:

> It is my suggestion that it be replaced by the metaphor "dimension," together with correlative concepts such as "realm" and "grade."[33]

He elaborates:

> The significant thing, however, is not the replacement of one metaphor by another but the changed vision of reality which such replacement expresses.
>
> The metaphor "dimension" is also taken from the spatial sphere, but it describes the difference of realms of being in such a way that there cannot be

---

[33]Tillich, <u>Systematic Theology</u>, 3:15.

> mutual interference; depth does not interfere with breadth, since all dimensions meet at the same point. They cross without disturbing each other; there is no conflict between dimensions.[34]

However, the interference Tillich chased out the door re-enters through the window when he proposed to grade the realms in value. He wanted to argue not only that the religious realm is independent but that it is primary or determinative.

> This leads to the question of whether there is a gradation of value among the different dimensions. The answer is affirmative: That which presupposes something else and adds to it is by so much the richer. Historical man adds the historical dimension to all other dimensions which are presupposed and contained in his being.[35]

This connection of succession accompanied by change in the structure of evolution with valuation is very uncongenial to the sciences and is something which paleontologists carefully avoid. Tillich tried to give his position oblique scientific support by reference to Teilhard de Chardin's book The Phenomenon of Man, but in doing so he failed to recognize the difference between science and a poetic vision inspired by science.[36]

To the extent that Tillich connected evolution and value he, to that extent, departed from the spirit and evidence of paleontology. There is no criterion for changing succession into progression, except by appending some ultimately arbitrary value scheme. The criterion Tillich alludes to, complexity (presumably neural complexity), is

---

[35]Ibid., p. 17.

[36]Ibid., p. 5.

only a trait which has happened to be very adaptive since the time of the dominance of the prairie in the Miocene. There is little reason to think that neural complexity will continue indefinitely to be adaptive. From a paleontologist's point of view our neural complexity, like the size of dinosaurs, can be said to be of greater "value" than other adaptions only in the sense that it has helped us to survive in our age. There is no reason to think that it will continue to be adaptive. Indeed, complexity may become a handicap in a depleted environment. To "we are the crown of creation" must be added "to dust we shall return."

The discussion of the theory of realms, viewed as a whole, gives rise to the question of whether there must not be an alternative. Is a separate theory of realms, or something like it, necessary if one is to make an argument for a theological understanding of human behavior and thus ultimately for pastoral care? Must the concepts of psychological and religious be hypostasized? At first sight this might not seem to be a live issue. It might be pertinently argued that Tillich's penchant for neo-Platonic reification of the categories of the psychological and religious is idiosyncratic. He has been described as a modern thinker who was somehow able to perform the miracle of reviving a medieval metaphysic--convincingly. Yet this too narrowly circumscribes the problem. He is unique not so much because he reified categories as because he understood the historical precedents for doing so, and was willing to draw out the logical consequences of reifying language.

It is very common to say "she has religious problems" or "he has psychological problems." What do these statements mean? They may be just a manner of speaking, but they seem to imply a theory of realms like Tillich's; anyone who says that there are some phenomena which are religious and some psychological is presupposing a means of making the division. This means is a theory of realms of being. Would it be proper to follow the statements ("She has religious problems" or "He has psychological problems") with the conclusion "thus the first needs to see a minister and the second a psychotherapist" or would it be proper to follow with the explanatory statement "in other words the first needs to see a minister and the second a psychotherapist?" If one answers that it is the first that is proper, then one is implicitly relying on some therory of realms of being. One is claiming, consciously or unconsciously, that the categories of "religious" and "psychological" characterize two distinct divisions of being, that is to say, two realms of being. The alternative to this, and the approach taken here, is to say rather that it is the second that is proper. In this case it is only a manner of speaking to say that problems are religious. It indicates that a minister is needed. This raises again the question of a perspectival approach to distinguishing the role of each professional, and thus the question of the definition of interpretation that was broached previously.

There is no possible smooth transition from Tillich's thought to a renewed discussion of perspective. It is true that Tillich was a pioneer in introducing liberal theologians

to the importance of social theories from the period at the beginning of his career when he edited Neue Blatter für Sozialismus to the end of his career when he became a regular contributor to Pastoral Psychology. Yet he remained on the farther side of a divide between a theological era which was learning to take advantage of the fact that social theories often illuminate human reality, and an era learning to accept the fact that social theories always provide a mode of illuminating human reality with which the theologian must contend. For Tillich modern social theory was the good luck of theologians. For Tracy it becomes another source of theology.

As a result of this change different problems have emerged as important. Our knowledge that there are always a variety of perspectives with which to content, and that the perception underlying every theory can be as distorting as revealing, makes the link between reality and our understanding of it seem much less sure. There has been an increased sensitivity to the transcendency of reality over theories about reality which is not so much a return to the nature Romanticism of Rousseau as it is an effort to move beyond the naivete of thinking that the world is pretty much as it seems.[37] Tillich was relatively sanguine about these matters. He was concerned about method in theology and understood that there were risks in interpretation but these matters did not preoccupy him. Thus his work cannot be of great assistance when we actually come to the matter of

---

[37]Tracy, "Theological Pluralism and Analogy," Fordham University Quarterly 54 (March 1979): 24-28.

constructing a method of correlation of perspectives.

However, an introduction to this work can be made by noticing a theme in Tillich's work which he left undeveloped. He write in the 1948 essay mentioned previously:

> In the pre-Reformation period all aspects of the psychic life are considered and acted upon in their relationship to the divine. A subtle psychology analyses the hidden impulses of the human soul sub specie aeternitatis" ("from the point of view of the eternal").[38]

For Tillich this did not suggest a perspectival understanding of human behavior because he merged the question of the meaning of a person's actions with what the person felt to be their meaning. In accordance with the Romanticist tradition of interpretation he took the meaning of behavior to be what the actor meant by it. Thus, he followed his observation about subtle psychology with conjecture that the phenomenon of psychological repression was a product of the Reformation. To Tillich it followed, that if before the Reformation people thought their behaviors were theological and today people think them psychological, it must basically be so, and therefore by some means or another behavior must have become psychological in the interim.[39]

What if one were to take a different tack? What if, inspired by the suspicion which psychology gives rise to for the interpretation people give to their own behavior, one were to reject their sovereign right to determine the meaning of their behavior? What if one separates meaning from intended meaning? Granting meaning this independence from

---

[38]Tillich, The Protestant Era, p. 132.

[39]Ibid., pp. 126-127.

intention removes the insurmountable barrier that subjectivity has posed to interpretation. When the meaning of behavior is seen to depend on the felt intention of the actor, it had to be ultimately unavailable to anyone but the actor, or, at least, the actor remained the supreme judge of whether others had correctly understood the intention. However, when meaning and intention are separated the meaning escapes the actor. The actor may still be interpreter but only on a par with other interpreters and according to his or her skill. This understanding of interpretation is captured in the idiomatic expression "slip of the tongue" which fascinated Freud; it indicates the sense in which the meaning of speech, or by analogy of any behavior, transcends conscious intention, escapes the actor, and becomes available for any interpreter to uncover.

By an extension of this reasoning, Tillich's psychology sub specie aeternitatis could even be considered as a source for theology, thus reappropriating much of that portion of Schleiermacher's heritage rejected by the neo-orthodox. Barth rejected Schleiermacher's suggestion that theology should investigate religious consciousness because consciousness was subjective. He held that the basis for religion (Christianity to him) must be objective and historical. Tillich accepted this argument, saying that experience cannot be a source for theology because, while experience is that which is immanent in consciousness, only that which transcends it can be a source for theology.[40] For this

---

[40]Tillich, Systematic Theology, 1:43.

reason Tillich made culture, which is historical, a source for theology and not experience, which he held to be non-historical. Yet if the meaning of individual experience, like the meaning of behavior, "escapes" the actor, then it too is historical and has an objective moment to it. Freed from their tie to intention, behavior and experience become grounds for revelation of the Sacred as much as for the disclosure of the psychological.

Taking this approach, I see two emphases in Seward Hiltner's work emerging as very important. The first is the stress he places on verbatims as the data from which interpretations are made, data which are open to an interpreter from any discipline. The second is the stress he places on the theological importance of pastoral care, that if God still lives and acts a theological interpretation will uncover traces of this. This is not, or need not be, a mimicry of scientific method. The more profound theological claim underlying it is that theology must be practical. It must not be a system above what William James called the teeming, buzzing confusion. The theologian must not try to preserve his or her own realm but must take the risk of entering the conflict of interpretations among perspectives. If this risk is taken there is the possibility that pastoral care could become authentically theological in the way Schleiermacher understood theology, the investigation of religious self-consciousness.[41] This is the potential for a correlation

[41]Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, p. 123.

of perspectives between pastoral care and psychotherapy.

The next step is to evolve a new understanding of interpretation through which it would be possible to make sense of the existence of a multiplicity of perspectives.

Ricoeur and the Model of Meaningful Action as Text

In his writings the French philosopher, Paul Ricoeur, develops an alternative understanding of interpretation to that of the Romanticist tradition of liberal Protestant theology. It is not by chance that it is possible to find in his work a continuation and correction of many of the themes found in Tillich's work. Both Ricoeur and Tillich are deeply rooted in the German philosophical tradition; both are students of the work of Heidegger and Bultmann. The difference is that Ricoeur is of an era in which it is no longer possible to avoid or overcome the problem of multiplicity of perspectives. Tillich followed in the footsteps of Dilthey and Husserl and hoped still to find a way to move beyond perspectives and anchor thought in that which is indubitably true. He turned to Husserl's project of pure description as a method of dividing among the realms of being. Ricoeur, on the other hand, gives up the hope of cleansing thought of presuppositions.

> We are all too familiar with the harassing backward flight of thought in search of the "first truth" and still more radically, of inquiry after a radical starting-point that might not be a first truth at all.
>
> Perhaps one must have experienced the deception that accompanies the idea of a presuppositionless philosophy to enter sympathetically into the problematic we are going to evoke. In contrast to philosophies concerned with starting points, a meditation on symbols

> starts from the fullness of language and of meaning already there....Its first problem is not how to get started but, from the midst of speech, to recollect itself.[42]

For Ricoeur truth is congenitally perspectival. He attempts to reconstruct philosophy in light of this fact. This makes his work very useful in taking the step explicitly and carefully from correlation to correlation of perspectives. The core of his work is his complex theory of general hermeneutics which he is constantly developing and applying to new situations.

Fortunately all that it is necessary to borrow here is his analysis of interpretation and perspective. This analysis opens the possibility of a multiplicity of perspectives and provides a solution to the problem of how there could be more than one valid interpretation of a behavior. This provides the theoretical framework in which, in the next and final section of this chapter, it will become possible to make a characterization of psychology and theology as perspectives from which behavior can be interpreted. On the basis of the particular utility of each perspective decisions can be made about which is needed in a specific situation.

Turning to Ricoeur for a definition of interpretation is made difficult by the fact that his definition has been constantly changing, but the difficulty is not as great as one might think because the direction of the change has been constant. He has always connected his definition of interpretation with the definition of the object of inter-

---

[42]Ricoeur, The Conflict of Interpretations, pp. 287-288.

pretation. Since the period of the writing of the Symbolism of Evil, when he first became preoccupied with the problem of interpretation, his understanding of the object of interpretation has continually broadened, and with it his definition of interpretation. Up until the time he wrote Freud and Philosophy Ricoeur defined interpretation in terms of symbol.

> I have decided to define, i.e. limit, the notions of symbol and interpretation through one another. Thus a symbol is a double-meaning linguistic expression that requires an interpretation, and interpretation is a work of understanding that aims at deciphering symbols.[43]

Since this period he has tied the meaning of interpretation to text. This change indicates his constantly expanding understanding of the problem of interpretation. In his understanding, a text has come to mean any bearer of meaning. Although symbol and written text remain particularly heuristic examples of objects of interpretation, his scope of interest has become much broader. It is in this broader form that his definition of interpretation becomes a possible model for the work of psychology and theology in understanding behavior. He sets forth this understanding in an article written in 1971, "The Model of the Text: Meaningful Action Considered as a Text."[44]

The suggestion made at the level of imagery when Paul Ricoeur proposes to consider meaningful action as text and when Anton Boisen or Seward Hiltner propose to make verbatims,

---

[43]Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), p. 9.

[44]Ricoeur, "The Model of the Text: Meaningful Action Considered as a Text," Social Research 38 (Autumn 1971): 529-562.

or more generally "living human documents," the focus of pastoral care study, is the same. The intention of both proposals is to make of the interpretation of behavior as rigorous an endeavor as the interpretation of the Bible or literary works. The spirit, though not the strategy, is the same as that which has enlivened the debate about criteria of verifiability and falsifiability. If the claims to truth of rival interpretations are to be evaluated, there must be some common ground on which the interpretations can meet.

One could attempt to distinguish between maximal and minimal attempts to establish common grounds. A maximal attempt would be an effort to establish a common ground on the basis of which one might hope very reliably to adjudicate rival claims. An example of this--the prime example--is Karl Popper's early attempt to construct a criterion of verifiability.[45] A minimal attempt would be an effort to establish a ground on the basis of which there could be coherent mutual criticism. The question discussed in the previous section of the relation of intention and meaning of action is part of this problem. As long as the two are equated it is impossible to establish a common ground. As long as the data on the basis of which the question of meaning is decided are ultimately internal to the actor and therefore unavailable to the interpreters, there is no common ground. The availability of the object of interpretation is the absolute precondition for interpretation. This is why

---

[45]Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London: Hutchinson, 1959).

censorship is anathema to literary criticism, denial of the right to examine witnesses is anathema to justice, and falsification of data is anathema to science. To consider meaningful action (Max Weber's sinnhaft orientiertes Verhalten) as text, and the people whom a minister counsels as living human documents, are both attempts to establish the minimal precondition for the discussion of interpretations.

For institutional and historical reasons the pastoral care field has not identified itself with the broadening debate about interpretation that has gone on in the sciences and humanities. Yet intense discussion of the problem of interpretation has gone on in pastoral care since the very beginning of the field. The history of the attempt to fix the data of pastoral care, to establish a minimal common ground on which interpretation could be founded and confounded, has been the history of the attempt to develop pastoral care into an intentional discipline. In this respect pastoral care has developed closely parallel to other disciplines. In geology, anatomy, psychoanalysis, and sociology there has also been lively debate about what constitutes the data and what are the rules by which choices can be made among conflicting interpretations of the data. The need for a rigorous basis for the discipline has been the fundamental cause for the continuing preoccupation with ways of making pastoral care more objective. Richard Cabot and Russell Dicks wrote one of the first foundational books in the pastoral care field, The Art of Ministering to the Sick. They stated:

> Note-writing is primarily a process by which the minister subjects his work with an individual to examination. This examination is the nearest approach to an objective check upon the minister's work which we have been able to discover.

And later:

> Protestant ministers are often accused of making merely social calls upon the sick....We have tried to make it clear in preceding chapters that our methods, our efforts to describe needs, and our ways of meeting them, are pointed toward overcoming this tendency to "visit."...Notes, written outside the stress of the sickroom itself, reveal to the writer whether he had a clear purpose in seeing a patient, whether he discovered the needs of that patient, whether he held himself and the patient to an attempt to meet that need.[46]

Since the very first the emphasis on the objective moment in pastoral care has been continued by every major writer in the field.

Note-taking as introduced by Cabot and Dicks was inspired by the example of doctors keeping charts on patients.[47] Yet it has transcended in importance this historical beginning. Recently there has been a sharp critique by writers such as Henri Nouwen of the efforts of pastoral counselors to be professional in the same sense as physicians, social workers, and psychiatrists, but the insistence on the importance of the objective moment in pastoral care has been kept.[48] The reason for this, whether it has been clearly understood or not, is that the question of the data of pastoral care is not one of technique or style but of precondition for the discipline. Thus, verbatims have survived the changing orientation of

---

[46]Cabot and Dicks, The Art of Ministering to the Sick, pp. 244 and 247.

[47]Ibid., p. 254.

[48]Henri J. M. Mouwen, Creative Ministry (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1971), pp. 41-66.

the discipline from scientific professionalism to priestly spirituality.

Only inside experience of the field makes it possible to understand fully the importance of what is here being called the objective moment in pastoral care. It has become essential to the process of teaching, learning, and evaluating pastoral care on a practical level. The basic learning tools of Clinical Pastoral Education are verbatim accounts written by students of their ministry sessions with patients. One way that they are used--the most obvious--is to teach skill in observation and response. A student brings a verbatim to his or her fellow students or supervisor for help in understanding the patient and for suggestions of more effective responses. In this respect a verbatim is very similar to the lab notes that a scientific researcher might keep. However, the verbatim also serves other purposes, a fact which shows again that its significance is not exhausted by its origin. Vis-à-vis other professionals in the hospital (which is usually the site of CPE programs) it can, in an active or a passive sense, serve to justify pastoral care and bring it into the realm in which patient care decisions are made. Passively this is so in that the verbatim has become symbolic of the fact that pastoral counselors wish to interact substantively with patients. Actively this is so in that other professionals can read the verbatims or attend discussion of verbatims. Thus, the verbatim becomes literally the focus for the conflict of interpretations. Finally, the verbatim can become, and often does become, the

basis on which to demonstrate to the writer some aspect of his or her mode of being or acting as a person.

In all three of these applications the verbatim functions as a minimal common ground for discussion of differing interpretations. The verbatim serves this function because it has independenee from the intention of its author, The author becomes one interpreter among others. This feature is confirmed by the fairly well accepted principle that, in the situation of interpretation by fellow pastoral counselors or by fellow professionals, the object of interpretation is not the situation about which the verbatim was written, but the verbatim itself. This might seem strange, since it would seem to make the other interpreters totally dependent on the report of the writer of the verbatim who may be a poor reporter of what took place because of inexperience, personal blind spots, or even deliberate forgery. In actuality the opposite is the case. The effect of making the object of interpretation the verbatim, and not the situation about which the verbatim was written, is but an instance of the problem of separating meaning from intention. If the object of interpretation were to be the situation about which the verbatim was written, then the object of interpretation could never be fully open to other interpreters and the writer would always remain in a sense sovereign over the decision about the validity of interpretations. The thing which makes verbatims so effective is precisely that they escape their authors. When the author of a verbatim is allowed in the discussion to amend the verbatim it becomes

very unlikely that he or she will come to any important insights. This is so because important insights usually take place when one overcomes systematic and personally satisfying misconceptions.

It might be thought that, if the object of interpretation were held to be the verbatim and not the situation about which the verbatim was written, this would make it hard to help the writer become more observant. You cannot help a blind man know what was in a room on the basis of his own account of what he saw. The fascinating and highly significant fact is that this is not so! Just how much the meaning of a behavior transcends the intention of its author is demonstrated by the fact that in practice a very inaccurate or even entirely fictitious account of a counseling session can be as revealing of a counselor's blindnesses as a tape recording. The writer of a verbatim is aided much more in developing powers of observation by the experience of becoming an equal interpreter of a document he or she has created along with interpreters of greater ability of from different disciplines, than he or she does when the verbatim discussion centers on helping the writer to recall what happened in the situation of ministry.

A caveat must be added, however. I do not intend by any means to advocate a blind faith in the values of verbatims. The CPE movement has suffered from an uneven growth of practical and theoretical knowledge. A discouragingly large proportion of theoretical thought in CPE has been borrowed from other disciplines and has been poorly assimilated. My own private speculation is that it is largely the lack of

theoretical thought in the discipline which has led to the tendency to give great, almost mystical, value to procedures which have in the past proven successful. Understanding the principles by which something works should free a person to develop and change rather than simply to repeat. Thus, I hope that the use of the verbatim as an example might serve as much to overcome over-reliance on it as it would to promote their use. A verbatim is an effective tool because it captures an objective moment in an area of ministry where it is very easy to hide behind personal knowledge of a situation. It might well be that other tools would be equally effective.

While this attempt to apply some insights gathered from the philosophy of interpretation to the situation of pastoral care is admittedly experimental, the attempt does suggest that there has been a movement in the pastoral care field towards establishing what here has been called an objective moment in interpretation, and that a considerable advance has been made on Tillich's understanding of interpretation. The value placed on verbatims in pastoral care expresses an ideal for the object of pastoral care. In the situation of ministry Anton Boisen's phrase "living human documents" expresses this same ideal. That ideal is that the pastoral care field can overcome the appeals to intuition and subjectivity, that the object of pastoral care can be open to all interpreters within the profession and from other professions. This problem is the same as the problem of the basis for a method of correlation of perspectives. If

psychology and theology are to be correlated as modes of interpretation, it must be established that behavior can provide a common open object of interpretation. This is the absolute precondition of correlation.

The openness of the verbatim as object of interpretation has already been established, and it can fairly readily be granted that the verbatim is regarded as the ideal of the object of interpretation in general. Yet it is a much more complicated matter to argue that the ideal of the verbatim is appropriate to the living reality of human behavior. A verbatim is a written document; living human documents can perhaps be argued to be sufficiently analogous to written documents that they might be considered to be open objects for interpretation by psychology and theology. This is what is established by Paul Ricoeur in an article titled "The Model of the Text."[49]

In the tradition of interpretation associated with Dilthey, here called the Romanticist tradition, it is customary to distinguish between Auslegung (exegesis) as applying to written documents and Verstehen (understanding, comprehension) as the "recognition of what a foreign subject means or intends on the basis of all kinds of signs in which psychic life expresses itself."[50] This poses an obstacle to an effort to correlate perspectives on the basis of contrasting and comparing modes of interpreting. As has been

---

[49]Ricoeur, "The Model of the Text." In the remainder of this section I rely heavily on this article as a framework. I will footnote only direct quotations.

[50]Ibid., p. 529.

previously demonstrated in the context of discussing Tillich's theory of realms of being, understanding interpretation as the discovery of intention makes it impossible for there to be a multiplicity of interpretations. In the Romanticist understanding the process of discovery is successful when real intention is discovered. Another interpretation can be valid only if it is identical. What is needed is the discovery of something like the possibility for Auslegung in the midst of the domain of Verstehen. Is human behavior sufficiently like a written document that it may be construed by a process which, like Auslegung, need not depend on intention?

First, it is necessary to borrow, as Ricoeur does, two contrasting terms from the French linguist, Ferdinand de Saussure.[51] The two terms are language and discourse. Language refers to the abstract system through which or by means of which people communicate and discourse to an instance of the event of communicating. More exactly, and this will become important later, language is not language as it is usually defined but rather a system of binary relations by which language in the normal sense specifies. Language itself never says anything about anything; it can be described as a structure independent from discourse, hence the name structural linguistics.

The approach of structural linguistics has become important in many disciplines, and is useful here, because many entities other than language can be described as

---

[51]Ferdinand de Saussure, Course de linguistique générale (Paris: Payot, 1960).

linguistic in the sense that Saussure uses the word. Claude Lévi-Strauss made the bold move to generalize linguistics:

> Among all social phenomena, language alone has thus far been studied in a manner which permits it to serve as the object of truly scientific analysis, allowing us to understand its formative process and to predict its mode of change. This results from modern researches into the problems of phonemics, which have reached beyond the superficial conscious and historical expression of linguistic phenomena to attain fundamental and objective realities consisting of systems of relations which are the products of unconscious thought processes. The question which now arises is this: Is it possible to effect a similar reduction inthe analysis of other forms of social phenomena?[52]

In answering this question in the affirmative, all behavior can be understood on the model of language, meaning-laden discourse, and therefore can justifiably be called language.

Using the term <u>discourse</u> eliminates the danger of a mistaken reification of meaning which leads back into equating it with intention. Discourse has meaning only in relation to language. Discourse is a series of signs (auditory, visual, etc.) which has meaning only in that it can be construed in terms of a language. Thus discourse does not begin as meaning created by the actor, packaged in behavior, unwrapped by the receiver. It is rather a raw material which can become meaningful in the process of being interpreted by an interpreter who knows a language. A prosaic example of this is the auditory sign (in phonetic alphabet) <u>wi</u>. A franco-phone will tell you, quite correctly, that it means "it is so." An anglo-phone, equally correctly, will tell you that it is the first person plural pronoun in

---

[52]Claude Lévi-Strauss, <u>Structural Anthropology</u> Garden City: Doubleday, 1963), p. 57.

the nominative case. This sign as an instance of discourse only has meaning in relation to languages.

One might object to the raising of polysemy to the level of a standard of language, on the basis that confusions like that over the sign wi ideally ought to be able to be eliminated by reference to intention. There is some virtue to this argument, although under this condition the recovery of meaning still depends on an interpreter knowing the language. Yet, though the reference to intention seems as though it would simplify interpretation, actually it hopelessly complicates interpretation. Does one mean by intention the intention of the actor? If I repeat a phrase, the "meaning" of which I do not know (suppose it was from a foreign language), in terms of whose intention does the phrase have meaning? To speak of discourse rather than to use a term that could be again connected with intention removes these difficulties.

Understanding human behavior in this way, as discourse whose meaning depends on the language of interpretation, verges on an answer to the main problem of this section: definitions of "object of interpretation" and "interpretation" which establish an open object of interpretation, and on this basis provide the possibility for perspectival interpretation. Human behavior understood as an instance of discourse is open because it is disconnected from intention. Interpretation is the actualization of meaning with respect to a particular language. This makes interpretation not only possibly perspectival but necessarily perspectival.

Perspective is language directed towards interpretation. To continue with the previous example, wi can be correctly interpreted when the perspective used in construing it is French, or when the perspective is English.[53] In linguistic terms, theology and psychology are not only analogous to languages, but are languages. The meaning of a behavior can be different depending on which language is used.

This analysis can be consolidated by introducing one further distinction, that between two kinds of discourse, writing and speaking. Writing is most clearly an instance of an open object for interpretation and thus it is finally in the affinity to writing that behavior can be claimed to be an open object. To find a similarity between that which is written, text, and human behavior is to return rigorously to Anton Boisen's living human documents.

Describing behavior as discourse shows clearly that it is an open object of interpretation since discourse is at least neutral to the relation of intention to meaning. This character can be further elucidated by means of the way behavior approximates the specific kind of discourse of writing. As stated above, language is distinct from discourse in that language is a system and discourse an event. Paul Ricoeur lists four contrasting characteristics of the two. As discourse both speech and writing have these characteristics, but the way in which they have them differs.

(1) Discourse is always realized temporally and in a

---

[53]The meaning of a behavior can be different depending on which language is used.

> present, whereas the language system is virtual and outside of time....
> (2) Whereas language lacks a subject--in the sense that the question "Who is speaking?" does not apply at its level--discourse refers back to its speaker....
> (3) Whereas the signs in language refer to other signs within the same system, and whereas language therefore lacks a world just as it lacks temporality and subjectivity, discourse is always about something. It refers to a world which it claims to describe, to express, or to represent. It is in discourse that the symbolic function of language is actualized.
> (4) Whereas language is only the condition for communication for which it provides the codes, it is in discourse that all messages are exchanged. In this sense, discourse alone has not only a world, but an Other, another person, an interlocutor to whom it is addressed.[54]

Using these four traits of discourse as a guide, the independence of the meaning of behavior from intention, and, more generally, its openness to a multiplicity of interpretations, can be clarified.

(1) Both speech and writing are realized temporally; everything said must have been said at some time; everything written must have been written at some time. The difference is that writing is fixed, speech is fleeting. This distinction can be elaborated to the advantage of speech. Speech preceded writing historically and the rules which govern it are more regular. Writing can be looked at as an imperfect attempt to preserve discourse and there is a certain truth to this view. Speech fixed in writing loses much of the meaning that is conveyed in speaking by tone of voice and by the power of presence. The advantage of writing is its durability--it can continue to exist beyond the moment of writing.

---

[54]Ricoeur, "The Model of the Text," pp. 530-531.

Behavior or action has this character by virtue of the way it is deposited into history. An action once done is fixed in the sense that it is not subject to change and can be identified and reidentified as the same action. One says metaphorically that an event makes a mark on history. One could say that action is a sort of writing on history (write, from Middle and Old English, to tear, scratch). As discourse, behavior enters into time or, more descriptively, the course of events, but as writing its durable character is emphasized.

This fixing in time makes possible the first beginning of transcendence of act over actor. It makes it possible to make a statement like "I surprised myself." Because it endures as event, action can stand over against the actor as memory.

(2) Both speech and writing as events have subjects. Speech is spoken by somebody; writing is written by somebody. The difference is that speech is connected to speaker much more tightly than writing is connected to writer. As a positive feature this means that in speaking as speaking (as opposed to speaking as tape-recording, for example) the speaker is always available to correct what has been said or to provide his or her own interpretation of it (as in "What I meant to say is ____."). As long as interpretation is understood as the recovery of intention, speech according to this criterion is infinitely superior to writing.

Yet, corresponding to this there is a great advantage to writing. Writing, existing separately from the writer,

can have a separate history. Free from the writer it can have consequences never intended by him or her. A text has a life of its own.

> Not that we can conceive of a text without an author; the tie between the speaker and the discourse is not abolished, but distended and complicated in writing. The dissociation of the meaning and the intention is still an adventure of the reference of discourse to the speaking subject. But the text's career escapes the finite horizon lived by its author. What the text says now matters more than what the author meant to say, and every exegesis unfolds its procedures within the circumference of a meaning that has broken its moorings to the psychology of its author....[W]ritten discourse cannot be "rescued" by all the processes by which spoken discourse supports itself in order to be understood--intonation, delivery, mimicry, gestures. In this sense, the inscription in "external marks," which first appeared to alienated discourse, marks the actual spirituality of discourse. Henceforth, only the meaning "rescues" the meaning, without the contribution of the physical and psychological presence of the author.[55]

This accounts for the strange mixture of hope and fear which often accompanies the act of writing, hope for what the text will be when it becomes actual in history, fear of its passing beyond control or correction.

Human action very closely resembles text in this respect. It passes beyond undoing ("What is done is done."). The consequences of the action pass beyond the intentions of action. "I did not mean that to happen" does not control the consequences of an action. This characteristic of action as text is a progression over the first one mentioned. The first only implied that the event was fixed. Because of this second characteristic the behavior gains independent life.

---

[55]Ibid., pp. 534-535.

> Henceforth history may appear as an autonomous entity, as a play with players who do not know the plot. This hypostasis of history may be denounced as a fallacy, but this fallacy is well entrenched in the process by which human action becomes social action when written down in the archives of history. Thanks to this sedimentation in social time, human deeds become "institutions," in the sense that their meaning no longer coincides with the logical intentions of the actors. The meaning may be "depsychologized" to the point where the meaning resides in the work itself.[56]

This feature of action is very important for opening the possibility of human experience becoming a source for theology, or of finding in human behavior any manifestation of the Sacred. As long as meaning is intention, the source of meaning cannot be Other. To equate meaning with that which the actor intends, utterly profanes meaning.

The equation of meaning and intention subtly repeats the movement that is in the thought of Feuerbach. As long as all meaning is that which is intended by the author or actor, there can be nothing sacred (of an Other) in human history, nothing sacred in human documents.

> Peut-être commence-t-on à apercevoir que la prétention de la conscience à se constituer elle-même est le plus formidable obstacle à l'idee de révélation....Si en effet la conscience se pose, elle doit être le "sujet" et le divin doit être le "predicat", et ce ne peut être que par une alienation subsequente de ce pouvoir auto-producteur que Dieu est projeté comme le "sujet" fictif dont l'humain devient le "predicat."[57]

As long as meaning is intention, discourse can only be about the Sacred and it can never express the Sacred. To

---

[56]Ibid., pp. 542-543.

[57]Ricoeur, La Revelation (Bruxelles: Facultes Universitaires Sait-Louis, 1977), pp. 46-47. This is a collection of essays, of one of which Paul Ricoeur is the author. I use Frence because an English translation does not exist.

separate the two does not say that there can be theological meaning in human action, but it does leave open the possibility.

At this stage intention has been overcome as far as intention regards meaning. However, this is not quite yet the open object of interpretation for which we have been searching. It has been shown that the action and the meaning of the action can be regarded as independent of the actor. It still remains to show that the subject (about which) is also independent of what the actor intends the subject to be, and finally that the action is, or can be regarded as, independent of the original object of the action (to whom).

(3) Writing and speaking are alike in that they are about something or, more technically, they have ostensive reference. Language as an abstract system cannot be about anything. As before, the weaknesses and strengths of writing and speaking arise from the connection of speech to speaker, and the independence of text from writer.

Speech clearly has ostensive reference because at some level it refers to a situation common to speaker and audience. This is not to say that speech can only refer to the common situation of speaker and listener, but with speech there must be the presumption that the speaker has a subject which the listeners are willing to hear discussed. This subject is the ostensive reference. This ostensive reference is indicated directly or indirectly within what is spoken and is presupposed as the reason the speaker and listener came together. In writing there exists an ostensive reference,

but a less definite one. To be sure, there may still be signs within a text which indicate that it is about something, and a reader is unlikely to read something about which he or she is not interested. On the other hand, the existence of a text beyond the moment of writing distances--and frees--it from the situation in which it was written.

This is, on the one hand, a disability in writing. Writing loses relevance. In surviving geyond the time in which it was written, time passes it by. Yet the independence of a text from its ostensive reference is a great advantage in that it frees the text to "speak" to other situations. Thus the fixation of writing causes the writing to lose its world, that is, situation, but it gains a world in a different sense.

> Far from saying that the text is then without a world, I will now say without paradox that only man has a world and not just a situation. In the same manner that the text frees its meaning from the tutelage of the mental intention, it frees its reference from the limits of ostensive reference. For us, the world is the ensemble of references opened up by the texts. Thus we speak about the "world" of Greece, not to designate any more what were the situations for those who lived them, but to designate the non-situational references which outlive the effacement of the first and which henceforth are offered as possible modes of being, as symbolic dimensions of our being-in-the-world.[58]

A text projects a world or opens a world as much as it describes a specific situation. This is an important character of literature. The description in Crime and Punishment of Leningrad is startlingly accurate, but its function as description is subsidiary to the way it projects

---

[58]Ibid., pp. 535-536.

a world.

This fact is very important for the interpretation of texts. To the extent that a text has a world rather than a situation, interpretation is more an investigation of where a text is going than of where it came from; as Ricoeur is fond of saying, the meaning is in front of the text, not behind.

The meaning of action, like the meaning of a text, becomes, to a great degree, free from its original situation and acquires a world. The meaning of action is not free only from the meaning intended. It is also free from the situation in which the action took place. An important action is "monumental"; it transcends in importance the situation in which it was produced. It may be re-enacted in other situations. Even normal action has something of this character. If the meaning of an action was not to some degree free from the situation in which the action took place, differences of situation would pose a total barrier to interpersonal understanding. In the positive sense this means that the meaning of an action can "speak" to a different situation. In interpretation of action, as in the interpretation of text, the object of interpretation must be allowed to "speak" to the interpreter, to a problem, or to a new situation. This creative ability of actions "to speak" (as in "actions speak louder than words") corresponds to the potential of a text to project a world. The interpreter's choice of the range of situations to which an action is to speak is pivotal. Thus, for example, the Soviet government

and Soviet dissidents disagree about whether Dostoevsky's discussion of political oppression "speaks to" the current political system or only to the pre-Revolutionary one.

The ability of action "to speak" to other situations gives a mythic quality to all action. When one says that an action is of mythic proportions we mean precisely that it has power to transcend in meaning its historical situation (as opposed to an action simply being historic, i.e., of great consequence). Although all discourse has a situation (this makes mythic action different from myth), a general characteristic of action is that its meaning can somewhat transcend the situation. What this means for the problem of an open object of interpretation is that for a third time the insularity of the meaning of action is overcome, this time with respect to the situation of the action.

One ramification of this is a very interesting interpretation of freedom which has neither the sense of being undetermined (conquering destiny) nor of giving in to determination (accepting destiny). To realize a wider significance to one's situation is an intermediary situation between feeling trapped and feeling free, and even between being trapped and being free. Consciousness-raising groups have made use of this fact, which has been instinctively understood wherever there has been oppression. To realize that the meaning of one's particular situation exceeds or breaks out of the bounds of the situation is an approximation of freedom on the level of thought and the beginning of its realization in practice. Hegel mentions this in the

Philosophy of Right but a considerably more pragmatic rendition of it is given by Marx in The Communist Manifesto: the first stage in revolution is the realization by the oppressed that their individual situations constitute a common situation.[59] An equally valid but very different example is of black spirituals which "read" the singer into the action of the Bible and the action of the Bible into the life of the singer.

> When Israel was in Egypt's land,
> Oppressed so hard they could not stand
> "Thus saith the Lord" bold Moses said,
> Let my people go!
> "If not I'll smite your first-born dead"
> No more in bondage shall they toil,
> Let them come out with Egypt's spoil.
> Let my people go![60]

(4) Speaking and writing, as two examples of discourse, are also alike in that both are addressed to someone even if that someone is only the writer or speaker himself. This opposes both to language in that language is an abstract system and does not need an audience. In fact, language can never have an audience. The language as language is inaccessible. It does not have actuality.

In the different ways in which text and speech have audiences, the opening of text to interpretation is made complete. Though both writing and speech have audiences, the connection of writing to the particular audience for which it was written is much more attenuated. No matter how narrowly a text is written for a specific audience, it is to

---

[59]Karl Marx, Communist Manifesto (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1948), p. 137.

[60]"Go Down Moses," American Negro Songs, ed. John W. Work (Philadelphia: Theodore Presses Co., 1940), p. 165.

some degree open to anyone who can read. This may not solve as many problems as it seems to at first--in that languages can be very specific and local to a strata of society, to a profession, or to a social group--but it does provide writing with a basic quality of openness.

Human action has the character of writing again for the fourth time in that it too is open for interpretation to anyone who can read it. Participation in the situation of an action is less necessary for interpretation that is knowledge of a means of interpreting it.

At this point the problem of the opening of the object of interpretation shades into the problem of the conflict of interpretations, and the problem of how different interpretations are distinct. The point of transition is the observation that what is necessary to make an interpretation is not the language of interpretation, but a language of interpretation. Action, as discourse, is not in a particular language. Rather, action is interpreted as this or that language or by this or that language. Recall here that object of interpretation and interpretation are independent. Thus there are two questions which need to be decided separately: what is the correct interpretation of an object according to a particular language or perspective (as in the example of wi)? And which interpretation is most appropriate?

The complete separateness of these two questions must be sufficiently emphasized. Action, as discourse, is extremely open. Internally correct interpretations can be given from the point of view of any language. While, from

the standpoint of the conflict of interpretations, it might be said that it is completely inappropriate to give an interpretation from a particular perspective (using a particular language), a valid interpretation could be given in terms of that language. However clear it might be from the outside that the wrong language was being used in interpretation, this fact can only be visible from the inside in the negative sense that no meaning would be found. Take an example from language: what would a franco-phone say was the meaning of the series of signs "He is a tall man"? Viewing this discourse as French the correct interpretation of it is that it is meaningless. This is a valid interpretation and there is no way to save oneself from it aside from the conflict of interpretations. Because reductionism poses such a problem, it is necessary to insist strongly on this point. It is too easy to say "I have looked for meaning and found none so there must be none." Nothing can save interpretation from this fallacy except the conflict of interpretations.

In this section it has been established that action or behavior is an object of interpretation which may be interpreted according to the languages of psychotherapy and pastoral care. This leaves for discussion the distinctiveness of psychology and theology as languages or modes of interpretation, and the appropriateness of each to particular situations. The former is the subject of the final section of this chapter and the latter is the subject of chapter three.

The analysis thus far does not exhaustively answer

the first of the two questions which, at the beginning of the chapter, were proposed as guides for the discussion: how can we account for the possibility of multiple valid explanations of a single behavior? Even the root analogy by which the analysis has proceeded, action as meaningful discourse, can still be disputed. However, there are preliminary conclusions sufficient to justify proceeding to the next stage. Multiple explanations are possible because (1) behavior is an object of interpretation open to interpretation from the point of view of diverse languages or perspectives, and (2) interpretations differ according to the differences between the perspectives of the interpreters.

Now it remains to answer the second of the questions: how are psychological and theological modes of interpretation different? This question has been present in the background throughout. In the following section it will be discussed explicitly. The discussion serves both to summarize and to extend what has already been said about the grounds for distinguishing the roles of psychotherapist and pastoral counselor.

The Perspectives of Psychotherapy and Pastoral Care

It is now clear that in the present situation pluralism is a stable feature of both depth psychology and theology. In Protestantism, and more lately in Catholicism, the mainstream has been fractured into myriad rivulets of thought: Social Gospel, humanism, neo-orthodoxy, the various empirical and process theologies, charismatic theology, theology of

story, and others.[61] Likewise, Freud's dream of building a cohesive metapsychology has been shattered. Freud's psychology now must co-exist with the psychologies of Jung, Adler, Pearls, Rogers, Skinner, and a plethora of others more extravagant.[62] These diversities could be systematized into single unities only by doing violence to what are two decidedly non-unified fields.

The fact of pluralism within theology and psychology complicates comparison, but does not make it impossible. Proponents of, on the one hand, the various psychologies, and, on the other hand, the various theologies speak common enough languages that there can be coherent discussions even though differences in dialect can prove troublesome. Even disagreement within psychology or theology depends upon the existence of bases of common understanding. A Jungian and a Freudian, or a Barthian and a Tillichian, may feel themselves to disagree bitterly on every issue, but bitter disagreement is evidence that there is enough commonality to engage intensely. Anyone who has been to a party and watched a group of people talking shop has a practical understanding of this.

And, more importantly, the fact that there is a pluralism in pastoral care and psychotherapy corresponding to the pluralism in theology and psychology does not make

---

[61]Tracy, "Theological Pluralism and Analogy," Fordham University Quarterly 54 (March 1979): 25-26.

[62]Calvin S. Hall and Gardner Lindzey, Theories of Personality (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1970), pp. vii-xii.

the ability to distinguish the roles of pastoral counselor and psychotherapist any less essential. The present situation may be complicated enough that it is impossible to distinguish them without falling into error in some degree, but, as William James observed, only in the realm of pure academics is one granted the luxury of waiting for complete certainty before drawing conclusions.[63]

How does one go about characterizing the distinctiveness of theology and psychology as perspectives? Kant, in trying to find a starting-point from philosophy, established a method. He started out by observing that the object of interpretation which is intended by thought (visé) is not the same as the object of interpretation which is in thought. Prosaically, thought about the world does not equal the world. Behavior, let us say dancing, cannot enter into thought, only the thought about dancing. As will be done here, he called the former objects and the latter phenomenon. Kant then suggests that the uniqueness of each discipline can be understood on the basis of how it constitutes its objects (or how it intends phenomena). The object is established a priori as that which is at one and the same time that which makes the discipline possible and that which imposes its ultimate limitation.[64,65]

---

[63]James, The Will to Believe (New York: Dover Publications, 1956), pp. 17-19.

[64]Immanuel Kant, "Preface to the Second Edition," Critique of Pure Reason (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1961), pp. 17-37.

[65]There is a very interesting and complex relationship between the dichotomies meaning/intention and object/phenomena. Object and intention have a psychological tone. Phenomena and meaning have an objective tone.

In a very summary form this applies to the distinction between psychology and theology, and on the basis of this, between psychotherapy and pastoral care, as follows. The perspectives of psychology and theology understand human behavior in different ways because what each takes to be a human being is something different. Both intend (visé) the same phenomena in the world. Yet the human being as object of thought in psychology is construed a priori to be a product of natural forces, an object for empirical analysis. On the other hand, human being as object of theought in theology is construed a priori to be Imago deo, in the image of God.

Choosing their objects in this way gives to psychology and theology the possibility of beginning interpretation, then sets the limits on their respective modes of interpreting. Choosing to understand human beings empirically, psychology earns the right to understand them empirically, but in doing so loses the right to understand them in any other way. Similarly, choosing to understand human beings in their relation to the Sacred, theology earns the possibility of finding in the action of human beings manifestations of the Sacred, but it gives up the ability to understand human beings empirically.

On this basis, psychotherapy and pastoral care can be distinguished. A psychotherapist, whose perspective is psychological, can and can only interpret human beings as empirical objects. A pastoral counselor, whose perspective is theological, can and can only interpret human beings as sacred objects.

This, then, accomplishes the first half of the task of correlating psychotherapy and pastoral care. They are distinguished in that psychotherapy interprets human beings as empirical objects and pastoral care as sacred objects.

By taking this final step in the analysis a full circle of departure and return to Tillich has been made. The criticism of Tillich was that he separated the behaviors which are objects for theological interpretation and the behaviors which are objects for psychological interpretation. Against this it must be held that all behaviors can be interpreted both theologically and psychologically (in the language of theology and in the language of psychology). Using the dichotomy of object and phenomena introduced here it becomes possible to say that Tillich was right but not as he thought. Theology and psychology do indeed take different objects, but they intend (vise) the same phenomena. It is not, contrary to what Tillich thought, possible to grasp a phenomenon with pure description, or to encompass it in a unified ontology. Yet it is possible to retain the phenomenon as that which is intended by both, that toward which both minister and therapist direct their energies. Thus the phenomenon of the human constitutes the project and the goal for both psychotherapist and pastoral counselor, and for other professionals who make the human the focus of their concern.

CHAPTER III

REBUILDING THE METHOD OF CORRELATION

PART II

THE COMPARISON OF PERSPECTIVES

The second half of the correlation of perspectives of psychotherapy and pastoral care is the task of relating that which has been distinguished. At the suggestion of Paul Ricoeur, this is discussed here under the heading of the conflict of perspectives.[1] The correlation of perspectives must perpetually reside between the two dangers of dogmatic separation and naive eclecticism. This is made more difficult still because both psychotherapy and pastoral care are evolving: the place between the extremes is a changing one. Finally, whatever synthesis of theory can be accomplished, Tillich is right that on the level of history, psychology and theology are in conflict.[2]

In the previous chapter we were able to specify and justify by means of a study of interpretation the suggestion Hiltner made, and did not develop, for a perspectival understanding of interpretation: that every explanation of a

---

[1]Ricoeur, The Conflict of Interpretations, p. 118.

[2]Tillich, A History of Christian Thought, pp. 539-541. The Courage to Be, pp. 9-10.

phenomenon begins with an abstraction from the concrete richness of reality, and that the uniqueness of a discipline depends on how this abstraction is made.[3] This is to say in the vocabulary established here: interpretation begins by the constituting of the object for thought from the phenomenon intended. Both the limits and possibilities of psychology and theology are established by the ways the two disciplines constitute their objects, one as of the world and the other as of the Sacred.

The methods used here are of course very different from those Hiltner uses, but the spirit is the same. Between the two easy positions of division and amalgamation, there is the work of correlation. The hope and caution associated with this work Hiltner captures well:

> I have tried to demonstrate that pastoral psychology is not something borrowed...but it is something to be worked over, created, and corrected through reflection on our actual operations as pastors.[4]

The subject of this work of correlation is practical, even if the approach is theoretical. Thus, the central concept will be choice or decision of perspectives. Frankly, there are reasons why organizing the discussion of the relation of perspectives around such an existential center tends to undo much that has been so carefully constructed. Nothing has been argued against more consistently in this thesis than

---

[3]Don Browning, "The Influence of Psychology on Theology." The New Shape of Pastoral Theology, ed. William B. Oglesby, Jr. (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1969), pp. 131-132.

[4]Hiltner, "Pastoral Psychology and Pastoral Counseling," Pastoral Psychology 3 (November 1952): 23.

the presumption of the actor to constitute (se poser) himself or herself, because in that presumption exists already the mentality of control of things which drives out the mentality of the openness to the Sacred. On the other hand, one can also choose to let go or to listen. And more importantly, the correlation of perspectives must ultimately be a practical matter, a matter of action, whatever imbalance of theory this creates.

Decision

A means is needed of deciding whether in a particular situation a minister or a psychotherapist would be more useful. Tillich solved this problem by saying that people whose problems are pathological need a psychotherapist and people whose problems are not pathological need a pastoral counselor.[5] The key here is the concept "pathological." Tillich is presuming incorrectly that the decision about whether a behavior is pathological or not can be made on strictly empirical grounds. In fact the matter is much more complex. The categories "pathological" and "healthy," like the categories "psychological behavior" and "religious behavior" which depend on them, do not correspond to realities in the world but to judgments about the world, judgments made on the basis of ultimately normative views of what is good and bad, changeable and not. There is even considerable cultural variation in that which is admitted to be a phenomenon to be described.

---

[5]Tillich, The Courage to Be, p. 77.

In the twenty-eight years since Tillich wrote this a considerable literature has grown up about the normative nature of the concepts of mental health and mental illness, the most penetrating coming from within the social sciences.[6] The criteria for whether a behavior is pathological are only partially empirical. In a broader sense the choice is an executive decision, a matter of social policy.

To say that something is pathological is to decide that it needs to be interpreted from a psychological, or at least non-theological, perspective. This is what Ricoeur speaks of as the risk of interpretation. The fact that the decision is made unconsciously or on a trans-personal cultural level does not change the fact that pathology is a matter of decision. When the object of interpretation is open to a variety of interpretations, the interpreter is free in making the choice of perspectives, but also vulnerable. The person making the decision must assume responsibility in both senses of the word: take responsibility, and decide without complete justification. One must not be fooled by the suggestion of clinical objectivity in the terms "pathology," "sickness," and "health." The suggestion that these terms refer to categories in the world independent of thought hides their existential nature. Even to hold that these categories are matters of decision is an optimistic position which needs to be balanced. The concepts of sickness and illness--

---

[6]Heinz Hartmann, Psychoanalysis and Moral Values (New York: International Universities Press, 1960), pp. 1-60.

particularly mental illness--have their roots in very primitive levels of individual and cultural being. Beyond the modern anesthetic veneer the words "sick," "ill," and "health" refer to an interplay of sacred and demonic powers, and to ideas of stain and blemish. To link pathology to the concept of policy decision is not to relinquish it to irrationality. Quite the opposite is so. It is an effort to build a solid foundation under it.

To build such a basis there needs to be a Copernican revolution: the question of whether a behavior is pathological needs to be made to center not exclusively on the phenomenon itself, but rather on the phenomenon and the decision made about it. In terms of the theory of interpretation this is to repeat what has been said earlier: meaning only occurs in the relation of discourse to a language of interpretation. This means that the method of correlation of perspectives must begin with a large concession to the privateness of judgment: there is no objective ground for deciding among perspectives beyond the relationship of object of interpretation and language of interpretation. The person who tries embroils himself or herself in the futile task of finding origins in the world for categories originating in thought. The second part of the task is to regain as much of the ground conceded as possible. Some functional equivalent to the concept of pathology is needed to make possible a decision among perspectives even when it is realized that such a concept is an ideal which sets the goal and direction rather than a task which can be accomplished.

In accord with this, the relative balance of importance shifts from theory towards practice. Tillich thought that practice could await the solution of the problems of theory, but then he thought the theoretical problems were nearly solved. This is not so. Ministers and psychotherapists must proceed making decisions about whether to treat and whether to refer the people with whom they work; meanwhile the possibility of finding completely reliable means of making those decisions recedes. This leads to William James' question in the essay "The Will to Believe":

> Are there not somewhere forced options in our speculative questions, and can we...always await with impunity till the coercive evidence shall have arrived. It seems a priori improbable that the truth should be so nicely adjusted to our needs and powers as that. In the great boarding-house of nature, the cakes and the butter and the syrup seldom come out so even and leave the plates so clean. Indeed, we should view them with scientific suspicion if they did.[7]

The fact that decision cannot await perfect theory leads to the understanding that a guide for practice is needed, a theory of practice rather than a theory of theory. This theory must necessarily be more descriptive (phenomenological) than analytical because its purpose is less application of abstract truths than clarification and criticism of practice. This orientation dictates a change of orientation from the previous chapter.

The concepts of language and perspective used interchangeably in the last chapter were not only abstract but also ideal. No language achieves the ideal of being a

---

[7]James, The Will to Believe, p. 22.

perfectly ordered structure.[8] This is true whether one means by language the disciplines of psychology and theology, behavior, the spoken or written languages of English and French, or the conceptual structure of a world view. Balanced against the synchronic character of structure there is always the diachronic character of change. Languages differ as to how closely they approach the ideal of perfectly integrated structure. This fact becomes important as the emphasis is changed from the theory of interpretation to the practice of deciding which mode of interpretation needs to be used.

Consider what it means to say that a person is looking at something from a particular perspective. Reification must be guarded against. A person who decides to look at a behavior does not, for that, become a different person. Perspective is something one can speak of changing, but it is also something very stable. Further, the very idea of correlation of perspectives presupposes that to some extent a person can have more than one perspective. Perspective at the encompassing level of world-view is a largely unconscious and loosely integrated structure of sub-languages.

A psychotherapist is a person whose world-view is more or less dominated by the perspective of psychology and a pastoral counselor is a person whose world-view is more or less dominated by the perspective of theology. When either

---

[8] Ricoeur, "Structure and Hermeneutics," The Conflict of Interpretations, pp. 27-61. This essay provides general background to this section.

claims to be looking at human behavior from a theological or psychological perspective, the claim has descriptive and ascriptive elements. It can be descriptive, meaning "This is what I observe myself doing" or "This is what I intend to do." It can also be ascriptive, meaning "I agree to make myself responsible in my statements and actions to the discipline of psychology or theology." If this is unclear, think of the situation of a novice psychotherapist who is being evaluated for his or her leadership in a group therapy session. Whatever the thought processes of the therapist during therapy, whatever the sources and motivations of the therapist's actions, whatever the intention of the therapist, the therapy can still be evaluated as therapy, however bad.

Further, even when a person chooses a perspective, other perspectives remain latently present and even active. This feature of perspective arises both because perspective is only partially open to conscious manipulation and because a perspective does not need to be totally exclusive of contradictory or competing perspectives in order to become enabling.

It has been said that the criteria for choice of perspectives cannot be totally empirical. There is a danger in this in that it opens the way for caprice and personal prejudice. This must be avoided. It is important that, in dropping the claim to be completely empirical, one not become prematurely mystical. Just because the criteria for deciding are not empirical is not to say that they cannot

be open to scrutiny. It is, in fact, important that they be open. The reason why it is so tempting to search for purely empirical grounds for deciding is that this opens the decision to scrutiny by the norms of scientific method. If this search cannot be fruitful, then other means of making the choice open to public scrutiny are needed.

The question of criteria for decisions between perspectives is a broadly philosophic one. In its most general aspect the question is: when does, or should, a person turn from one perspective to another? Tillich's concept of pathology and his realms of being are his attempt to answer this question. Beyond the bounds of psychology and theology many thinkers have attempted partial answers to this question in specific applications. One might think that a general method could be constructed for deciding between psychological and theological perspectives. This is not so. The criteria for correlations between disciplines resist full elaboration.

Psychology and theology are changing and it is only possible to describe exhaustively the relationship between fixed structures. More important, the criteria resist elaboration because in trying to find criteria for relating perspectives one runs up against the same block that made the perspectival understanding of truth necessary in the first place. A fully elaborated criteria for deciding between perspectives would be the same as a perspective beyond perspectives. There must always be a trade-off between abstract precision and loyalty to concrete reality.

This limitation to theoretical thought should serve as a reminder that correlation of perspectives is not sealed within the professional sphere of life, but rather presses beyond it. The person who would correlate is placed in a double-bind between the necessity and impossibility of theorizing. It is at this point that the problem of correlation becomes a human one. The theoretical pitfalls discussed here are also human pitfalls. The passions behind theory are the constant wish for a comprehensive mode of understanding and the constant temptation to impose one on the world. Perhaps Kant is right in identifying this inclination to totalize, rather than the violation of interdictions, as the radical origin of evil.[9,10]

Looking at the determining principle in the correlation of perspectives as one of choice rather than empirical analysis suggests that it would be enlightening to view division among perspectives within the same framework in which ethical decisions are analyzed. This would replace Tillich's attempt to use either a concept of pathology or a method of pure description. Three types of criteria influence a moral decision: ethical, practical, and empirical. The ethical criteria are the values which are to be applied. The practical criteria are bits of knowledge about the probably effect of different decisions. The empirical

---

[9]Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone (Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1934), pp. 23-39.

[10]Ricoeur, The Conflict of Interpretations, p. 423.

criteria are the facts about the situation. These three types of criteria apply very well to the problem of the choice between perspectives.

(1) Empirical. The false objectivity of concepts like "pathology" has been broken and the possibility of non-empirical criteria has been raised. Yet this does not mean that empirical criteria lose all importance. As in all moral judgments there is in the choice among perspectives an inter-dependence among empirical, practical, and ethical criteria. The noblest values without a knowledge of a situation and an understanding of how the values might be applied are paralyzed. Similarly, empirical knowledge is paralyzed without values, and practical knowledge is paralyzed without values and knowledge of a situation.

In the problems of correlating pastoral care and psychotherapy the same holds true. Take, for example, the situation of a minister counseling a man who has referred to the fact that he has contemplated suicide. The minister needs to decide whether to refer the man to a psychotherapist. In order to make this decision the minister needs to have some values: life is good, suffering is bad, violence is bad, etc. The minister needs to have some knowledge of the empirical questions concerning suicide: that, for instance, a good way to determine whether the man is seriously contemplating suicide is to ask whether he has made specific plans. And, finally, the minister needs to have some practical knowledge about where the man could be referred, about what psychotherapy could accomplish and at what cost, etc.

Practical, empirical, and ethical criteria are thus mutually dependent for their potence. This means that, although it has been shown that empirical criteria by themselves are an insufficient basis for deciding between theological and psychological perspectives, this does not imply that ethical criteria form to any greater degree a self-sufficient basis.

(2) Practical. The further one moves along the line from the abstract problem of the relation of the languages of theology and psychology towards the practical problem of whether in a particular case to suggest pastoral care or psychotherapy, the more important practical criteria become. The question becomes not what are the ideal possibilities for ministry and psychotherapy, but what could be accomplished for a person with the ministers and therapists available. Nor does the influence of practical considerations need to be considered as a blemish on the application of theory, a concession to the poverty of reality. The reverse is equally the case. From the standpoint of practice the theory of correlation is a rough generalization about the gifts that ministers and psychotherapists tend to bring to their arts. It is only by the experience of ministering in a community that someone can know the special gifts of individual people in the helping professions. Practice may necessitate concessions to what is practically possible, but it also humanizes what is theoretically rigid.

Ministers need to be more attentive to the relationship of theory to practice than they are. There is a two-way

relationship, but not as simple a one as is usually understood. Practice may first be understood as an application of theory. This was Tillich's basic understanding. As opposed to this, practice may be understood as a test for theory. This was very important to Hiltner and to recent praxis theologians. I agree that both of these points are important but would add to them a third. While it is important that practice inform theory, it is dangerous when practical considerations are allowed excessively to limit the correlation of perspectives. One must not lose sight of the fact that one of the reasons why the correlation of psychology and theology has become more important than correlation of theology with other disciplines is practical. It is easier to change an individual than it is to change society. Historically, both Tillich's interest in the correlation of theology and psychology and recent interest in the same subject have followed from discouragement with the possibility of changing society.

Just as an internally valid interpretation of a behavior can be given from a psychological and a theological perspective, an internally valid interpretation can be given from other perspectives. It is just as reductionistic to say that all truths are encompassed by the sum of the psychological and theological perspectives as it is to say that all truths are encompassed by either one separately. The ethical problems caused are equally serious. At this point the criticism from the liberation theologians of pastoral practice is well taken.[11] A minister who limits himself or herself

---

[11]Juan Luis Segundo, The Hidden Motives of Pastoral Action (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1979).

exclusively to balancing individualistic theology and psychology makes the monumental transition from the practical judgment that it is generally easier to change individuals to the ethical decision that only individuals need to be changed. It is so easy to make this transition because change of perspective begets change of ontology. It is not so much that social and economic realities are not considered in psychology and individualistic theology as it is that they are considered unreal. That which does not fit into the conceptual structures of a discipline cannot attain reality from the perspective of that discipline. The most narrow perspective can become totalized into a way of understanding the whole of reality if only the person holding the view is willing to sufficiently blind himself to the phenomenal richness of the world. There are many tragic examples of this. One comical one is the amazing ability of PhD students to turn the narrowest dissertation topic into a means of understanding the entirety of existence.[12]

(3) Moral. In the background of every decision about which perspective to use there are always ethical norms. They are often not obvious because they are ones which would be generally accepted, but they are present in every choice of perspectives.[13] The occasions when they seem most absent

---

[12]These examples are only meant to be illustrative, and are not intended as a substitute for the psychology of selective perception or for the study of the influence of culture on perception, both of which are interesting subjects.

[13]A more detailed schema would need to include discussion

are exactly the times when they are the most overridingly present. Medical pathology seems like a value neutral concept only because nobody would dream of questioning the assertion that it is generally good to preserve life and to end suffering. Similarly, behind the clinical concept of psychological psthology, there are standards for what behavior society will accept.

Yet one must be careful. In the present intellectual climate it is as important to say what this does not mean as what it does mean. It does mean that it is important to examine critically the standards, and to expose ways in which the society is unjustifiably imposing itself on the individual and ways in which the norms may be self-serving creations of the psychotherapeutic community.[14] However, it does not mean that there should be a prima facie presumption that the norms are invalid. Rather, there needs to be as much ethical as empirical seriousness infused into the perpetual task of defining pathology.

The task of defining pathology needs to be made a public one. Tillich sought to open decisions about which behaviors are pathological by stressing the ways in which the concept is an empirical one. This effort turned out to be only partially successful. However, the very same

---

of the problem of non-moral good (J. L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong [Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977], pp. 50-63.)

[14]Thomas S. Szasz, The Myth of Mental Illness (New York: Harper & Row, 1961). This is a constructive book from which many people, including the author, have drawn destructive conclusions.

fact which stood in the way of empirical scrutiny suggests the possibility of even more radically opening the concept. In so far as pathology is an ethical concept, it needs to be--and is--open to general social review as well as technical professional review.

The notion that the decision about what is pathological behavior is an empirical matter, and therefore only open to review by technically qualified experts, may be a fiction necessary to the practice of psychotherapy in contemporary society, but this does not make it true. Often a doctor or psychologist prefers that his or her decisions be seen as totally objective. This places the decision beyond question, and that is seen as a necessary expedient because patients frequently prefer to discuss the goals of psychotherapy than to engage in the hard work of psychotherapy. Myself, I am inclined to see this ruse as an unnecessary crutch. Patients respond well when the therapist deals directly with them on the issue. The therapist can say to a patient that continual discussion of the goals of therapy impedes therapy, and can interpret continual demands to discuss goals as resistance.

The decision about what is pathological--diagnosis--is no more and no less than the method of finding indications of that which is, or is likely to become, undesirable according to some system of values. The accuracy of the indicators is an empirical and technical matter. The question of what is desirable is not. It needs to be open to discussion both by the community at large and, as is possible and

prudent, by patients.[15]

There is always an ethical component to a decision that something is pathological (i.e., that it should be viewed from a psychological perspective) just as there are always empirical and practical components. A choice of perspectives in which any of the three types of criteria has been neglected is deficient. The advantage on a practical level of moving the question of perspective from the metaphysical framework of realms of being to the ethical framework of choice is that this is made clear.

The advantage on the theoretical level is that it paves the way for a fuller philosophic discussion of the method of correlation of perspectives. There are two ways of looking at a decision between perspectives: as a decision now being made, and as one which has already been made and which needs to be reconsidered. Actually every decision is both. Perspective is always something I have already, and something I decide to have in a particular situation. There is nothing mystical about this. It arises from the fact that the concept of perspective as it is used here has intentionally been left broad enough to cover a broad continuum of phenomena. At one end of the continuum is Dasein, as Heidegger described it, an encompassing and largely unconscious

---

[15]As someone who has worked in various mental institutions, I feel a duty to speak against the romanticizing of mental patients to the detriment of people who care for mental patients. People who work in mental health care are generally motivated by human concern and do amazingly well considering the pittance society has decided to spend on the people it finds inconvenient. The patients they serve generally have problems which even the sharpest critic would agree need attention.

structuring of a person's mode of being in the world.[16] At the other are the perspectives of the various disciplines, consciously learned and only intended to account for a small segment of reality. The two ends of the continuum are anchor points rather than positions actually reached. Perspective can never be totally conscious because at the most fundamental level perspective is what one is. There is no point outside of it from which a person can stand to decide. (This is the difficulty confronted by someone who would literally attempt to pull himself or herself by the bootstraps.) On the other hand, perspective is always to some extent conscious because the existence of consciousness implies that there is some self-consciousness, some knowledge that there is an "I" who is doing one thing and not another.

Up to now the decision to take on a perspective has only been considered in this chapter as if one were looking forward in time towards it. From this angle the decision appears as though one were approaching it with "fresh" eyes, taking it in as a whole before approaching it in any specific way. This is the ideal of a pure phenomenological description.

Looking at the decision in this way, it can be understood as proceeding by the process of the critique mentioned in the previous chapter. In so far as choice of perspectives is a conscious choice about a future way of viewing, the decision can begin with a detached observation of the richness

---

[16] Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), pp. 26-27.

of phenomenal reality, and then proceed to the choice. Any descipline chooses as its object some abstraction from the full richness of reality. Choosing what is not important to include in a perspective is as crucial as choosing what is. Every discipline must begin with a narrowing, but it is a narrowing that is enabling. The object and the limits of the discipline are established together. In making the conscious choice of perspectives, the goal is to leave out that which for the present purpose is unnecessary so as to focus more clearly on that which is. Starting with the richness of reality a decision needs to be made to approach it in one way rather than another.

However, one never begins with the full richness of reality. Reality is always filtered. Thus the decision about perspectives is always something that has already taken place and which needs to be corrected. Viewing the choice of perspectives as having always taken place, the question is not how to choose from the richness, but how to detect and correct the poverty.

The possibility for doing this depends generally on the fact that the perspective which, in the normal course of events, is being chosen is a sub-part of a larger order perspective. Though one has chosen to look at something in one way, dissonance from one's more encompassing perspective as a human being can suggest the necessity of re-evaluation. For example, a school psychologist who has been giving children therapy directed towards curbing their violent behavior may, because of his or her values as a human being,

be forced to decide at some point that the action of the children is less expressive of their inability to conform and more expressive of the injustices of the social system.

The possibility of changing perspectives from the midst of perspectives derives more fundamentally from the im-pressing of that which, according to the perspective, is denied reality. On the relatively conscious non-threatening level of whether to refer a parishoner to a psychotherapist, this grounding for the change is relatively less important.

There is a possibility of correcting perspective to the extent that the person maintains an attitude of openness, that is, to the extent that an attempt is made to look again with fresh eyes, but this is an ideal. In actuality, perspectives are held in ways which range between two extremes. At the one end is hearkening, Heidegger's term for listening as one would ideally with a friend--with complete openness--and at the other information processing, putting information into set categories and rejecting information which does not fit. The first attitude has the advantage of being changeable, but is ineffective because it is uncommitted. The second is effective because it is definite, but suffers from rigidity.

The Choice Between Psychological and Theological Perspectives

In the course of this analysis the focus of the method of correlation has been changed. The task is no longer to identify which areas of reality are theological and

psychological or even which questions can be asked and answered by each. The task is to understand the decision to change from one perspective to another and to understand the criteria for doing so.

It is important to point out from the outset that the question of choice of perspectives has usually been treated as a decision about to take place. Tillich, for one, treats theology and psychology as if he were standing at a point before (or outside) of all commitment. This is not to accuse Tillich of bias but, rather, to say that while Tillich spends most of his effort discussing which perspectives to choose, the question which poses itself in life has more the character of "why change perspectives?"--or, at least, the two elements are always held in tension. One requires as a solution an a priori critique of perspectives, the other an a posteriori criterion for changing them. For the most part today the point of deciding to look at things in a psychological way or a theological way is lost in history. Perspective begins as fact; it must be reclaimed as choice. It is a unique aspect of modernity that people perceive themselves to have a choice of how they will view things.

It is impossible in the scope of this thesis to enter deeply into the, admittedly very interesting, discussion of the development of science and scientific language generally. However, in describing psychology as a language of finitude--searching for material causes--and theology as a language of transcendence, generalizations are being made which might not hold for all times in history. The discussion so far has

been synchronic and not diachronic.

The polarization of theology and psychology as non-objective and objective is a historical phenomenon, even a recent one. While it is true to speak of Tillich's theology as radically a language of transcendence and Freud's psychology as radically a language of finitude, the same distinction might not fit as well for other psychologies and theologies either before or after. However, while I believe psychologies must pre-eminently be languages of finitude and theologies languages of transcendence, my argument does not require that this be so. The tension between languages of finitude and languages of transcendence is of intrinsic interest regardless of whether that tension is identical to the tension between theology and psychology over the explanation of human action.

Eliade and others (e.g., Heidegger) have argued that theological or religious language did not develop as pseudo-science or proto-science. Rather, it is a language through which people open themselves to the transcendent and through which the transcendent is indicated. It is an opening of ourselves to determination by the transcendent, and through which we are drawn out of ourselves and beyond our habitual ways of viewing things.

In contrast, psychological language is a language of objectification, the polar opposite to a theological language. The world is taken as available to potential human manipulation, to being made an object. Indeed, in an objective language the world can only be comprehended in so far as it

can be made an object. Objective explanation of human behavior is the furthest extension of objectivity in which the self is made available to the self as an object to be changed. Through objective language we gain the potential of controlling and changing the hitherto uncontrollable, but in doing so we close ourselves to reality as other, as accusation and consolation.

All situations can potentially be understood from a psychological or from a theological perspective. The question is, how is it to be decided that a situation needs to be looked at from one perspective or the other. The vast majority of situations can be profitably understood from both perspectives: as having as antecedents material causes and therefore as subject to potential manipulation, and as symbolic of the transcendent and therefore as revelatory of possibilities for wholeness. And further, it is not the case that, as it becomes more important to understand a situation psychologically, it becomes less desirable to understand it theologically (as would be inferred from Tillich's The Courage to Be). The reverse is the case. Unstable situations are both those in which something is most likely to be revealed--here it is crucial to avoid reifying the psychological as an aspect of reality contrasting with the theological and to avoid reifying the transcendent as another material cause alongside others. Although one must be careful to remember that it is a symbolic way of speaking, it is none the less true to say that the in-breaking

of the transcendent is a powerful force as potentially destructive as constructive. In the case of a divorce, for instance, an instability is created in which both sides see new realities. This in-breaking of reality as Other (that which is not me and which is alien to everything I have known of the world and to all the categories I have had for making sense of the world) can be revelatory of wonderful newness, but it can also lead to a situation which needs to be made the object of manipulation by psychotherapy or other objective points of view. Thus, if those situations in which there is a need of psychotherapeutic intervention are called "psychological," then psychological and theological problems are more likely to coincide than to be mutually exclusive. This is the risk of interpretation mentioned earlier on the theoretical level translated to the practical level. No simple eclecticism is possible. A correlation of roles between a minister and psychotherapist (or between minister as spiritual director and minister as psychotherapist) is needed, rather than simple triage of cases between the two.

To look at a situation psychologically is to look at it objectively: as object potentially amenable to manipulation and change. The possibility of approaching human behavior in this way is inspiring of hope and of fear. Its focus on manipulation is both its strength and limitation. It is a strength in that many circumstances which were seen as unalterable can now be altered. Human character and behavior

are no longer simply fated.

Whenever the question of the best means of accomplishing a particular change in human behavior or character is posed, it is a question which must be answered from an objective psychological perspective. The decision about which changes need to be made is not objective, or at least not exclusively objective. Yet the decision about how to bring them about is (primarily) objective. In the best of cases the goal of the psychotherapy is arrived at by mutual consent of the therapist and patient. Often it is imposed implicitly by the methods used, by the therapist, or by some referring agency.

The need for psychotherapy and the need for pastoral counseling tend to arise together when there is some disjuncture in normal patterns of living. The decision to treat the situation psychotherapeutically is a gain in that it makes it possible to achieve any particular goal for the situation as expeditiously as possible (to help a person sleep better, for example), but it is a loss in that the situation once made object is no longer visible as revelatory of possibilities for deeper unity in the person or society. One goal is chosen or imposed, and others are suppressed.

While it is often the case that, in the course of psychotherapy, exploration of the situation reveals other goals, this does not change the basic circumstance. It rather confirms it. The situation is not in itself psychological, and the psychotherapist no matter how single-minded never sees the situation totally as object. Thus the psycho-

therapist must, as a practical matter, be occasionally a minister and view the situation with the client as revelatory of new goals. However, unless the therapist chooses to abdicate completely his or her role, these new goals become the basis of a new contract and therapy continues objectively as previously. While as a practical matter psychotherapists are often very perceptive about which goals might be accomplished given a particular situation, neither the exploration of the situation as revelatory of the transcendent nor judgment concerning what is revealed is within the competence of psychotherapy qua psychotherapy.

A minister needs to refer his or her parishoner to a psychotherapist, or to take on a psychotherapeutic perspective, when a goal for change has been decided and appropriate means of implementing the decision are needed. Two specific instances of this need to be noted. (1) In so far as ministry becomes an effort to accomplish certain specific behavioral or characterological changes, it becomes psychotherapeutic and only secondarily theological. In so far as traditional pastoral care was this, it might be argued that modern pastoral care has not so much changed from non-reductionistic to reductionistic, as that it has changed from amateur psychotherapy to semi-professional psychotherapy. (2) Pastoral counselors, like physicians, must above all avoid doing harm. In the situations of most potential interest theologically, there are powerful and potentially dangerous forces. Thus a pastoral counselor must be perceptive enough psychologically to know what symptoms are warnings of the

onset or existence of serious problems. Ministers rarely have this skill. Even those who consider themselves competent pastoral counselors are usually only familiar with problems a psychologist would call neurotic. It is currently the belief among ministers that encouraging people to express feelings has a universally beneficent effect. This is not true and leads to tragic consequences when applied to psychotics or manic-depressives.

To look at a situation from a theological perspective is to see it as containing symbolic indications of the transcendent, to search it for deeper possibilities of unity or wholeness in the individual, in a relationship, in the Church, or in the society. This makes the minister a listener (versus an information processor) who searches in and through what is for indications of what might be. This role is very different from talking about theology, but theology is a necessary tool since it is the history and summary of hope for a people.

This process is only indirectly inter-subjective or inter-cognitive. It is not primarily one person trying to understand another, or to help others understand themselves. It is rather two people trying to understand a situation as revelatory of the transcendent: as giving indications which might help to break old perspectives and build new, more comprehensive ones.

A theological perspective is needed to discern answers to questions of goals or ends. Indeed, to speak of goals or ends in terms of their source or grounding is to speak in

theological language. Three cases need especially to be considered. (1) When patients themselves are not able to determine the goals of psychotherapy, an evaluation of the goals needs to be made from a theological perspective, or, at least, subjected to ethical review. (2) When the patient differs greatly from the therapist, ethical or theological review becomes important. (3) When in the course of psychotherapy the therapist decides that the intervention of a minister would help achieve the goals of therapy, a minister can consent to help, but this does not in itself constitute ministry. It is only assistance of a minister in psychotherapy. A very usual form of this is when a psychotherapist seeks a minister to validate the goals of psychotherapy to a client.

At the moment there are a great variety of therapies in use. Whether this is a normal characteristic of the early development of a science, a result of inherent difficulties of objectifying human behavior, or a product of modern culture, is a subject to be answered by a historian of science. A minister needs to be careful not to abuse this diversity. While a minister is enjoined to criticize the theological presuppositions of the various therapies, to the extent that they live up to an ideal of being objective a minister cannot choose among them. Ministers need, in particular, to avoid choosing a psychology because its findings are convenient rather than because they are true.

Psychotherapy itself can become a religion, but only at great expense. If the world is not only looked at

psychologically, but is even made psychological, the possibility of seeing otherwise is excluded. There is a certain nobility and asceticism in refusing to see the world as other than object. That is the existentialism of Sartre and Camus. However, in that view reality is only that which is potentially object and thus a world as revelatory of an other is made impossible. And it is made impossible for reasons that are not objective.

Contrast with Tillich

This explication of the critique of perspectives and the choice between (and among) perspectives leads to an overall understanding of correlation of perspectives very different from Tillich's. Overall it can be said that there is no direct correlation: theology and psychology are different languages and they can speak to each other only through a process of translation. Tillich's dictum that questions come from the secular disciplines and answers from theology must be reformulated. Questions must be about some-thing and answers must be about some-thing. And the things--the objects--of psychology are different from the objects of theology. Even if the same reality were to be intended--God, for instance--each discipline can ask and answer questions about the reality that is God in so far as that reality fits into the concepts and categories of each discipline.

The correlation of perspectives comes through the thinking, judging person who meets the limits of one way of viewing and is moved to adopt another. The question of

correlation--what is the role of each discipline--rests on the criteria for choosing and how the choice is made. This approach builds on the effort to argue that the relationship between theology and psychology should be two-way and transcends that way of viewing things.

In so far as it is objective, psychology cannot give answers to ultimate questions. Psychology cannot be the source of values. It can speak of the relationship between behaviors, or between behaviors and values, but it cannot reach out beyond categories and objects to transcendent unity, reality before or beyond objectification.

Yet there is a qualification which needs to be given to this banishment of psychology from questions concerning values. Psychotherapies, as realities rather than as ideals, are not means of attaining any change, but means of making particular ones. In all but the most marginal of cases, psychotherapies presuppose structures of values. Psychotherapies have been criticized for their implicit value assumptions--and there is reason for this criticism--but the strength of reasoning and method proceeding from the assumptions often makes them impelling and effective as answers to ultimate questions. It is still a matter of applying values already objectivized. The question of the source of values is not touched. However, the strength of reasoning proceeding from such objectivized value assumptions has been such that psychotherapies are a moral force in society, and regardless of the propriety of the claim of psychotherapy to derive the values, many people have been supplied with answers to

ultimate questions through psychotherapy.

In Tillich's method of correlation the key to whether a situation is to be considered psychological or theological is the concept of pathology. Tillich tried to derive the concept of pathology theoretically, from his philosophic anthropology. It has been shown here, however, that the concept of pathology was not a theoretical one but a matter of practical judgment in the midst of a complex of criteria which cannot even potentially be fully objectified. The choice between perspectives is thus an involved one entailing risk.

This suggests a new valuation of practical theology. Systematic theology is not complete in itself. Or, more exactly, the method of correlation can only be completed by a detour into practical theology and even into practice.

On the abstract level considered in this thesis the method of correlation is empty. A framework has been constructed which might be compatible with a variety of theologies and psychologies. It should be noted, however, that there are two positions for which this model would be irrelevant if not invalid. Both narrow the question of explanation to the search for material causes. The first would be a theology in which God or divine action was considered as a material objective cause of events. The second would say similarly that only the objective was real but would deny the reality of God.

In this model reductionism can be understood in two ways. It can be understood first as an aspect of any perspective. It has been stressed repeatedly that to look

at anything at all it must be looked at from a particular perspective. In a perspective reality is reduced to, or fitted into, the categories of that perspective. This is inevitable. It is an aspect of all thought.

It can be understood, second, as a flaw in a perspective. Reductionism as a flaw in thought is the refusal to consider another perspective. It is the destructive retention of a particular perspective. The judgment as to what is reductive in this negative sense is a historical one as well as a theoretical one. Theoretically it can be said that reductionism becomes a flaw when some aspect of reality is not recognized which should be. But the crucial phrase is <u>which should be</u>. Just because some aspects of realities exist, does not necessarily mean that they sould be given attention in a particular situation. It could be argued, for example, that Freud's reduction of religion was historically necessary to the development of his discipline. Freud was perhaps justified in applying his new psychotherapeutic perspective as consistently as possible even if today this is being reconsidered.

CHAPTER IV

REBUILDING THE METHOD OF CORRELATION

PART III: CONCLUSION

This study grew out of one student's involvement in an important area of the current history of the Church in America, the pastoral care movement. It is now time to rejoin this history. Through the course of the study the subject has stayed the same but the context has changed from the struggle of the CPE (Clinical Pastoral Education) movement with reductionism to the struggle of conflicting understandings of what it is to be human in modern life. I began in the introduction this thesis with an observation from Paul Pruyser about the pastoral care students and ministers with whom he worked:

> They manifested, and sometimes professed, that their basic theological disciplines were of little help to them in ordering their observations and planning their meliorative moves....They did not quite trust their parishoners' occasional use of theological language and their presentation of theological conflicts. The issues of faith were quickly "pulled" into issues of marital role behavior, adolescent protest against their parents, or dynamics of transference in the counseling situation. There seemed to be an implicit suspicion of the relevance of theology, both to any client's life and to the method and content of the pastor's counseling process....It is a jarring note when any professional person no longer knows what his basic science is, or finds no use for it.[1]

A jarring note indeed, but the question is: to what sort of

---

[1]Pruyser, The Minister as Diagnostician, pp. 27-28.

reflection should it give rise? It can, and should, give rise to reflection about the inadequacies of theological education but it should also give rise to reflection about the movement of the Western Church[2] as a whole into modernity and the way this has transformed the role of the Church in the care of individuals.

The development of the psychotherapeutic disciplines is a paradigmatic example of the process of secularization. Psychotherapy is the culmination of a movement to bring within the sphere of human control that which hitherto had to be accepted as Providence.[3] Secularization transforms that to which humanity must conform into that which serves human purposes and conforms to human wishes. Freud boldly continued this Promethean thievery. He steals for men and women, from what is now a rather poor God, the power for them to recreate themselves.

Psychotherapeutic disciplines present challenges new and unique to the Church, but in historical perspective they comprise but another institution to grow up next to the Church. As in the past the Church has had to divide her role with civil government, public education, and social service, so now the Church has needed to make a division of roles with psychotherapy. Willingly or unwillingly a new partner in the care of individuals has had to be accepted.

If in the midst of this situation there has been a

---

[2]I use the terms "Church" and "Western Church" intentionally and I am mindful that many would object. The problem Universalist Unitarians face in pastoral care are problems which need to be seen as common problems.

[3]Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), pp. 3-35.

great deal of confusion about the role of the Church in individual care, that is natural. It has become necessary for churches and ministers to learn to make distinctions which had not been needed previously. It is, in part, unfair to accuse ministers of inappropriately borrowing psychotherapeutic methods of helping people with their problems when the notion that there are methods which work but which are not appropriate to ministry is itself new.[4]

The problem of the division of roles which has been imposed on the churches by the rise of psychotherapy has been the subject of this thesis, broadly conceived.. This effort needs to be understood, not as a project of inventorying what role is left to ministers in the care of individuals, but as an opportunity for re-visioning the meaning and goals of pastoral care. It needs to be a time of focusing on what role now needs to be taken by ministers, not a time of consolidating losses.

The central insight that makes it possible for there to be a discipline of psychotherapy is that character can be changed. Before this is good or evil, it is powerful. "Character," from the Greek word kharaktēr meaning "mark" or "brand," meant classically that part of a person's nature which could not be changed. The knowledge that kharaktēr can change has opened up a new possibility in being. This insight is not something that was, or that could be, proven

---

[4]Nothing is completely new. The idea that some arts are black arts has existed since Biblical times. Yet it is less clear whether there is a precedent for thinking that there are good techniques which are not appropriately used by ministers.

directly. It was only the fruitfulness of a venture out into the world under the guidance of the insight, which could be an indication of its value. Freud's working papers are the record of the first stages of this adventure.

The discipline of psychology and the profession of psychotherapy are the fruit of this venture. They are not proof of the initial insight. At best they are proof that sometimes character can be changed and that, in general, it is fruitful to view it as so--but this has not been proven. Following from this initial venture, the insight that character is changeable has been made a permanent possibility by the way it has become institutionalized.

The insight that character is changeable and the discipline of psychology form a unity of object of interpretation and mode of interpretation. Psychotherapy must always bear the mark of its origin. The insight that people can be viewed as changeable governs both the possibilities and limits of psychotherapy. It governs the possibilities by construing the object of interpretation to be <u>human beings as changeable</u> it made it possible to abstract from the full richness of the human that which, for the purposes, was important. It sets the outside limits in that the discipline has no possibility of retrieving that which was lost in the initial abstraction. Hence, psychotherapy is privileged and condemned to operate in a <u>language of finitude</u>, understanding persons in so far as they may be made into objects for manipulation, yet standing dumb to other possibilities for being. The dangers and the benefits resulting from

this venture are the same as those accruing from the theft of fire of Prometheus: the gift of psychotherapy has the power to form--but also to deform--character.

The Church opposes the insight of human being as created by himself or herself, the insight of human being as created by God, Imago deo. "God created man in the image of himself, in the image of God he created him, male and female he created them."[5] This insight is precisely the mirror opposite of the founding insight of psychology. This is the insight that human beings are not objectifiable, that they always remain in unity with an Other which stands over against all that van be made object.[6,7] This is human being as Thou in Martin Buber's sense.

Just as the insight of human being as changeable cannot be proven and can only be shown to be fruitful by a venture, so the insight of human being as Imago deo cannot be proven and can only be shown fruitful in a venture out into being. (Need I repeat the sad story of those who have insisted that they have proof?) Church history, indeed the history of religions, is history under the guidance of the symbol Imago deo. The venture out into being, guided by this insight, is the venture of exploring the meaning of

---

[5]Genesis 1:27.

[6]"Other" here does not mean God, necessarily. The term is adopted from Sartre, who means by it that which stands over against. Whether that which stands over against everything is God is another question.

[7]"Object" is being used in a new sense here to mean that which can be made object.

self in history in relation to the Other.[8,9]

Theology is precisely the Church's record of its experience of this venture, and pastoral theology the experience as it pertains to ministry to individuals. However, a careful distinction needs to be made. This "experience" is not experience in the psychological sense--Schleiermacher has been badly misunderstood here--but experience in the sense of its Latin derivation (experientia), the sense preserved in the Romance languages: trying or testing.[10]

If one understands human beings as related to the Sacred, then the language for speaking of this--theology--is the language of transcendence. This language opens up the possibility of understanding human behavior as revelatory of the transcendent. In and through the actions and words of a parishoner a minister can search for the emergence of new elements of purpose and meaning. Thus the minister can help the parishoner to understand and evaluate in relation to the language of faith of the community. The limit imposed by the original insight of Imago deo is that under the guidance of that insight human behavior can only be understood as manifesting the Sacred--there is a complete discuncture between this language and the language of finitude. The gift is the power to open self and others to the revelatory

---

[8]Eliade, Patterns in Comparative Religion, pp. xiii-xvii.

[9]Gerhardt Von Rad, Old Testament Theology, 2 vols. (New York: Haper & Row, 1962/5).

[10]A more complete discussion would need to include a mention of divine nature and the evolution of Imago deo in the line through Augustine, Calvin, Schleiermacher and Tillich. Calvin articulates a position surprisingly like the one stated here.

nature of being, to the source of values and purpose. This power may be perverted into the evil of totalization, which would claim that being has spoken for the last time.

Yet the two functions of pastoral care and psychotherapy are not so sharply divided as these images would imply. This division is only meant to facilitate a rough division. The functions are two foci and not two sealed compartments. For a psychotherapist to initiate therapy there must be implicit or explicit discussion of values to form a contract. In continuing therapy, goals must be established and discussed as the course of therapy alters. It is often assumed in theoretical works on pastoral care (but not, interestingly, on psychiatry) that the patients who tend to need psychotherapists are the ones who could not use or should not see a minister. The contrary is the case. Moments of instability in a person's life are the moments when that person is likely to need a psychotherapist and when the surface of the person's life is likely to be stirred up enough so that new values or purpose can emerge.

The work of correlating perspectives is practical work. The theory of correlation can only be a prelude to this work. Theoretical work on this subject has lost its clearly articulated relationship to the situation of the Church in contemporary society. When the formative effect of practice on theory is forgotten, theory becomes an indecipherable mixture of what is generally true and what was true in a specific situation, now forgotten. Such has been the result of the exclusive emphasis on correlating

pastoral care and theology--Tillich chose these foci in his later life because he felt himself a guest in America and therefore not entitled to become politically involved, and because he was an elderly man living in a politically discouraged time. Anyone who today lets his or her horizon of thought be limited by Tillich's horizon is making a great error. Tillich chose the perspective he did on what were probably legitimate practical grounds. Another person who understood Tillich's decision on this matter to be based on universal and normative criteria would be making a great mistake. The constant danger of theory is that it may lose its footing in history in this way.

Practical recommendations thus are in some respects more appropriate than theoretical conclusions. Their historical setting is clear. But, more than this, they ask to be tested, thus completing the circle from practice to theory and back to practice. I myself have four recommendations. As a matter of professional respect--and with a realistic assessment of my audience--I add that I would limit the applicability of these conclusions to fellow Unitarian Universalist ministers. However, this is the only limit I give them. Taken together these four recommendations constitute my practical answer to the question of this thesis: by what method can theological and psychological understandings be correlated in making pastoral diagnoses so that the benefits of both are gained and the integrity of each is preserved?

(1) Ministers need to learn basic psychotherapeutic

diagnosis. Ministers need to know what is, and what is not, a symptom of serious mental illness. Otherwise, he or she will not know the empirical criteria for making a referral. The danger is that, after learning a few therapeutic techniques, and after having gained some experience, a person tends to assume that he or she has a general knowledge of mental illness. The reverse tends to be the case. Most of the people Unitarian Universalist ministers counsel are mildly troubled neurotics. There is relatively little risk involved when an amateur counsels these people and it is usually personally rewarding to do so. However, the attempt to apply to every situation the perspectives which can legitimately be used in helping neurotics is destructive. Psychological perspectives calling for forthright expression of feelings are seldom lost on neurotic people, and even more seldom harmful. However, the same methods used with psychotics--whose troubles generally have to do with controlling the expression of feelings--can be seriously injurious in counseling by an amateur directed at expression of feelings.

There is a persistent tendency for ministers in the liberal churches to set themselves up as judges of psychotherapeutic theories. As long as the therapies themselves contain norms for human behavior as well as means for changing human behavior, ministers must make some judgments. However, a minister should try as much as possible to broaden the criteria for judgment. Ministers preach the theologies that work for them and their friends and there might be virtue in this. However, it is wrong for ministers to assume that the

therapeutic techniques which have been helpful to them in solving their own problems are therefore generally superior to other techniques.

At the same time, however, that ministers need to learn the symptoms of the different mental illnesses, they do not need for this reason to avoid giving pastoral counseling to those people who are found to have serious mental problems. The chances are that when a person needs to see a psychotherapist he or she also needs to see a minister. This is a direct application of the most basic conclusion of this thesis. The problems people have are not psychological or religious. They may need to be seen as one or the other. The tendency has been both in pastoral theology and in ministerial practice to divide people with psychological problems (people who need psychotherapy) from people with theological problems (people who need pastoral counseling). This is a mistake. There are a few, a very few, cases when the nature of a person's psychological problems demands that a person see a psychotherapist and not a pastoral counselor, but these situations are rare. Some people tend to play helping professionals off against each other, and some have religious delusions which make it desirable that, at certain stages in therapy, they not interact with a clerical person. However, even in these cases important theological content may be present, though it may be better that it not be discussed with the patient.

The fundamental reason the occasions for ministry and for psychotherapy tend to coincide is that it is only when

there has been a break in the fabric of a person's life that either is likely to be effective. Change is painful. People do not, and should not be asked to, change unless something arises calling for a change. This something need not be a specific problem, but only a sense of <u>something</u> happening which can stand to be interpreted by the languages of finitude and of transcendence. To speak in the terms developed here, this <u>something happening</u>, is an im-pressing of being on existence, an impressing which has both the power to destroy and the power to create. Camus' understanding of the eruption of the absurd could be interpreted this way, as the impressing of a previously denied reality on the world-view of the person.[11] It is the task of the minister to take the occasion of a disturbance in life as possibly revelatory of new goals and values. It is the task of the psycho-therapist to help prevent destructive consequences of the situation and to use the power unleashed and the fluidity of the situation to help the person make any desirable changes.

If ministers were more skilled in preliminary psycho-therapeutic diagnosis, they could more closely cooperate with psychotherapists. The minister would know when his or her parishoner was in a dangerous situation and needed a psychotherapist. And further, the minister might be able to feel more comforable working with people with severe mental problems when he or she understood better the broad range of mental problems.

---

[11]Albert Camus, <u>Le mythe de sisyphe</u> (Paris: Gallimard, 1942), pp. 15-23.

(2) Ministers need to learn to correlate their theological perspectives with the broadest possible range of other perspectives and not just with psychology. The times might now generally be bad for political action, but it is important--vital!--that the horizon not become dominated totally by the perspectives of individualistic theology and psychology.

One of the bad consequences of the CPE movement is that the basic model of the situation of pastoral care has become the institutional chaplain at the bedside of a patient in a large urban hospital. There are certain aspects of this situation which constitute valid practical criteria for deciding that only individually-oriented perspectives are appropriate. The mission of most hospitals, and the fact that the patients generally only stay a short time and are cut off from the rest of their communities, make it difficult to apply fruitfully anything but individually-oriented perspectives. This focus of Clinical Pastoral Education--this construing of the situation to be interpreted--is both a strength and weakness. In Clinical Pastoral Education ministers can get a great deal of experience very quickly by ministering to individuals who are sick. But, to choose to interpret the situation where an individual is sick on an individual level is to make a very significant decision, one governed by many criteria. Illness is not individual any more than it is social, is economic, or is religious. In hospitals a categorization of problems is imposed on the reality of illness. That categorization is constructed.

on the basis of what causes those individuals to be sick.

One could ask equally: what causes this group of people to be sick? If one defined the object of interpretation this way the venture of interpretation would be rewarded very differently. Emile Durkheim wrote the classic book whose founding insight was this. He ventured: what if one looked at suicide, not as a phenomenon to be interpreted on an individual level, but as a phenomenon to be interpreted on a social level? He found that while it was very difficult to make useful generalizations about why and when individuals commit suicide, very fruitful interpretations could be made on the social level. It is possible to ask the same order of question about any group. One can ask why there tend to be particular illnesses in particular groups as fruitfully as one can ask why this individual is sick. Often individual problems cry out to be interpreted socially or economically. Is it ethical in a society where malnutrition is common among elderly persons to say that the cause of the problem is that many individuals do not eat well? Is it ethical in a society where alcohol is a contributory cause to nearly half of illnesses requiring hospitalization, to say that the cause is that many people drink too much? Of course not.

Intelligent and responsible ministers can fall into such absurd moral reasoning because perspectives act as blinders. No matter how poor a choice of perspectives has been, it is always possible to make an interpretation on the basis of the perspective chosen which is valid within the perspective. For every person who is an alcoholic in a

society where alcoholism is an epidemic,[12] it is still possible to say that the cause is that individuals drink too much. To counterbalance the constant tendency to totalize a perspective ministers need to work at opening themselves to other and new perspectives. The same ability to listen which has been so highly--and fruitfully--cultivated on an individual level needs to be turned outwards.

(3) Ministers needed to cultivate the ability to contribute effectively and appropriately to the task of psychotherapy. I was recently the chaplain on the psychiatric floor of a major regional medical center in the Northeast. In a staff meeting with twenty professionals practicing psychotherapy in various contexts I was startled when I was told that not one of the people present had ever been contacted by a parish minister to initiate cooperation in the care of someone. Admittedly, this case is exceptional but that it could occur at all is an indication of a problem. I do not have an overall solution to it, but I do have two suggestions.

First, ministers need to contact habitually the therapist involved (at the permission of the parishoner) when a church member is in long-term therapy. Some would dispute this. It can be viewed as prying or a violation of professional confidence, but it is not if permission is obtained. The minister should, as in other professional contacts or requests for information, make it clear that he

---

[12]The word "epidemic" is fascinating. It, like "pathology," is a perspective-determining word that is otherwise contentless. It refers to a situation where the incidence of a disease is so high that it is no longer possible to avoid recognizing its social and demographic causes.

or she is not asking for violation of confidence.

There are a number of advantages in early consultation between minister and psychotherapist. The primary one is that there is generally a far greater choice of options for treatment than the public realizes. The choice among the various psychotherapeutic perspectives on the problem is governed by the same criteria that determine any choice of perspective: empirical, moral, and practical. Frequently, the choice of treatment method is greatly influenced by (1) the psychotherapist's judgment of what are and are not appropriate life goals for a particular person, and (2) what is practical in terms of the life situation of the person. Unless contacted by a person from the community of the patient--and it is very helpful to the psychotherapist if that person is another professional not highly emotionally involved with the patient--the therapist must decide these questions very conservatively. The very fact that there is a community of support sufficiently organized that the community leader initiated contact changes the diagnostic equation.

Second, ministers need to widen the range of their intervention in pastoral care. Again, the model of pastoral care as a one-to-one interaction isolated from the rest of the world is a barrier. As long as ministers keep this model their role in critical cases is likely to be minimal. It is of the nature of critical situations that they require efficient actions calculated to manipulate a situation to particular ends. This is the forte of psychotherapy. In

medical psychiatry the protocols for handling emergencies are worked out in great detail and are effective precisely because they have been worked out in advance. The most effective level for a pastoral counselor to intervene in very acute care is in the formulation of hospital protocols and in the formation of social policy in the community. To advocate a community mental health care program is every bit as much contributint to the pastoral care of individuals as any action. It is frequently the most effective level to contribute to the psychotherapeutic care of a community.

(4) Pastoral care needs to establish itself as a theological discipline. Pastoral counselors must not be afraid to focus their task as more narrowly theological than in the past. Because of the rise of psychotherapy a division of labor has become necessary--and possible. The theological understanding of human being is as a creature in whom the ultimate is brought forth.

This focus has been neglected because pastoral counselors have not clearly differentiated their perspective from that of psychotheapists. There has been a tendency to see pastoral care as psychotherapy practiced by ministers in the church.[13] This has given rise to a subtle banishment of the theological. As long as pastoral counselors are practicing psychotherapy they take as their central insights those of psychotherapy

---

[13]The two recent histories of pastoral care (or pre-histories) have suffered because they understand the history of pastoral care to be the history of ministers helping individuals to solve their problems. A better history would have more in common with Eliade's Patterns in Comparative Religion than with these.

and along with them the limits and possibilities of psychotherapy. In taking as the goal of pastoral care the manipulation of human behavior or more generally the solution of problems, there has been a subtle exclusion of the sacred. Within a psychotherapeutic perspective only that which is objectifiable is real. The Sacred is that which cannot be objectified. Therefore, the Sacred cannot exist within a psychotherapeutic perspective. This simple syllogism tells volumes about the current state of contemporary pastoral care.

The alternative to this is to take a venture under the guidance of Imago deo. There can be no proof at the outset of the results of this venture. But there is the possibility that in the contemporary experience of individuals will be found a continuation of the Sacred history, and that there will het be new revelations of purpose and value.[14]

[14]It seemed anti-climactic to mention it at this point, but what I understand myself to be proposing is re-instigation of Schleiermacher's project of the investigation of religious self-consciousness.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. Books.

Adams, James Luther and Hiltner, Seward. Pastoral Care in the Liberal Churches. Nashville: Abingdon, 1970.

Boisen, Anton. The Exploration of the Inner World. New York: Harper and Row, 1938.

Browning, Don S. The Moral Context of Pastoral Care. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1974.

_____. "The Influence of Psychology on Theology." In The New Shape of Pastoral Care, pp. 121-135. Edited by William B. Oglesby, Jr. Nashville: Abingdon, 1969.

Bultmann, Rudolf. The Theology of the New Testament. New York: Scribners, 1951.

Cabot, Richard C. and Dicks, Russell L. The Art of Ministering to the Sick. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1936.

Camus, Albert. Le mythe de sisyphe: essai sur l'absurde. Paris: Gallimard, 1942.

Clebsch, William A. and Jaekle, Charles R. Pastoral Care in Historical Perspective. New York: Jason Aronson, 1964.

Clinebell, Howard J. Basic Types of Pastoral Counseling. Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1966.

Commission of Appraisal of the American Unitarian Association. Unitarians Face a New Age. Boston: American Unitarian Association, 1936.

Dilthey, Wilhelm. The Essence of Philosophy. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1954.

_____. Dilthey's Philosophy of Existence. Translated by William Klubach and Martin Weinbaum. New York: Bookman Associates, 1957.
This is a translation of the introduction to Dilthey's Weltanschauungslehre.

_____. Dilthey: Selected Writings. Translated by H. P. Rickman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.

Eliade, Mircea. Patterns in Comparative Religion. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1958.

_____. The Sacred and the Profane. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1959.

Encyclopedia Universalis. Fifth edition. "Ontologie," by Paul Ricoeur.

Feuerbach, Ludwig. Lectures on the Essence of Religion. Translated by Ralph Manheim. New York: Harper and Row, 1967.

Frankl, Viktor E. The Doctor and the Soul. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1952.

Freud, Sigmund. The Future of an Illusion. Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1964.

_____. A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis. New York: Boni and Liveright, 1920.

Hartmann, Heinz. Psychoanalysis and Moral Values. New York: International Universities Press, 1960.

Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967.

_____. The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays. Translated by William Lovitt. Harper and Row, 1967.

Hiltner, Seward. Pastoral Counseling. New York: Abingdon Press, 1949.

_____. Preface to Pastoral Theology. New York: Abingdon Press, 1958.

Husserl, Edmund. Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy. Translated by Quentin Lauer. New York: Harper and Row, 1965.

Ihde, Don. Hermeneutic Phenomenology: The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur. Forward by Paul Ricoeur. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971.

James, William. The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy. New York: Dover Publications, 1956.

_____. The Varieties of Religious Experience. New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1925.

Kant, Immanuel. Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by Norman Kemp Smith. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1961.

_____. Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone. Translated by Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1934.

Küng, Hans. Freud and the Problem of God. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979.

Levi-Strauss, Claude. The Savage Mind. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966.

_____. Structural Anthropology. Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1967.

Mackie, J. L. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977.

McNeill, John T. A History of the Cure of Souls. New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1951.

Nouwen, Henri J. M. Creative Ministry. Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1971.

Pannenberg, Wolfhart. Theology and the Philosophy of Science. London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1976.

Pauck, Wilhelm and Marion. Paul Tillich: His Life and Thought. Vol. 1: Life. New York: Harper and Row, 1976.

Pruyser, Paul W. The Minister as Diagnostician: Personal Problems in Pastoral Perspective. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1976.

Ricoeur, Paul. The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in Hermeneutics. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974.

_____. Fallible Man: Philosophy of the Will. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1965.

_____. Finitude et Culpabilite. Vol. 2: La Symbolic du Mal. Paris: Aubier (Editions Mantaige), 1960.

_____. Freud and Philosophy: An Essay in Interpretation. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970.

_____. Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970.

_____. Main Trends in Philosophy. New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1979.

_____. The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur: An Anthology of His Works. Edited by Charles E. Reagan and David Stewart. Boston: Beacon Press, 1978.

_____; Levinas, Emmanuel; Haulotte, Edgar; Cornelis, Etienne; Geffre, Claude. La Revelation. Bruxelles: Facultes Universitaires Saint-Louis, 1977.

Russell, Bertrand. A History of Western Philosophy. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945.

Schleiermacher, Friedrich. Brief Outline on the Study of Theology. Translated by Terrence N. Tice. Richmond: John Knox Press, 1966.

_____. The Christian Faith. Translated from the second German edition by H. R. Mackintosh and J. S. Stewart. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1928.

_____. On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers. Translated by John Oman with an introduction by Rudolph Otto. New York: Harper and Row, 1958.

Sartre, Jean-Paul. L'Etre et le neant: essai d'ontologie phenomenologique. Paris: Gallimard, 1943.

Szasz, Thomas S. The Myth of Mental Illness: Foundations of a Theory of Personal Conduct. New York: Harper and Row, 1961.

Tillich, Paul. The Courage to Be. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952.

_____. A History of Christian Thought: From Its Judaic Hellenistic Origins to Existentialism. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967.

_____. Love, Power, and Justice. London: Oxford University Press, 1954.

_____. My Search for Absolutes. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967.

_____. Political Expectation. New York: Harper and Row, 1971.

_____. The Protestant Era (Abridged Edition). Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957.

_____. Systematic Theology. 3 vols. Chicago: University Press, 1963.

_____. Theology of Culture. London: Oxford University Press, 1959.

Tracy, David. Blessed Rage for Order: The New Pluralism in Theology. New York: The Seabury Press, 1975.

Von Rad, Gerhardt. Old Testament Theology. 2 vols. New York: Harper and Row, 1962/1965.

II. Journal Articles

Browning, Don S. "William James' Philosophy of Mysticism." The Journal of Religion 19 (January 1979): 56-70.

_____ and Lyon, Bernie. "Sociobiology and Ethical Reflection." Theology Today 34 (July 1979): 229-238.

Cabot, Richard S. "Adventures on the Borderland of Ethics: A Plea for a Clinical Year in the Course of Theological Study." The Survey 55 (December 1925): 275-277, 315-317.

Hiltner, Seward. "Man of the Month: Paul Tillich." Pastoral Psychology 3 (December 1952): 66.

_____. "Mr. Hiltner Accepts." Pastoral Psychology 1 (May 1950): 6.

_____. "Pastoral Care and Pastoral Counseling." Pastoral Psychology 3 (November 1952): 21-28.

_____. "Theology and the Institutional Chaplain." Pastoral Psychology 2 (February 1951): 24-28.

Ricoeur, Paul. "L'Hermeneutique de la Secularization: Foi, Ideologie, Utopie." Archivio di Filosofia (1976): 49-68.

_____. "The Model of the Text: Meaningful Action Considered as a Text." Social Research 38 (Autumn 1971): 529-562.

_____. "La Philosophie et la Specificite du Langage Religieus." Revue d'Histoire et de Philosophie Religieuses 55 (1975): 13-26.

Tillich, Paul. "Beyond Religious Socialism." Christian Century 64 (June 15, 1949): 732-733.

_____. "The Impact of Pastoral Psychology on Theological Thought." Pastoral Psychology 11 (February 1960): 17-23.

_____. "On the Boundary Line." Christian Century 77 (December 7, 1960): 1435-1437.

_____. "Psychoanalysis and Religion by Erich Fromm." Pastoral Psychology 2 (June 1951): 63-64.

_____. "The Theology of Pastoral Care." Pastoral Psychology 10 (October 1959): 21-26.

Tracy, David. "Theological Pluralism and Analogy." Fordham University Quarterly 54 (March 1979): 24-36.

Williams, Daniel Day. "Truth in the Theological Perspective." The Journal of Religion 28 (October 1948): 242-254.

Pastoral Psychology 19 (February 1968). This entire issue is dedicated to Paul Tillich.

III. Manuscripts

Barth, Karl. "Ludwig Feuerbach." Translated by J. L. Adams. Meadville/Lombard Theological School Library. A portion of a lecture on the history of modern theology, given in 1926. It appears in Die Theologie und die Kirche, Zurich, 1928.

Gerrish, Brian A. "Theology within the Limits of Piety Alone: Schleiermacher and Calvin's Doctrine of God." Mimeographed.