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A STUDY

in

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THEODICY

or

THE RESPONSE OF MIND - ATTITUDES

to

THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

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by

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A THESIS

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CHAPTER - I.

THE INTRODUCTION

I suppose there is neither in religion, ethics, nor philosophy a more difficult or more disputed problem than that of evil. Historically it has been one of the storm centres of debate, and this might well be, since in the very problem of evil one finds the test case for theologies, philosophies, and systems of ethics. This is no doubt due to the underlying fact that our attempts to think straight -- for such all theologies, ethics, and philosophies are! -- have come in response to the stimulus of evil. They have been attempts to understand what men have labored, fought schemed, and prayed to escape, and have called "evil". The view of the modern evolutionist who calls evil the spur to evolution has no small grain of truth in it. If we were, indeed, in the least inclined to be poetical, we might see in evil a divine musician playing on the chords of life, and bringing forth from each its hidden music, hidden in the depths of every man, waiting but for the touch of the master's hand.

Apart from its central importance in systematic thought, the problem of evil has a practical bearing not to be ignored. It is met in many forms by the unsophisticated minds, and proves a stumbling block both to the advance of religion and morals. What and how one views evil will unquestionably determine the degree to which advance views of religion can be taught. If evil is seen in the peasant-thought to be the work of witch-charms or of devils, the problem presents a special

difficulty to the reformer, and demands, indeed, a special method of approach, both for theology and ethics. This is a the practical side of evil which does not concern us particularly in our present study.

For our present study not the smallest difficulties are involved in the 'why' of so many and divergent theodicies. Among the explanations of evil advanced, there are no two coming to the same conclusions. The question must be raised, Why is this? The difficulties of definition are not less; definitions of the terms used in theodicies vary, ~~as greatly.~~ And, without question, we may expect to find answers to the origin, cause, purpose, effects, and such like of evil varying greatly. The different theodicies have varied from a mere denying of the reality of evil, calling it an error of judgment, to the most complicated dualism, where mutually antagonistic forces are fighting for the mastery of the universe.

How shall we approach the complex field of theodicy? The casual observer, the mere dilettante in the fields of psychology, even, is recognising the importance of mind-attitudes. Why should we not approach theodicy from the dominant mind-attitude of the one who offers us a solution? It may be stretching a figure, but I ~~will~~ shall venture to speak of the psychology of theodicy. At the basis of the divergence of theodicies is the conflict of mind-attitudes, as much as divided personality among men is traceable to severed mental states. The mind-attitude is of great importance in understanding the theodicies we shall discuss.

In discussing the problem of evil, we ~~will~~ shall have four factors to consider; (1) the world of empirical knowledge; (2) the dominant mind-attitude of an investigator. Out of these two (chiefly out of the (2)), will grow the last two; (3) the definition of what evil is;

and (4) the method of approach. The world of empirical knowledge is relatively unimportant, being given but little consideration in most discussions. The important factor is the mind-attitude. The mind-attitude both creates and solves evil, and this is the cause of the great divergence between theodicies. Of the four factors three are variable quantities, and the one fixed point has been thought of little importance.

This fact alone makes an adequate -- universally acceptable -- theodicy impossible. A theodicy never satisfies anyone so fully as its own author, simply because it grows out of his own mind. We shall not attempt to give an explanation of evil. It would merely be adding to the already conflicting views advanced. I shall simply attempt to study the theodicies advanced and see what of practical value rests with all together.

To simplify my task I have approached the theodicies from the psychological point of view, the responce of mind-attitudes. I make no attempt to understand the psychology of the particular writer but of the group of writers who for convenience can well be classed under the divisions I use. In this chapter, the first, I am concerned merely with general introductory points. Chapter II, on Evil as Fact, will attempt to find out what evil is aside from our interpretation of it, if, indeed, evil has any existence at all in such a state of our minds. Chapters III, IV, V, VI, and VII, respectively, will deal with the nature and the general responses of the Apprehensive, the Suggestible, the Reflective, the Empirical, and the Critical mind-attitudes. In chapter VIII, I shall attempt to draw some conclusions from my study, the Creative mind-attitude.

To determine the characteristic of a mind attitude is comparatively easy. Not so, is the response of the mind-attitude. How shall one treat these divergent responses in a clear and intelligible manner? There is no adequate method for a common approach to all. Almost in desperation, I have adopted what is, no doubt, an artificial scheme. I have determined to use the method my mind almost unconsciously adopts, of putting to each 'mind-attitude' the query of our five interrogative pronouns. What is evil? -- metaphysical, physical, moral intellectual, spiritual? When did evil come into the world, when will it cease? How did evil enter? how does it continue? how does it effect man and God? how shall man or God put an end to it? Where is evil? in man alone, in God alone, or in both? Why does evil exist? through necessity of God or gods, of matter, of thought, of ideal? or through the purposive choice of God? I think these questions cover the field. They are artificial in the extreme, but yet helpful in a difficult discussion.

CHAPTER II.

EVIL AS FACT.

Confused and baffled by an unknown evil the bewildered Job cried out: "Oh, would that mine adversary had written a book". No doubt that was a cry for clearness on this perplexing problem, ~~before us.~~ Such a desire is not confined to Job. We would like to have evil defined in black and white for us that there might be no misunderstanding of its nature, cause, and implications.

What is evil in and of itself? We have a great number of contradictory definitions ready at hand, gleaned from numerous theodicies, but they add confusion not clearness. They are all colored by ultimate philosophies which men have tried to defend. We desire to know, if possible, what evil is, apart from all theories as to its final reconciliation with some theory a man has to advance. What is evil? Whatever it be, evil is the one relatively fixed point to which we must cling in our study of theodicies. Mind-attitudes and their responses will inevitably vary; but evil must be made as nearly fixed as possible. For, if we leave evil to be defined by every writer -- and thus a variable quantity -- our task will become absolutely hopeless. What is evil? How near can we come to a definition that will be free from the influence of theory and mind-attitude?

Perhaps the ideal thing would be to have a definition come down to us, as it were, from the blue, free even from the work of human consciousness. One of the limitations of our study is the imposs-

ibility of such an ideal definition. Then might we feel certain that we did possess a fixed point for argument, but it is not so. Even the best of our endeavor must be confined to such definitions as human consciousness is able to construct for itself out of itself. To rule out the influence of the higher processes which end in theory is our desire. There is no knowledge absolutely free from some such influence, but there is one kind that is relatively free. This is the knowledge gained by experience, without the working of higher processes. The knowledge world that we thus meet in experience we term the World of Empirical Knowledge. This world we must confess, to be strictly honest, is to a large extent an abstraction. What does it tell us of evil?

Is evil a "thing-in-itself"? If so, it is impossible to seek it in the empirical world; its nature we could never know. The "thing-in-itself" is purely metaphysical and must be discussed in abstraction. It is the Unknowable that lies just below sensation, even as we are told there is another Unknowable lying above our highest conceptions. Is evil this "thing-in-itself"? No. The"thing-in-itself" is, by definition, undifferentiated x, without attributes, or qualities. Now the problem of evil and the problem of good -- for there is such a problem -- are two, twin problems. If we decide that evil is the "thing-in-itself", we must, logically, come to the same conclusion in regard to "good". But this would be unthinkable. We would thus be postulating a duality in the "thing-in-itself", which the mind cannot grasp. By the very nature of the concept, the "thing-in-itself" must stand for the unknown, undifferentiated substance below sensation. Then duality would be a differentiation within the "thing-in-itself", admitting -- theoretically -- of a further reduction to a still lower, and purely undifferent-

iated state; which is the virtual denying of this as the "thing-in-itself" and postulating another "thing-in-itself" just beyond. We may then assert that evil -- also good -- is not the "thing-in-itslef". Therefore evil does not lie below sensation, and so may be approached in the empirical world. Below sensation is out of sight.

The world of empirical knowledge is the world lying within sensation and perception. What is evil here? A pure sensation, apart from perception, is something that we rarely meet. A perception follows so quickly upon sensation that they are blended in our conscious processes. Our sensation of a red rose is a red blurr; but perception tells us that it is a red rose. This is the difference. Sensation then can tell us little of evil. We must depend upon perception which gives us the empirical world. Yet there are evils in the world limited to sensation, so testifies the orgahism.

The evils pointed out by sensation are extremely few. Why we call them evils at all, is out of respect for the orgahism which treats them in precisely the same manner as our higher conscious processes treat what are commonly called evils -- by withrawl from, and avoidance of objects. These objects we call evil. In sensation they are chiefly physical pains alone, of heat or cold, hunger, thirst, pressure, dizziness. I place my finger in a flame; I almost instantly withdraw it. No higher process intervened. Reflex action jerked it back. If I doubt this being without thought process, an experiment on an Amoeba will show the same result. Here, in sensation, evils are confined to sense organs lower than the visual and auditory, though not

so much through necessity as through the fact of experience. A bright, dazzling light, such as we meet in gazing at the sun on a clear day, would be a visual evil to be avoided. The crash of thunder would be an auditory evil calling for covering the ears to shut out the noise. The range of evils here is very limited. On sensation alone we could not base a definition of evil.

In perception physical destruction still exists as an evil but with it there is more still. My finger is still drawn back from the fire by reflex action that calls physical destruction an evil. But comparison with other such experiences leads the mind to group these experiences of similar nature together and call them "heat", "burning", "fire", and approves of the reflex action that removed the finger in time to prevent serious injury. But it goes further than the mere physical evil. The conscious life approves the avoidance of evil on other grounds. It notes its past experience, says that too much fire destroys a finger, and notes that a destroyed finger has lost the ability to do the work of a finger; therefore consciousness declares the burning of a finger by fire is an evil, since it destroys usefulness (which is the begining of a purely moral judgment in regard to evil). Also the conscious life has learned that a severe burn results in a blistered or festering finger, or a running sore; such is suggestive of decomposed food-matter, which, if taken into the stomach, results in nausea and a general loathing. The reflexive act is approved in that it prevented a condition of the finger that would be distasteful; for this new reason, the burning of a finger is declared to be an evil, because burning destroys the original natural form of the finger, replacing it with a

repulsive condition resembling putrefaction,(the begining of a purely aesthetic judgment in regard to evil).

Thus we find in the empirical world of sensation and perception that "evil" is a term applicable to destructive agents. But to be evil, the thing destroyed must have "worth". In the reflexive withdrawal of the finger from the fire the "worth" was physically sensed, not perceived. But above sensation the "worth" becomes more a part of conscious process, of perception and conception. Evil then becomes a destruction of "worth" that is set by the conscious processes themselves. In a word evil becomes the destruction of ideal ends. Under ideal ends, the purely physical evil loses ground. The burn is still a physical evil, but above these it becomes a greater evil through ideals of service (moral), ideals of purpose (religious), and ideals of harmony (aesthetic or intellectual). I place the words moral, religious, aesthetic, and intellectual in brackets because in our use they imply a degree of speculation not fully present in an empirical world. The unfolding of the idea of an ideal end is about all there is there. The physical reflex is the strongest part. The sense of ideal end may not go further than what we would express in the exclamation: "My finger isn't meant for that!"

Later we shall find that the question of the reality of evil will be one of the most disputed points in theodicies. What does experience, with the least possible coloring of theory,have to say on this point. Perhaps this can be best treated as purely speculative, but as we shall in later chapters deal with speculation, let us here consult the world of empirical knowledge.

In two general ways the question of relativity of evil is introduced into the discussion; (1) by the main thesis of a theodicy, that is, by direct assertion that evil is an error in judgment, an outgrown good, a passing phase of the present points of evolution; (2) where the relativity -- or negativity -- is implied by other arguments and the general conclusions of the disputants, as in the case of a number of monistic idealists, who, indeed, make strenuous efforts to prove that evil is positive, and yet in some way taken up into a higher unity where it is entirely transcended and ceases to be evil. Mystics, in general take the (1) course; philosphers are apt to follow the (2).

Against the negative view of evil is ranged a double class of opponents; those who have felt the keen edge of evil destroying the "worth" of life, who merely suffer without relief; and those who have a thesis to maintain that would be upset by such a view of evil, as negative. Where the assertion of the positive nature of evil is made in discussion of theodicies, the assertion can be considered as not primary. It is relative, depending upon a prior counter assertion having been made. We need not name adherents of a positive view of evil; they are numerous. Usually they can be classed as men opposed to the ultimate philosophical systems which are supported by a view of evil as relative, passing, or negative.

The above criticism is just: the question of reality is not a primary, but a secondary issue in the problem of evil. And yet the defender of evil as positive has the weight of experience on his side -- so the World of Empirical Knowledge tells us. What does it say?

If positive means what some would have us think, then

the empirical world cannot help us. Positive cannot mean "independent of" or "transcending human consciousness". If positive means that evil is the "thing-in-itself", we need not consult experience. The "thing-in-itself" is ~~at~~ below the level of conscious life, and so beyond the limits of our present discussion, which must bar speculation. But, as we have seen above, even in the field of speculation such a view of the nature of evil is unthinkable. Again, evil is not meant to be the "thing-in-itself" when we say that evil is positive.

I venture to say that positive can mean no more than that evil is found in Sensation -- that is in the lowest, most fundamental level of conscious life, and so free from theory. In Sensation evil, indeed, is the only positive thing -- heat, thirst, hunger, exhaustion, pressure. Evil is positive in the sense that it is in Sensation and cannot be rooted out. On the border of perception evils increase. This favors the view of evil as positive and not negative or illusory. Successive states of cognition add to the awareness of evil; they do not destroy evil. Thought processes may eventually by their own almighty 'fiat' declare evil to be non-existence -- but evil does not die; the fire still burns the finger; the conscience still rises to point the finger of shame at betrayed trust. Evil may be trampled down, but not eliminated from consciousness, by superior knowledge. Now, if evil were indeed an illusion, experience tells us that the result would be otherwise. Before understanding knowledge illusion fades away as shadows before the sun. When once we clearly learn that a certain appearance is an illusion that illusion immediately flees. Once disillusioned -- in a case where there was an actual illusion -- it is often very difficult to force oneself to see again the exact nature of the illusion,

so fleeting is its nature. Not so with evil. All our assertion never fully convinces. The assertion that evil must be repeatedly made for every recurrence of the experience of evil -- and then not always with success, as witness the doctors admitted secretly through the rear entrance to the homes of many Christian Scientists.

But there is a sens e in which evil is relative. Experiene tells us that that is evil which destroys "worth". But what is "worth"? The intensity, the amount, the duration of evil will depend upon the objects declared of "worth", -- physical, moral, intellectual, spiritual. The degree of facility with which we transfer "worth" from one manifestation of the ideal -- physical, moral, intellectual, or spiritual -- enters as a large factor here. "Worth" may be attached to educational ideals, and centre on a particular object, a country school house for instance, on which parents of a rural community depand as the sole means for the education of their children. The destruction of that school building by lightning would be an evil. Positive? No. The keen mind may see that its existence was standing in the way of a new and much better equipped school. In the ashes of the old may be seen the rising of a greater and more widely influential institution. The man who made this transfer of "worth" from the old institution, now in ashes, to the new, and yet unbuilt, school, saw good rather than evil in the stroke of the lightning. Perhaps,even, he had prayed for the that lightning stroke! Others, without the vision, the facility for rapid transfer of "worth", called it a positive evil. This fact makes all definition of evil difficult. We see how evil can have a relative, passing aspect. But again there comes a deeper objection: why must good come by means of destruction and pain and heart-ache? Is this

not the hideous monster that we call positive evil? We are now in the maze of the labyrinth of theodicies. Who shall find the way out?

Let us look briefly at the numerous definitions of evil and see if they correspond to the testimony of the empirical world.

Evil is disobedience of the will of God -- sin. Evil is willing your own finite will against God's will. The simplest objection is that the empirical world knows no God. God is a concept of a level of consciousness transcending sensation and perception. As an ultimate definition perhaps this is good, but as a definition for the begining of discussion it cannot be used. It is question-begging. It is a definition that would not be acceptable to all parties in a discussion.

Evil is an error in judgment. Perhaps so, but this definition depends upon ultimate philosophical conclusions. If the empirical world says one thing, it affirms that evil is not an error of judgment. In sensation and perception evil is not influenced by judgment.

Evil is that which marks the imperfection of the finite in its relation to the perfection of the Infinite. This may be true, but the empirical world is not cognizant of such terms as finite, infinite perfect, imperfect. Here again is the placing in a definition of that which only speculation can reach. To understand the definition one must understand the philosophy of its advocate. This will not do for our purpose. A definition of evil must be on common grounds, acceptable to all. Where is there any such grounds except in the empirical world? And the empirical world rejects this definition as incomprehensible.

Evil is desire, ~~drawing~~ driving the Unconscious out into the conscious. Aside from the question of the ultimate truth of this

definition, we must reject it; it, likewise, is not within the world of empirical knowledge.

Evil is the result of action contrary to, or in disobedience of, laws. This may be adavanced by a Deist, a Theist, or a Positivist. In this respect it is broad and more nearly worthy of acceptance, due to its appeal to more than one class of philosophers and theologians. But it cannot be taken as our definition of evil, where we are making a strong insistance on experience. We have no experience of laws; laws are present only to the highest reflective conscious processes. This is true whether we think of laws as imposed upon man from without or created by himself, (Karl Pearson, "Grammar of Science"). We do not experience laws; we formulate -- or become conscious of -- laws through reflection on experience. We cannot accept this definition as a starting point.

Evil is anything that obstructs the progress of evolution. This is a common definition of today, but unsatisfactory for our purpose. It is question-begging, for a discussion aiming to start from experience. The empirical world is not aware of evolution. Indeed, evolution is a theory not acceptable to all thinkers even after long reflection. We may finally believe in evolution, but we never have an experience of evolution. I may be willing to swear by evolution, but this should not blind me to its evident defects as the second term of a proposition that attempts to be a fair definition. Moreover, such a view of evil flatly contradicts the testimony of experience, that the destruction of worth is evil, in that this definition sees such as good if it can in some way serve the progress of evolution. Again, this definition is the virtual denying of evil. Under it -- with nine-tenths of evil al-

ready ruled out -- how hard would it be to show that the other one-tenth, where the course of evolutionary progress is checked, can after all, in the long run, be an aid to evolution, pointing out the road around future obstruction? Is there any evil at all under the heading of such a definition? No, none. Again,this definition makes an entirely unwarranted assumption that there is a definite known progress of evolution, in the light of which acts are to be judged. This assumption necessarily calls for two other equally unsupported assumptions (1) that man's conscious life is the goal and arbiter of evolution -- for we need must speak from man's point of view alone -- ; and (2) that within man himself there is a conscious certitude in regard to what the "progress of evolution of man" means. What man dares affirm an act to be evil under such an definition? He needs must know what tomorrows turn of evolution will bring, and that no experience, but only theory in its most attenuated form can give him. Such a question-begging definition leaves far behind the world of empirical knowledge, to which we must appeal.

How shall we then define evil? At present no final definition can be given, but the world of empirical knowledge gives us a starting definition with which to work. In Sensation evil is physical pain, no more. In perception evil is clearly seen as physical destruction, and then as anything destructive of what the conscious organism terms a part of itself. This broadening is through a desire to preserve what is deemed of "worth". Taking our terms in the simple sense in which they are met in the empirical world we can say that evil is anything which tends to destroy -- wholly or in part -- what the conscious organism deems of "worth", whether it be in the physical, moral, intellectual, or physical world,

III.

THE RESPONSE OF THE APPREHENSIVE MIND.

The strange, the vague, the unseen, the powerful has always been a source of terror. This is true both in the childhood of the race and in the childhood of the individual. When one looks back at his own childhood days and recalls its numerous imaginary evils, and sees that his own mind was two-thirds, if not all, of the 'boogy-man'; and when later observations among mature men and women bring to light the working of great, and seemingly, unfounded fears, one feels that there is such a thing as an Apprehensive Mind. It convulses the child in paroxysms of fear; it wrings the anxious mothers heart, though her child be safe as any human life can ever be; it blanches the faces of what we might otherwise call brave men. Before the Apprehensive Mind, molehills become mountains; rumors, destructive panics; and pains, common to the lot of man, the insurmountable obstructions of a malign fate, if not of plotting devils themselves.

Strictly speaking, one must consider the apprehensive mind as the negative side of the Suggestible mind, the positive side responding in a like, though opposite manner to suggestion. The man who sees the working of mighty hostile forces in this world is, through his suggestible nature, making a great leap from the plain uncolored facts to his final conclusion. It is response to suggestion. And so is the response of the poetically inclined, who sees beauty, loving purpose

even in the deepest pain. One is the negative, the other is the positive side of suggestion. But I have chosen, perhaps arbitrarily, to call the negative response Apprehensive, and the positive response Suggestible. I have done this because in positive response there seems to be more of active following out of suggestion; the negative, apprehension,is more a recoiling, a 'freezing in one's tracks'. I have called this chapter the Response of the Apprehensive Mind, while the next chapter has been reserved for the more positive side of suggestion, being called the Response of the Suggestible Mind.

This attitude of mind, which we have found in ourselves and in others, and which tends to exaggerate the ills of life, we have chosen to use as a means of approach to certain treatments of the problem of evil. 'Fear first made the gods' is an old and significant statment, but it is hardly sufficient to explain all our religious developments. Most of our religions are the outgrowth of two great parallel problems, the problem of good and the problem of evil. These two cannot be fully severed from each other. But the importance given either to the one or the other decides the mind-attitude of the man or woman. Where fear predominates devils are in great number; where good predominates merciful gods are chiefly found. The existence of so many dualistic systems of religious thought is testimony to the perplexing nature of these parallel problems: they often were pitted against each other, locked in an unending struggle for mastery.

As an apprehensive mind has been more active in our childhood days, so has it been more influencial in the early, primitive periods of man's civilization. 'Fear first made the gods'. Paul Carus,

in his interesting book, The History of the Devil, emphasizes this primacy of fear in religious thought.

> "From a surveyal of the accounts gleaned from Waitz, Lubbock, and Tylor, on the primitive state of religion, the conviction impresses itself upon the student of demonology that Devil-worship naturally precedes the worship of a benign and morally good Deity. ..... Demonolatry, or Devil-worship, is the first stage in the evolution of religion, for we fear the bad, not the good." (Carus: H. of D., p. 6).

We need not be surprised that religion begins with fear. We need hardly expect that the world in which our primitive ancestors lived was in the least a better world than that in which we live. Fire burned, cold chilled, animals were ravenous, hunger wasted, storms destroyed, and men were then as cruel as the beasts themselves. When we realize that what makes us find beauty and love in this world is to a large extent our own ability to see distant ends accomplished by present evils, and when we realize that such a vision came but late in the human race, then do we understand the great incentive to build up weird religions based on fear of unseen but ever present destructive demons.

> "Religion always begins with fear, and the religion of the savages may be directly defined as 'the fear of evil and the various efforts to escape evil'. Though the fear of evil in the religions of civilised nations plays no longer so prominent a part, we yet learn through historical investigations that at an early stage of their development almost all worship was paid to the powers of evil, who were regarded with special awe and reverance.
>
> "Actual Devil-worship continues until the positive power of good is recognised and man finds out by experience that the good, although its progress may be ever so slow, is always victorious in the end." (Ib. p. 14).

If we understand the apprehensive mind, we see clearly that the fear, the dread, of destruction is a personal fear. When fear first comes home to us, it is not a fear for others -- least of all, for

an abstract principle of ideal worth; it is a fear for personal existence. This fear does extend to others but through the selfish path of family or tribal unity. Some writers, as W. Robertson Smith in his Religion of the Semites, desire to restrict the word religion to such expressions as seek the beneficent aid of good spirits, not using it in reference to the mere propitiation of the malign spirits. But, as Robertson Smith says, even the good spirits are domesticted evil spirits; they have grown from malign to beneficent. The next chapter will deal with the great religions of the world in their peculiar attitudes toward the problem of evil. Here the discussion must be of a limited nature.

Let us put our questions to the Apprehensive Mind. Its answers can speak best for itself.

What is evil? Herbert Spencer says that evil has been the great Unknowable, to the primitive mind. There is always an element of uncertainty as to the outcome of a dangerous encounter, always an element of uncertainty, but what is feared by primitive man is chiefly what he <u>knows</u> to be dangerous to himself. This knowledge has come through bitter experience. To such knowledge the apprehensive mind adds of itself more than is really there, but mere 'unknowableness' is not the basis of fear. The known, experienced, evil is sufficient. From this the imagination builds its schemes of demonology. Evil is anything destructive of worth. Worth is chiefly physical in the earlier stages of civilisation. Yet, with the development of culture, the extent of evil increases. More ideal ends are recognized as defeated.

It is uncertain to what extent men in the period of animism ask the question of the origin, duration, or cessation of evil.

These questions are rather speculative. They belong in the problem of evil but are not the earliest in appearance. To the man in the period of animistic thought , evil is an existent fact. He traces it to spirits in the objects. How or when these spirits appeared there are later questions. He concerns himself first with appeasing their hostility. It may be done by gifts, sacrifices, or magical formulas. The primitive man conceives of the surrounding spirits as being influenced in a manner similar to men, since stones and streams and such like are animated even as the men themselves.

But the same tendency which directs religious thought toward monotheism has lead the apprehensive mind to see more and more evils caused by fewer and fewer spirits or demons. Shall we call it the survival of the fittest Devil? At least the more dreaded demon-spirits came to be looked upon as the source of nearly all evils. The result in some instances, as in the Persian and the Christian religions, was the final attribution of all evils of life to one powerful evil principle or spirit. Satan and Ahriman are the archfiends. But these developments ran parallel with deification of good principles. The evil was earlier in origin but not independent of good. Man early recognised the strange fact that there were two sides to evry thing. Fire is good or evil, depending on its use. In the hands of evil spirits it is evil; in the hands of the good spirits it is good. This lead to the great dualism that is even now hard to escape, the dualism of good and evil. This dualism, since it depends upon a division of the mind, where apprehension does not rule supreme, I would prefer to leave to the next chapter

We need to keep in mind the fact that the recognition of beneficent powers was a slow process. Where one Jinn,or spirit of an ancestor, or spirit of a place,came to be known as friendly, the whole country, trees, rocks, streams, clouds, animals, and winds were infested by the malignant powers. Life was a precarious existence, to be insured only by the most extreme precautions. Indeed it was very late that man had the idea of a beneficent power being able to protect one outside of its special region. The dependant upon a local spirit had to flee to the dwelling of his god for protection. It was not till late that Israel could think of Yahweh as leaving the temple at Jerusalem and punishing the sinner a-far off. Not till the lesson of Jonah was taught was this fully understood, if even then. In animistic and later polythesitic views escape from the wrath of a vengeful deity was extremely difficult. The Aeneid tells us of 'Juno's direful wrath' that pursued the happless fugitives from Troy.

Sacrifices, prayers, fruit and meal offerings, magical practices are drawn upon by the apprehensive mind as escapes from evil, which is seen as the direct action of a malign spirit or devil. A large step has been taken upward when the human mind can conceive of its own struggles against evil as serving a benign spirit that is pitted in warfare against the same evil that the human soul must endure. It is an attitude that lifts men upon mere apprehension to that of positive action. They are servants of their god. It is a positive reaction to the bitter experiences of life, and falls under the head of Suggestion. The Response of the Suggestible mind is postive and trusting.

CHAPTER IV.

THE RESPONSE OF THE SUGGESTIBLE MIND

How persistently real evil is, and yet how different are the attitudes that men can take toward it! And how significant one's attitude when the final effect upon himself is considered!

Between the Apprehensive and the Suggestible Mind-attitudes there is almost as much difference as between the optimist and the pessimist. The pessimist looks at life as a bad bargain, but he does not resign his efforts to live. His efforts are merely the half-successful attempts of weakness to propiatiate the unscrupulous power of an ill-minded fate. How otherwise is the Suggestible Mind affected. Its response does not deny the existence of evil. It rises, in a sense, above it. It makes of man, not the helpless victim of fate, but also the servant of a higher, purer spirit that is fighting precisely man's own battles. The Suggestible Mind-attitude is that of the poet. It sees beauty, where others see mere lines; it sings of triumph, where lesser spirits complain of defeat; it sees loving purpose, where the common vision rebels. The spirit of religion is poetical.

Yet evils exist. They are perhaps even the more real, due to the exalted nature of the vision of which the suggestible mind is capable. Who weeps for the destruction of art but the man of artistic temperment? Who, for a shattered dream of life, except the dreamer of that dream? Evil is but the more real, though its effect is not permitted to be stunting in the response of the suggestible mind.

Above all other things the religious mind we are dealing with is poetical. There are two sides to such a mind-attitude; one dream and the other acts. The practical side of religion may, to the man of deep ethical interests be the most important side of religion, but in all religious expressions, which must be the basis of our study, the religious mind is poetic. And poetic means filled with the tendency to follow the suggestive lead of the higher and purer side of ones nature. This great tendency to throw oneself on the side of the higher nature leads to the practical postulating of some beneficent power greater and purer than man himself. What greatness and pureness mean depends somewhat upon the ideal requirements of society at what ever period we may take it, for such things vary greatly. With this slight restriction on meaning, then, we may say that the suggestible mind postulates some Being greater and purer than itself, to which it attaches itself as a follower and servant.

When the Suggestible mind has seen in its visions an embodiement of its ideals, a step has been taken but the problem of evil has not been solved. Evil still remains, perhaps more serious than before. This God is of great value, but its own existence is somewhat precarious. Unless there is someway of explaning the existence of evil that seems fairly successful in withstanding the combined strength of worshipper and God, then the God must fall. Who shall name the dead Gods of mankind? What Gods have not fallen victims to the great power of evil? When I read in the old mythologies the stories of the great conflicts and the slaying of hosts of Gods, I am led to think that there is all too much truth underneath the stories. They are stories true to experience of man in his ideal life, in his poetic response to the good

and the beautiful, where he has seen in his deepest visions the onward moving of a power greater than himself, of whom he was but a follower, and on whom he relied, only to be rudely awakened by the ever present problem of evil, to find his 'god' unequal to the battle with evil. But not all have been defeated. Their Gods have been more than themselves and have won out. How? Through some satisfactory explanation of the presence of evil. These have been of a great variety for the Suggestible mind.

1. DUALISM.*

The most common escape from the evil which seemed to be proof against both man and his beneficent God is the escape of dualism. It is a practical escape. If the beneficent God is opposed, there must be some being external to God acting against God.

(a). These opponents of the beneficent God were of the same power and rank with Him, but of an hostile mind. They were anti-gods, or devils. It is fairly safe to say that an element of such devil opponents of deity is to be found in all religions.

The religion of Egypt, of which we know but little, is illustrative of this dualism. Perhaps here the dualism can hardly be called a conscious dualism, but it is present nonethe_less. In general we find Osiris, the beneficent God with his followers beset by the evil minded God Set. Prehistoric traces suggest that Set was a an All-powerful God of old made demon by the rise of the Osiris cults. However this may be

*The outline I here follow is taken in the most part from Pfleiderer: The Phil. of Rel., vol. iv. p. 1-2.

we find that in the later periods Set was the source of all evil, a demon to be dreaded.

> "Set, or Seth, whom the Greeks called Typhon, the nefarious demon of death and evil in Egyptian mythology, is characterised as 'a strong god (a-pahuti), whose anger is to be feared'. .... He is conceived as the sun that kills with the ▪▪▪▪▪▪▪ arrows of heat; he is the slayer." (Paul Carus: Hist. of t. Devil, p. 15).

> "As an enamy to life, Set is identified with all destruction. He is the waning of the moon, the decrease of the waters of the Nile, and the setting of the sun."

Evil is here personified. All that is destructive of 'worth' is associated with the name Set. The evil power of Set was not limited to this life. The body has a double, which lives after the bodies death and can suffer all evils known to the body in life. The future must be guarded against the machinations of Set. The soul was thought to be in need of food and drink, and to suffer as the body had. The only means of escape in the view of many was that of magical formulas and incantations. These secur- the needed food for the soul. Hence the great importance of funeral rites, and proper embalming and carving of magical formulas upon mummy cases.

> "'The Book of the Dead of the ancient Egyptians and the numerous inscriptions of the recently opened pyramids are, indeed, nothing but talismans against the imagined Seth and his associates.'" (Carus, p. 19, quoting p. 706 of H. Brugsch: Rel. und Mythologie d. alten Aegypter).

But we would do the Egyptians an injustice if we were to think that they had in no case advanced above magic and incantations. To deserve the name religious, they must have some sense of the value of their allegience to a beneficent power, not merely opposition to a demon. As Carus says, a righteous life appealed to many as the sole means of escaping Set in after life.

"...in spite of all superstitions, and the ridiculous pomp bestowed upon the burial of the body we find passages in the inscriptions which give evidence that in the opinion of many thoughtful people the best and indeed the sole means of protection against the typhonic influences after death was a life of righteousness." (Carus: H. of D., p. 20).

After death the soul must descend in the lower world and be tried before the Lord of Life and Death. If the soul is found lacking in virtue, it is destroyed and that ends the matter. But, if the soul is found perfect in the eyes of the judge, it is conducted to the Elysian fields of the blessed. The soul becomes one with the beneficent Gods. Here the soul suffers the fate of Osiris, being slain by Set. It is not a final detruction, for the soul is born, along with Osiris, in the child Hor who takes vengeance on Set.

"Set, the great and strong god of prehistoric times, was converted into Satan with the rise of the worship of Osiris. Set was strong enough to slay Osiris, as night overcomes the light of the sun; but the sun is born again in the child-god Hor, who conquers Set and forces him to make the old snake of death surrender its spoil. As the sun sets to rise again, so man dies to be reborn. The evil power is full of awe, but a righteous cause cannot be crushed, and, in spite of death, life is immortal." (Ib. p. 28).

In Persia this dualism is even more marked.

"The transition from Devil-worship to God-worship marks the origin of civilisation; and among the nations of antiquity the Persians seem to have been the first who took this step with conscious delib eration, for they most earnestly insisted upon the contrast that obtains between good and evil, so much so that their religion is even today regarded as the most consistent form of dualism." (Ib. p. 50).

This Persian religion of dualism, called Zoroastrianism after its founder, was much the product of one man. The questions of evil and good are fairly answered by the suggestible spirit of Zoroaster.

There are two uncreated principles, good and evil. The

good is called Ahura Mazda; the evil, Ahriman. Both are self-existent. Ahura Mazda is the creator of the universe of Law. This universe of his creation was perfect, no pain, no hunger, no evil of any kind, as it came from the hand of Ahura. But the jealousy of the evil-minded spirit Ahriman lead him to interfere in the good creation. His intrusion into the realm of Ahura is the cause of evil. The subsequent life of the world has been a conflict between the two forces. The duty of right-minded men is the service of Ahura Mazda ih defeating Ahriman. Ahura will be victorious in the end. The men of evil life will be cast into a hell of fire; the servants of Ahura will dwell in eternal blessedness. This religion of Persia had great influence on post-exilic periods of Jewish thought, and thus on Christianity, and especially on the heretical sect of Manichaeans, who believed in a dualism more absolute than that of the Persians.

In Israel the development of an evil principle separate from the good can be traced, in the literature of the Hebrew people. In the canonical documents of the Old Testament Satan is never an enamy opposing Yahweh, but an obedient servant executing his will. So the Satan of the Old Testament hardly represents a pure dualism. More will be said in regard to this in a later section.

But in the background of many Jewish expressions and religious ceremonies lies a dualism similar to that of Persia. The material is so slight that not much can be said in regard to it, but it seems that in the time of the desert wandering the people had just left a religious conception in which good and evil were looked upon as parallel. The conservatism of religious ceremony points to this. Azazel

was a desert demon some of whose rites were carried over into the later period of monotheism. The account of the purification of Israel in the sixteenth chapter of Leviticus is suggestive in this matter, showing a certain equality between the good and the evil.

> "And Aaron shall cast lots upon the two goats; one for the Lord, and the other for Azazel. And Aaron shall bring the goat upon which the Lord's lot fell, and offer him for a sin offering. But the goat on which the lot for Azazel fell, shall be presented alive before the Lord, to make atonement with him and to let him go to Azazel in the desert." (Lev. 16/8-10).

But this is so far from the real worship of two opposed forces that we can say no more than that some such thing originally existed among the early Hebrews. Azazel is a last lingering remant of an early dualism.

Of Satan we may say that he did not represent a power hostile to Yahweh. He was a servant of Yahweh to whom the lesser and meaner deeds were entrusted. He was Yahweh's prosecuting attorney, as some one has well said. Yet, even at that, he serves in the thought of the people the place of a complete dualism. It is very difficult for men to think of good and evil as both from the same source. Ultimately Yahweh may have been the source of both good and evil, but the religion seemed on a better working basis as the idea of evil being enacted by Satan grew. This development can easily be traced, but it hardly belongs here.

The Christian Devil grew out of the Jewish Satan, but, in the grossness of many conceptions came nearer to pure dualism. But this cannot be said of all Christians. Yet in general the Devil represented the evil forces of life arrayed against the good. Monotheism was maintained in theory by the over-ruling Father God, but the real world was

divided between the forces of Christ and the Devil. The greater part of the world was on the side of the Devil, for the world was his dominion. But in the long run Christ would be victorious. The evil powers would be overcome. Those who had fought on the Devil's side would be destroyed with him. As to the manner of escaping this evil, opinion differed. One thought that the escape was through living the righteous life, thus serving the cause of good in its battle with evil. Others, especially the author of the Fourth Gospel, thought that the escape from evil was through 'believing' that Jesus was the Son of God. This was a Gnostic tendency. However much their theories and practices varied, in all we see the working of the suggestible mind that raised its own moral struggles above the clouds and found courage in believing that the very struggle that wastes our life is also the struggle of Beings above, upon the outcome of whose battle all our happiness for the future must depend.

(b). One may look upon evil as due to the opposition of a Fate to which the gods must bow. This explains the helplessness of the beneficent gods at trying periods when they fail to succor their devotees. We find it chiefly among the early Greeks. But it is not produced as the sole cause of evil. Fate usually stands in the way of removing evil, but hardly is the source of it.

(c). Matter may be the opponent of spirit. Strictly speaking this dualism is philosophical, a product of the reflective mind, but any such dividing lines are difficult of enforcement. This treatment of evil as associated with matter, producing an insuperable obstacle to the good intentions of Deity, is present to Plato's thought, to the Gnostics,

to the Apostle Paul, and to the author of the Fourth Gospel. Their differ very much in detail, but all agree on a certain evil resident in the material world that obstructs the progress of good.

2. MONISTIC.

Monistic here may not be used very strictly. I use it as a heading for religious explanations of evil that do not centre evil in some hostile power, but either in an imperfection of God himself or in his creature man. It is very difficult for our minds to conceive of a one all-inclusive God as in any way imperfect. With monism we naturally expect complete perfection. In our reflective thinking this is true, but to the suggestible mind in its dealing with evil there is seldom any very complete Oneness.

(a) An Imperfect Deity is the cause of his own evils. Evil comes not from external opposition but from blunders, ill-will, and such like of God.

God meant right but he knew no better. There are two sides to this, one ancient and mythological, the other modern and philosophical. The ancient mythological attribution of evil to the ignorance of God is very repulsive to our modern thought, and we feel some what sceptical as to whether it ever was very seriously held. Pfleiderer mentions an instance of such mythological view.

> "...the reason of evil in God maybe a defect in his thinking: thus, in the legend of the Kamtschatkans evil came from the stupidity of the Creator of the world, who was only prevented by his wife, who is cleverer than himself, from perpetrating still greater follies."
> (Pfleid. Phil. of Rel. vol. iv. p. 1).

The modern example of some such similar explanation of evil is in the

philosophy of the Unconscious Will, (see ch. vi. sec. 4). Here evil is due to the irrational striving of the will after existence. And a certain modification of this philosophy, omitting its pessimistic tone, is in the view presented by Professor Doan, where God is seen as not all-wise from the begining, but honestly learning from experience and doing things better after a few failures. Much of evil is due to ignorance, but that ignorance is being overcome in God's life just as in our own by experience and willing to be better.

A view common to ancient thought looked upon much of evil as due to the jealousy of God or gods. This is found chiefly in Greek thought, where it is mixed up with polytheism, and in a smaller degree, perhaps, in Hebrew thought, where it is strictly monotheistic. The jealousies among the Greek gods themselves, and their jealousy of men who aspired to be too powerful is common knowledge to all. Prometheus is a good example. Prometheus was cruelly punished for giving fire to men, a powerful adjunct by which man might vie with the gods themselves, and which Kronos had been guarding from man. Hebrew thought is likewise full of expressions in which Yahweh is spoken of as a 'jealous God', and in more senses that one. He is not only jealous, as Ezekiel would have us believe, for his honor among nations, but of man's power. Witness the restriction on the fruit of the tree of knowledge in the Garden of Eden, the destruction of the tower of Babel! Also Yahweh is shown to directly cause man to sin in order that he might punish him.

> "And again the anger of Yahweh was kindled against Israel, and he moved David against them, saying, Go, number Israel and Judah."

And the account goes on to tell of the severe punishment Israel suffered for this act of impiety <u>inspired by Yahweh</u>.

(2) The Imperfection of the creature is the cause of evil in the world. The suggestible mind, when once it has conceived of a power of righteousness has tended to humble itself, and find all evil, not in God, but in man, who fails in some way to rise to the high standard of divine leadership set for him. He fails in many ways.

A Fall from Grace has been a popular theodicy. Some place in the distant past a perfect state of society existed, in which evils did not have a place. This fortunate condition, established by God, or the gods, was lost through some weakness of man. Greek thought turned thus back to the Golden Age long lost by man's rapacity and thirst for power. The Christian thought likewise has turned back to the Garden of Eden, lost by some original sin. The 'why' of these falls from original perfection is not different from the reasons offered for evil where no original state of perfection is thought of, so we may consider them all together. The important point is not what condition a man fell from but why he fell, or, if a fall is not thought of, why he lives in evil. It is his own fault.

Man has free-will. God has created man with liberty. If he abuses that liberty, he suffers. This is a realistic theodicy. Man's suffering is the just punishment of his evil deeds. A distinction is made in theological discussions here between moral and physical evils. Physical evils are educative and necessary to the imperfection of the finite existence, while moral evils are the result of man's free-choice of something known to be contrary to the will of God. This distinction may be pressed too far. It is only as the human mind becomes aware of the untenable character of such a theodicy that it begins to draw such

distinctions. In Hebrew thought, in the prophet school, the Deuteronomic writers, and Job's contemporaries, physical evils were the result of the moral transgression. Evil there was both physical and moral, the moral being the direct cause of the other.

As free-will came to be worked into systematic theologies it became the centre of the whole Christian system of salvation. A perfect condition was lost to man by Adam's disobedience of the the will of God. He and his descendants were punished for this. Accordingly all men are born sinful. They are helpless to gain heaven unaided by God. God accordingly sent his Son into the world to aid man in a return to his primitive state of perfection. Since he lost it through disobedience only obedience can win it again. This is to be shown by believing in Jesus Christ as the 'only begotten Son of God, whose blood was shed as an atonement for sin of man. Belief in Christ wins such salvation from sin. But the evil is not confined to this world. The greater evil is in a future life. Salvation consists in escaping such future punishment. The present is a probation, where the true believer must prove his faith; in the next world he will receive his reward. Doubtless this future reward is a concession to the fact that nothing in this world seems to insure man against evil. Great disputes have arisen in the church as to man's ability to help himself. All practically have agreed that human effort alone was useless, but some only have gone to the extreme of saying that man was absolutely helpless and that all the work of salvation is from God alone. This is the great controversy between Augustine and Pelagius. We need not discuss it here. In general this is the 'orthodox' scheme of redemption. It is truly a product of the suggestible

mind.

To whom such theodicies appear too superstitious the free-will escape from evil may serve in other manners. The suggestible mind, too a certain extent, trusts itself. One of its most common experiences is that of moral guilt, a consciousness that an evil action need not have occurred. The self-accusing moral consciousness speaks so loud that the suggestible mind tends to take its accusation as pointing to a solution. If the individual can so bridal his own will as to will what God wills, then, there would be no evil for him. If God wills suffering the individual should accept this suffering as meant for a good purpose. Faith in God's infinite goodness will lift the sufferer over all evil. This, to be sure, is no especial theodicy; it is merely the suggestible mind's attempt to reconcile its own life to the presence of evil after it's other explanations have been shown untenable.

Man is too ignorant to cooperate with God. His intention is good but he fails miserably through lack of knowledge. This has no reference to physical evils which are outside of man's control, and so leaves them unanswered. It is an answer of a rather educated class of people and does not stand for the suggestible mind. The God of beneficent power is very far off. We might say this was the theodicy of Deism. Men suffer through their failure to cooperate with God's wise and merciful laws. It is a spur to education, and so helpful. But it is the begining of the sceptical mind that ends in the entire repudiation of the suggestible mind-attitude as superstitious.

Evil is an error in man's thinking. This is a typical mystical attitude toward evil. Believe that there is no evil, and there

will be no evil. This is a tribute to the human mind, in which is seen to lie the distinctions between good and evil. Evil is an illusion, a deceit of finite existence. What Professor Royce says in regard to this is very interesting.

> "The mystic first denies that evil is real. He is asked why then evil seems to exist. He replies that this is ~~xx~~ our finite error. The finite error itself thereupon becomes, as the source of all our woes, an evil. But no evil is real. Hence no error can be real. Hence we do not really err, even if we suppose that evil is real. Herewith we return to our starting point, and can hope to escape only by asserting that it is an error to assert that we really err, or that we really believe error to be real. And of the dialectic process thus begun there is, indeed, no end, nor at stage in this process is there consistency."

Mysticism may object to such rough dialectic handling, yet, if it would attempt by similar processes to deny the reality of evil, it must be content to have the tables turned. The difficulty is that this 'grain of truth' in the mystic position is carried to an unwarranted extreme. When the suggestible mind tries to completely monopolize the field of human consciousness it is in danger of runing into untenable extremes.

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To sum up, the suggestible mind is conscious of powers higher than itself -- which it defines in numerous ways -- that are fighting the same battles men are engaged in against evil. Evil is seen as destructive of the life of this, or these, higher power or powers. Evil is the destruction of the worth of life. Evil may be personified as an anti-god, or demon; it may be thought of as impersonal fate; or it may be seen as matter. Whatever its form, its presence is keenly felt. Man and God both are interested in some solution. The two must in some way work together, God offering some means and man cooperating with the proffered help. In good time evil will be overcome.

CHAPTER V.

THE RESPONSE OF THE EMPIRICAL MIND.

There is a type of mind-attitude with which we are nearly all familiar. It sees facts as facts and refuses to go further than the statement that they are facts. It is a cultivated mind-attitude more often than natural. As to this we need not concern ourselves. We are interested in how it treats evil. This we cannot know without appreciating its general attitude toward life. The empirical mind-attitude is suited best to such scientific pursuits as require little imagination. Facts alone, uninterpreted, appeal to this mind. It says: "Business is business and science is a beautiful thing". In its work emotions, such as are so directing in the response of the suggestible mind, are barred as misleading.

In the response of this mind-attitude there is, strictly speaking, no problem of evil. Evil there certainly is, but there is no problem of reconciling it with any theory of the goodness of God or of ultimate reality. The problem goes by default of such theories. We from the empirical mind no theodicy simply because it recognises in its thinking no 'theos'. All we can expect here is simply a very clear statement of the facts of evil, and possible human modes of making the best of an unfortunate facts. We have much to thank such a mind-attitude for in our civilization.

Where disease is seen to be wasting the life of men and causing unbearable pain, the empirical mind seeks to check its ravages by

direction action without speculation as to why such a thing is permitted in this world. Medicines and surgery are offered as checks to such evils.

Where ignorance seems, from the accumulation of facts, to make make man weak in his practical checking of disease and other ever present evils, the empirical mind urges more thorough education of all classes of society. Immorality, since leading to weakness of body, is to be checked by education and wise laws of man's own making.

To the empirical mind there is no problem of evil, simply evil to be avoided. If the question of origin of evil is raised the reply is that man does not know and that he need no t waste his energies in fruitless speculation; he needs all his strength for practical work. To this mind-attitude we owe much, but none of our numerous theodicies. It is the attitude of the positivist, concerned more with practical work than with theory.

CHAPTER VI.

THE RESPONSE OF THE REFLECTIVE MIND.

Who is not familiar with the reflective mind, and its peculiar characterists? The idea, reflective mind, at once suggests to all the picture of an old man, at the end of life's journey, looking back upon the past, its crooked places now "made straight", seeing in the now distant turmoils and strivings a gleaming thread of gold, till now unseen, running through all, binding the once shattered and garring fragments into a whole of marvellous beauty; before him "the past rises like a dream". The quiet of age has brought upon the restless strivings of youth a calm repose; a new light breaks through all. Age has brought an attitude of mind that is reflective.

We would be wrong to confine this mind-attitude to mere length of years. Age more often brings it, but reflective temperments may be given by birth. One may be born with such an attitude of mind. If so, the present rises before him "like a dream"; all is bound into a unity of perfect harmony. One may be youthful, and yet possess an attitude of mind that cries out to see the world as a Whole, self-consistent throughout, capable of being grasped in "a scheme entire". Harmony, harmony is his passion.

The reflective mind is not content to dwell satisfied by the perfection of its own vision. The reality of the empirical world of evil -- as seen by others, or , perhaps, by itself -- challenges the reflective mind to a harmonization of the perfect World View with the facts of experience.

The reflective mind finds in evil a grave problem, taxing all its ingenuity. But the difficulty is not distinctly moral or religious, as we found it to be in the case of other mind-attitudes. Evil is a serious problem to the reflective mind only in that it is concerned with harmony of the Whole. Here evil is chiefly a problem of accuracy, clearness, consistency of thought. Empirical facts, laws, morality, God, matter, are not, to the reflective mind, ends in themselves. They are but elements out of which a World View, self-consistent throughout, is to be framed. They are the clay upon the potters wheel. Reflection is the potter. Out of the lump -- no more must we call it -- shall come one form, not more, of complete perfection. One not two, not many! The reflective mind abhors duality, plurality. It says that duality is an inhibition of its own reflective processes. Reflection, of itself, would never be content with dualism. One perfect Whole it seeks. To become dualistic reflection must be violently turned aside from its main channel by distinctly religious or moral considerations. Let there be consistency, says the reflective mind. Every fact of the empirical world must have a cause, must admit of rational explanation -- fitting consistently into the Whole -- whether that cause be a mechanical law of necessity, a purposive choice of an Absolute, or an ideal necessity of thought.

Three factors draw the reflective mind into consideration of evil. (1) the reflective mind feels under obligation to give a self-consistent explanation of the world of empirical knowledge in the light of the perfection of the Whole. (2) The reflective mind realises that the discordant and destructive nature of evil -- as it is seen -- is the dominant factor of experience. (3) In the indisputable universal-

ity of the self-accusing moral consciousness, that affirms of an evil deed: "I did it", is found an element discordant with the Whole. An inexplicable, irrational, uncaused choice on the part of some individual destroys the consistency of World View, which depends upon the possibility of rational explanation of all parts.

I group the methods of solution for the reflective mind under four general headings. These are general headings, and not mutually exclusive. For instance the first division deals with free-will, yet free-will arises under the other headings. I have chosen the headings merely for convenience. Those philosophers will be classed under the same heading who make their chief approach to the problem of evil over the same grounds. For instance the first heading would come the consideration of the Xian theologians who make free-will the sole cause of evil, yet others who treat of free-will, as Royce, Leibnitz, Kant, etc., belong under an other heading, since their chief argument is not based on free-will.

1. FREE - WILL.

The reflective mind may avoid the inconsistency found in the presence of evil in the world through a doctrine of free-will. One may listen to the urgent voice of the moral consciousness in its self-accusing declarations until he finds there a solution of evil. As treated by the reflective mind this doctrine of free-will becomes distinctly metaphysical; but its origin, historically, is theological. Free-will became prominent in philosophy through Christian apologetics.

The Christian connections of free-will may have something to do with its limited horizon. Not all thinkers can appeal to free-will. As a satisfactory explanation of evil it goes best with a view of God as 'ab extra'. The less God is viewed as outside of the universe, and more involved in its life, the more free-will becomes inadequate. Where deity is viewed as transcendant and immanent, then the theory of free-will is usually present, but only in an attenuated form, of no real consequence as a solution of evil.

Let us examine free-will under these three possible headings.

(1) Free-will as a solution for 'Deus ab extra'.

What is the view 'Deus ab extra?? God is the creator, first cause, of all. God is assumed to be perfect in wisdom, intention, and power. What he ought He wills; what he wills He does. Power, wisdom, goodness all are his.

What is evil here? Here evil is, as a rule restricted to the moral sphere, though as a complete explanation, free-will also has to shoulder even the physical evils. The problem of evil is, how evil ever came into existence under the wise, and good, and all-powerful rule of God. (This problem we met under the chapter on the Suggestible Mind's Response, but we may briefly re-state the general argument, as it has some claim to be reflective).

The answer is, that God did not create evil; man himself gave evil its existence. God created men as free moral agents, enclining them to neither good nor evil, leaving it to man's independent choice, which he should take. Man chose evil. Man has no one to blame but

but himself. The justice, the wisdom, the power of God are thus, as the theory claims, exonerated.

This theory seems, in part to have the support of experience, in so far as it agrees with the accusations of our moral consciousness. This no doubt has given the wide acceptance that this theory of free-will has received. But the moral consciousness protests that it suffers somethings that are not due to its own willing. These are too numerous to enumerate. They are all the evils beyond the direct control of man. Whence came these? Our theory holds that this state of perfect freedom, where no evil existed, was a state existing only for the first man. His choice of evil committed the world to a future of evil such as we daily experience. The mode of escape, since it involves doctrines of atonement, and is chiefly religious, had better be left to the previous chapter on the Response of the Suggestible Mind.

The objections to this theodicy are twofold. One may criticise it from the religious standpoint or from the standpoint of reflective thought. The religious criticism we have already considered. It began in the English deistic movement, and culminated in scepticism. Doubt as to the divine revelation of the Genesis story of creation and the Temptation, and the growth of trust in human nature as a creator of its own institutions and social concepts, shook the foundations of the free-will view in religious circles. The reflective mind's objections are of a different nature.

This view of free-will is called "indeterminism". W. James, "Will to Believe", says, "Indeterminism is rightly described as meaning chance." Chance is irreconcilable with rational explanation.

Leibnitz objects to this old theodicy because it leaves room for the entering wedge of cosmic disorder. Leibnitz' cardinal principle was that nothing happened without a cause. Any such free-will, as described above, would be mere chance, admitting of no rational explanation. The old view of free-will was rejected. But the moral consciousness of man must be accounted for. Therefore Leibnitz retained an attenuated form of free-will. It certainly does not serve as an explanation of evil; it is a problem in itself, demanding explanation. Leibnitz argues that man never finds himself in a stage of indifference, of equipoise. Man is lead to his decisions by motives, desires. The choice is the "resultant of all the competing inclinations and the ultimate reason of these lies in the disposition of his own nature." Man is free simply in this that he is contelled, not by any external force, but by his own nature, which is forordained by God. Free-will is retained; God's omniscience, and the possibility of rational explanation are not sacrificed.

(2) Free-will and the God transcendant and immanent.

Here there are two phases of the problem. Free-will here may concern the choice of God, or the choice of man. Naturally where it concerns God's own choice we can have little to say, it being so far beyond our reach of experience.

Here God is All-perfect, as in the view above considered. Also He is immanent. Evil is not only do to God as creator, but it is in some sense his own life, in so far as He is immanent. God has chosen evil -- for it exists -- for some purpose, and that involving himself. Why? Into the councils of God we may not enter. The sug-

gestion, in our own lives, of the purging and purifying effects of evil endured, may lead to the decision that God has chosen evil to be a part of his incarnate life, as in some way working for His own good. To be of any such service God must be completely incarnate, immanent in the world life. But this would meam His imperfection -- since the world life is striving activity --, a desire for perfection. A God completely in this world would be under the limitations of this world. Therefore the distinction between Time and Eternity is drawn. In time God is completely incarnate in this world; in Eternity he is transcendant, above it. The great champion of this theodicy is Professor Royce. Perhaps he comes more nealry under the division of the "Relation of the Part to the Whole".

The individual is a part of the temporal life of God. When the individual suffers God suffers. His tears are my tears. We are one in joy and sorrow. But the moral consciousness of the individual is the same. The individual is personally responsible. He chooses good or evil by attention or non-attention to the Ought of the higher self. Evil is but partially due then to individual free-will. Even here, since the individual is a part of the immanent God, his evil is not entirely evil, for in his link with all he must at some time or other help expiate the wrong. Free-will here is but small, hardly enough to be an explanation of the existence of evil on the part of the individual. Evil is the choice of God, of whom in Time, the individual is a part.

(3) <u>Free-will with an absolutely immanent Deity</u>.

The great problems of theodicy, under this view of God, are non-existent.

Evil there most certainly is, but no All-perfect Deity with whom its existence must be harmonized. To the question, How can God be all-good and yet permit evil? the answer is God is desires to prevent evil but cannot. God is not infinite except in tendency. God is not all-good, nor all wise, nor all powerful. Evil is the life of God too, but out of it is the infinite tendency to evolve. It is evident that in any such view of God the problem of evil becomes quite different. It is not a question so much of the origin as of the fate of evil. The fate of evil is in the hands of men, or of God, just as you care to say. "God, if not merely human, is at any rate essentially just that," (Dr. Doan, p. 194, "Religion and the Modern Mind").

But yet freedom becomes in this view more important, if it can be fully substantiated. The existence of evil can be done away with by the courageous willing of men. The life of God is involved in the decisions, not the fate of the individual alone. Out of relative chaos the universal life has moved into greater order, and into consciousness in man through willing. Only in men does this willing become conscious, does the part involved become aware of its own responsibility and capability of good by its own choice to live for the good. Man necessarily is somewhat helpless in the presence of many physical evils. These are the life of God, but the relatively unconscious life of God. Man, as conscious can now check the evil-causing tendencies; life lower than man lacks the self-consciousness needed for such. But man, as conscious, must will to not-sin. His freedom involves God -- the universal life now waking to conscious choice in him.

The reflective mind finds difficulties here, but they are

not all properly classed under 'free-will'; a fuller consideration can more logically come under the fourth general heading of this chapter, the Unconscious Will.

Under the consideration of free-will we cannot turn to the philosophy of the absolutely immanent God for an explanation. It does not attempt to explain the existence of evil through a theory of freedom. In this I am using freedom in a very broad sense; I am not restricting 'evil' to the destruction or obstruction of moral "worth", but using it as refering to the "worth" of physical life as well. Here then cannot fall under human willing the cause for all evils. A few such as are directly traceable to our ignorance or weakness may be due to man. But the great majority are outside of man's control. These are not touched by man's willing. A man may will to make pure his own life; that is possible. But to make fortune always the reward of virtue is beyond his will's power. The choice of the will here may determine the fate of a small part of evil, but it does not explain its origin, nor the origin of the much greater part which is beyond man's possible control.

Also here we face more than before the problem of whether or not there is such a thing as freedom. Science through its investigations in nature and in psychology is more and more questioning the claim of freedom on the part of the moral consciousness. Many holders of the view of the God absolutely immanent are doubtful of the fact of human freedom of choice.

Free-will, to recapitulate, is a theodicy that depends entirely upon the ultimate philosophy of its advocate. As a complete theodicy it is found only in a view of special creation, where the God

-life is not in any way involved in the creation, neither depending on it nor directing it. As we depart from such a view of God, free-will gradually becomes less and less adequate to meet the problem of evil, and where considered becomes itself a problem. Where God is viewed as partly immanent and partly transcendant, free-will is of importance but by no means a complete explanation; moreover the free-will as used must be considered both in God's and man's action: both are considered as having made a choice not entirely forced upon them. In the view where God is absolutely involved in the life of the world, without begining and without hope of end, free-will is not advanced as an explanation of evil. Free-will may be so used as to further ends that the individual chooses to make eternal by the weight of his choice, but more he cannot do. ******* Free-will is not a satisfactory theodicy since the undermining of the Xian theology out of which it came.

2. KNOWLEDGE.

Evil may be approached from the point of knowledge; but ones theodicy will necessarily be limited thereby. Socrates is the great exponent of knowledge as the cause and cure for evil. In this he restricted 'evil' to the moral, intellectual,and religious phases which were from man outward. We might say that 'evil' was restricted to 'sin', though the Xian usage of this word was necessarily much later than Socrates. Evil were the deeds of man that were not done in accord with what all men are able to recognise as the duties of men. Socrates argued that men did wrong, not through willing, but through ignorance. Every man seeks to do what is best, the surest to bring happiness to himself. Only a false understanding of objects makes a man choose to do wrong in staid of right

The man who chooses to run away and leave the battle has a false idea of his own happiness; he thinks that the preservation of his present life is necessary to happiness, and fails to see that the consequences and after-thoughts of cowardice are more destructive of his happiness than the facing of danger. A clear knowledge in respect of these matters would make all men brave, and all men doers of good.

Socrates, in common with the Sophists, scorned the physics of his day, and was very sceptical of knowledge that transcended the experiences of daily life. He did not, therefore, enter into questions as to the cause of other evils. He considered the failure to perform ones highest duty -- the function belonging to man, just as there were particular functions belonging to the animals -- to be the great evils. Others he did not consider. These, that he did consider were due to ignorance. Socrates, with the Sophists, considered man to be the measure of all things, but not the individual man, which would permit of as many truths as there were men; but the truth which all men respond to. This tended to give Socrates a more objective authority than was possessed by the Sophists. In this way Socrates could make evil more definite.

In this form knowledge is but sparingly offered as an explanation of evil. Socrates was too optimistic in regard to good and evil. Men do not do what they know to be right. Moral evil is not the result of ignorance. The most humiliating thing about 'sin' is the fact that one is conscious that he has knowingly done what he ought not to have done. Socrates thought that virtue was teachable, in that it would follow knowlege. In this he was mistaken. "Intellectual culture

and moral excellence are .... entirely independent of each other. ... moral excellence in no wise springs from reflection, which is developed by intellectual culture, but from the will itself, the constitution of which is innate and not susceptible in itself of any improvement by means of education" (Schopenhauer, p. 73 of Essay on "Human Nature", in Baily Saunder's trans.). Against the view of Socrates we have quoted the radically opposite view, showing the great change of emphasis that is possible in regard to knowledge. No doubt Schopenhauer may be as far wrong on the other extreme, but the truth cannot lie with Socrates. Another passage from the same author strengthens the view that moral evil is not entirely due to ignorance. The weight of this argument appeals to all, in that it is all too common an experience of life. Schopenhauer says,

> "The unalterable nature of character and the consequent necessity of our actions are made very clear to a man who has not, on any given occasion behaved as he ought to have done, by showing a lack either of resolution or endurence or courage or some other quality demanded at the moment. Afterwards he recognizes what it is that he ought to have done; and, sincerely repenting of his incorrect behavior, he thinks to himself, If the opportunity were offered to me again, I should act differently. It is offered once more; the same occasion recurs; and to his astonishment he does precisely the same thing over again." (Ibid. p. 77).

That is an extreme statement of the opposite, which is in a large degree true to experience. But it is not true that we thus never profit by experience. Schopenhauer has gone just as far to the opposite extreme from Socrates. Nothing is truer than that we learn by experience.

This leads us to some more modern views of the nature of evil, its purpose, and destiny. These are, as Royce, "Studies in Good and Evil", calls them, "Popular compromises between a belief in a world of natural law and the belief in a teleological order". They look

upon evil as transient and disciplinary in nature. Pain teaches us wisdom. A burn warns us against the fire. Evils teach us our place in the system of things; knowledge grows under the stimulus of evil. Evolution has depended upon the presence of evil. Evil is the spur to progress. This sort of a theodicy, though popular, is unsatisfactory. It does not really explain the presence of evil; nor does it tell us more than how we are actually making the best possible out of something we are powerless to escape. Royce very justly critises it.

> "If we did not suffer, we should burn our hands off! Yes, but this explanation of one evil presupposes another, and a still unexplained and greater evil, namely, the existence of a danger of which we need to be warned. --- If I can only reach a given goal by passing over a given road, say of evolution, it may be well for me to consent to the toilsome journey. Does that explain why I was created so far from my goal? ----- One justifies the surhery, but not the disease; the toil, but not the existence of the need for the toil; the penalty, but not the situation which has made the penalty necessary, when one points out that evil in so many cases is medicinal or disciplinary or prophylactic." (Studies in Good and Evil, p. 6-9).

Our knowledge does grow with experience; that experience is largely made up of evils; and our knowledge to a certain extent helps us to meet new evils, but such knowledge falls woefully short of being a grounds for all the evil that exists. Knowledge cannot be a satisfactyr theodicy. We must turn elsewhere. The reflective mind, fertile in resourses, has still other approaches to a solution of our problem.

3. THE PART AND THE WHOLE.

Under this heading, perhaps, all the explanations of evil might be classed But we choose to class here only such theodicies as make evil the necessary limitation of the finite in its relation to the Whole. Freedom of the will and the theory of knowledge may fall here, but the special emph-

asis is, in both cases, rather on the freedom ~~in~~ or knowledge than upon part and whole. In this class will fall the largest number of theodicies. Perhaps this will be due to the fact that here there is postulated a Whole with which all the minor detailed parts must be reconciled -- and such is, in reality, necessary to any real problem of evil in the sense of needing a theodicy. The reflective mind demands a consistent view of the Whole, where the evils of the parts are duly recognized as as existent yet made someway or other harmonious with the Whole.

Where we have a consistent World View, where there is postulated a Whole, we find that Whole thought af as perfect. Imperfection is a contradiction, a lack of harmony that would make the Whole but a part. To preserve a self-consistent philosophy of the Whole, one must postulate coplete perfection. Perfection must be in the Whole. How, then, is the presence of evil consistent with the perfection of the Whole? In answering this question there arises another, why is this very contrast itself, between the part and the Whole, existent? could not the Whole be perfect without this contrast? In general three modes of answer are taken: (1) it (-- the contrast --) was purposely chosen; (2) it was chosen with neither purpose nor cause, but with caprice; (3) it is due to the necessary metaphysical limitations of deity.

(1) <u>There is a purpose in the imperfection of the finite</u>. This is the assertion of the majority of theistic thinkers. God created the world with a definite purpose in view. Not all are, however, very clear as to what that purpose was. But here we must deal with thinkers other than distinctly religious, meaning thereby connected with some traditional and well-developed belief in Go.

Plato thought of the world of sense, wherein resides evil, as the purposive act of the supreme Idea, being the creative expression of the Good. We may call this external constraint, in that the Good seems not satisfied without reproducing itself. But in Plato's thought there was no idea of necessity forcing the creation of the world.

> "The Idea is the absolute good; God is supreme goodness. Now the good or goodness cannot but create the good. God is life, and life must create life. Hence God must create; the Idea must create itself," (p. 92, Weber: History of Philosophy.)

The Idea is the only reality, but is also the only activity, so it must produce out of non-being the matter for the best possible of worlds. This matter becomes eternally co-existent with the Idea, but being the equivalent of non-being, the matter does not destroy the supreme Perfection of the Idea. But the matter offers resistence to the creation of the Idea. Matter is necessary to the creation of the Idea, and yet it is an eternal obstruction to the Idea.

> "It (matter) is non-being or the perpetual negation of being, and consequently opposes and resists everything positive, stable, and immutable, and forever destroys the works of God. It is the primary cause of the imperfection of things, of physical and moral evil, as well as of their,instability, their constant change, and of all that is uncertain, perishable, and mortal in them." (Ibid. p. 94)

This reminds one of the distinction later made by Leibniz between the 'antecedent' and the 'consequent' wills of God! Still, in spite of this seeming frustration of the purpose of the Idea, Plato considers the world to be the best possible world. Does this imply a limitation of the strength of the Idea to carry out its creative purpose? It seems so.

Plato considers man the "paragon of creation", for whom all else was made. Man's soul is endowed with reason, and his body is arranged so as to develope the workings of reason. This soul is an

emanation from the world soul.

> "The human body is, according to Platonism, a house of correction and education, constructed and organized with a view to the moral perfection of the soul." (Ibid. p. 97).

"Man is the end of Nature, and the Idea the end of man." The soul is to leave evil and find its highest good in becoming as near to the likeness of God as is possible. This lies in justice. Man must seek to resemble the Idea in justice. Justice covers 'truth', 'courage', and 'temperance'. Justice needs education for man's attainment to it. And this is social; it cannot be attained in isolation. But yet it is impossible to do entirely away with evil. Evil, as Plato views it, is not 'positive' but relative. A thing may be good in comparison with one thing but bad in comparison with another. Therefore evils can never entirely pass away; in the world of sense some evils must exist in order to have the good.

But the reflective mind has not been content with Plato's Idea. It finds in it a dualism between matter and the Idea. Besides the starting point, the empirical world, in which we start to argue for the existence of an 'idea of cat' separate from the 'cat', gives man little ground for such final conclusions. It is simply the apotheosis of mind, on the part of the reflection of Plato.

Josiah Royce -- to skip from an ancient to a modern example of purpose-finding reflective thinkers -- is an idealist much resembling Plato. He uses a more familiar vocabulary; he takes into account the intervening philosophical developments; and he is more conscious of progressive world activity, though Plato, too, viewed the Idea and its creation as 'active'. However Royce talks not of the world

-- the cosmos -- as the creation of God, but as His incarnation. The world 'nous' becomes involved; it is the immanent God. These are, of course, great changes; but the essential idea is the same. A purpose hardly within the scope of human thought leads to the creation of the phenomenal world. Resistence to the will of the Idea or the Absolute produces the passing phases we call evil. The goal with both is the attainment to divine perfection. In neither is this perfection existent in the visible world; with one it is presently existent in the Idea; in the other it is only existent in Eternity.

Why there is evil in the world, when God is viewed as its life and its author, let Royce answer for himself:

> "The true question then is: Why does God thus suffer? The sole possible and sufficient answer is, Because without suffering, without ill, without woe, evil, tragedy, God's life could not be perfected. This grief is not a physical means to an external end. It is logically necessary that the Captain of your salvation should be perfected through suffering. No outer nature compels him. He chooses this because he chooses his own perfect self-hood. He is perfect. His world is the best possible world. Yet all its finite know not only of joy but of defeat and sorrow, for thus alone, in the completeness of his eternity, can God in his wholeness be triumphantly perfect." (p. 14, Studies in Good and Evil).

Royce views God as Perfect, absolutely perfect, but only in eternity. In the present temporal order He is involved by his own choice in the imperfections of the world. Why? Simply for his own discipline. We hesitate to raise the question but we rather wonder why God should desire to be perfect? to suffer? Are not these rather anthropomorphic feelings to ascribe to the Absolute? Have not these high desires of ours come to consciousness only through the prodings of bitter experience? In short, doesnt the desire for perfection imply previous experience of imperfection? Would Royce grant that his God was a blind urge at the

begining? I hardly think so. Yet I do feel that this is a large assumption on his part that the present evil -- God's temporal life -- was chosen by a Perfect Being for his own perfection. Perhaps I am not fair to Royce, perhaps he does not think of Perfection choosing a means to perfection, but of the distinction between time and eternity being non-existent to the Absolute, in which case a thought or wish would be an instantaneous fulfillment. But even here, how may a man enøter into the councils of God and know why he chose such and such?

Man also has a part in the cause of evil. His influence is indeed temporal and fleeting, but he may choose to deny the Will of the higher Self, and thus obstruct its progress. Royce believes that freedom is a fact and that it is necessary to a Moral Order. Man's freedom however is expressed not by an uncaused choice that borders upon 'chance', but by 'attention'. By attention or non-attention to the Ought man produces evil in the world. But this evil is temporal.

> "The only field of choice... is the field of attention. --- An idea arises in your mind. Attend to that idea rather than to any other, and at once the idea, filling the whole circle of your consciousness, turns into its appropriate deed. --- Does the conceived deed win possession of the whole field of consciousness? Then, indeed, by what thenceforth appears to the externally observant psychologist as an altogether automatic process, the deed is carried out in man's conduct." (p. 353, World and the Individual).

This represents an evil where one is the cause through failure to attend to the Will of the higher Self. There are evils that are not due to one' failure in this line, but due to external defeat of one's own strivings. Thes Royce considers.

> "(An) epitome of every finite conscious life in the temporal world might be given in the words, 'Dissatisfied with what now is, I press on toward what is yet to come'". (Ibid. p. 383).

"All finite and temporal processes of will must inevitably involve dissatisfaction. ---- the finite life to which we belong is full of ideal strivings, so that the whole creation, seeking its own fulfillment, groaneth and travaileth together in pain until now." (Ib. 385).

Through this very fact man becomes responsible for much of the pain in the world. But such responsiblity is cause for his rejoicing.

"I suffer. Why? In general because I am an agent whose will is not now completely expressed in a present conscious life. I seek in the Beyond my fulfillment. The higher my ideals, the more far-reaching my plans, the more I am full of the longing for perfection, the more there is in me one kind of sorrow, -- namely, of sorrow that my present temporal life is not yet what I mean it to be." (Ib. p. 405).

"I suffer because of the very magnitude and the depth of my meanings. I am in ideal larger than my human experience permits, in present fact,to become. My evil is the result of this my highest present good." (Ib. p. 406).

To be a man, to be possessed of such lofty ideals, means to be punished. It is what Royce calls "the dear sorrow of possessing ideals".

Royce's whole treatment hangs upon the distinction between 'temporal' and 'eternal'. In this light must we consider the nature of evil. It is positive and negative in the temporal order, but non-existent in the eternal order.

Evil is positive, at least Royce will not assent to the views of the mystics that the experience of evil is an experience of unreality. Royce affirms that evil is as real an experience as any other experience.

"Mysticism has always asserted that an experience of evil is xx -... illusion, a dream, a deceit. ----- If evil is merely called finite error, this finite error remains none the less, as a fact of human experience, an evil. One has only changed the name. The reality remains what it was. And in escaping from such error the mystic either escapess from nothing at all (and in that case, indeed, escapes not at all, since nothing has happened when he escapes); or else he escapes from a real ill, when he turns from error to the Absolute (and in that case, the reality of the evil from which he escapes is admitted). (IB. p. 396).

The reality of evil is essential to a moral Order.

> "Where there is nothing to escape, to transform, to transcend, or to make better, deeds become as illusory as the ills with which they contend." (Ib. p. 397).

Evil is a real fact.

> "I regard evil as a distinctly real fact, a fact just as real as the most helpless and hopeless sufferer finds it to be when he is in pain. Furthermore, I hold that God's point of view is not foriegn to ours. I hold that God willingly, freely, and consciously suffers and that our grief is his. And despite all this I maintain that the world from God's point of view fulfills the divine ideal and is perfect." (Studies in G, and E., p. 16).

This leads us to a further statement of the presence of evil in the life of God. In Royce I find the most extreme statement of God's suffering with man in his ills.

> "Evil is not an unreality. It is a temporal reality, and as such is included within, and present to the eternal insight. ---- Evil is something explicitly finite; and the Absolute as such, in the individuality of its life, is not evil, while its life is unquestionably inclusive of evil, which it experiences, overcomes, and transcends." (World and the Indiv. p, 395-6).

> "The answer to Job is: God is not in ultimate essence another being than yourself. He is the Absolute Being. You are truly one with God, a part of his life. He is the very soul of your soul. When you suffer, <u>your sufferings are God's sufferings</u>, not his external work, not his extennal penalty, not the fruit of his neglect, but identically his own personal woe. In you God himself suffers, precisely as you do, and has all your concern in overcoming this grief." (Ib. p. 14).

This evil is the choice of God and is not imposed upon man; God, in man, suffers the evils of this world. Is this evil unending? Is there to be no ceasing from the struggle, as so many evolutionary views would have us think? Struggle without some goal, struggle simply for struggle, without begining, end, or purpose, is staggering to the thought. Shall man ever be free? shall God ever be free? Again, the answer depends upon the contrast between time and

eternity. In time there is ever the struggle. In time there is no satisfaction, but in eternity is complete satisfaction. In the eternal perfection of God man shares. To man, as man and as part of the temporal order there is no end to the struggle with evil.

> "Morally evil deeds, and ill fortune of mankind, are... inseparably linked aspects of the temporal order." (W, & Ind. p. 389).

> "The World is not <u>now</u> good. --- the future is needed to supplement the present. --- every hope for temporal good brings always its measure of disappointment. Nowhere in time is the good finally found. It is found as final good only in the eternal order." (Ib. 37

Yet Royce insists,

> "... it is decidedly the condition of a moral order that evil should in the end, be overruled for good." (Ib. p. 368),

and this means,

> ".....not that no moral ill can be done, but that, in the temporal order, every evil deed must somewhere and at sometime be atoned for, by some other than the agent if not by the agent himself, and that this atonement, this overcoming of the evil deed, will in the end make possible that which in the eternal order is directly manifest, namely, the perfection of the Whole." (Ib. p. 368).

Mr. Royce is especially insistent upon the necessity of viewing the world as a moral order. I think he is successful in keeping the moral nature of his view before us. But the conception of a moral order involve us in further considerations.

> "Just because this world is a moral order, we suffer together. Nor can it be wholly indifferent to any righteous man that his neighbor sins. In a sense the sin of every evil doer among us taints all of us. --- all human sin is therefore indeed in some sense my own. No man among us is wholly free from the consequences, or from the degradation, involved in the crimes of his less enlightened or less devoted neighbors; and the solidarity of mankind links the crimes of each to the sorrows of all." (Ib. p. 389)

This moral interdependence is not one sided. It works both ways. On the one hand,

"I might... rebel to find that my essentially independent moral entity had been, by ill-fortune, somehow yoked by external and by arbitrary ties to my fellows evil deeds, so that I seemed to myself to be dragging about with me the corpse of another man's crimes even while my deserts were wholly sundered from his. But I am no realist. I know that I have no being whatever which can be sundered from the Being of my fellowman. I know I have moral individuality only in so far as I have my unique share in the identically common ideal task of endurance, and of seeking for the expression of the Eternal Will." (Ib. p. 391).

But on the other hand I realise that I, in a like manner burden my fellows.

"No sin of mine is wholly indifferent to my fellows. All future life is in some wise other because of my misdeeds, whetehr finite beings observe the fact or not. ---- I constantly carry about with me a genuine, if in one sense strictly limited, responsibility for the whole world's fortune; for what is deed to me is in some sense fortune for all other Selves. My visible sphere of action cannot then be so narrow that I am wholly without influence upon the whole realm of Being, and upon every region thereof. ---- When you move, you move, however little, the whole earth and the sun and the stars." (Ib. p. 392).

Thus beautifully does Royce sum up his description of the moral dependence of each of us upon all the rest of our fellows!

Professor Royce feels that his message, his philosophical view of evil, his theodicy, is of great comfort to the human soul. Such is an element too often neglected by our purely reflective thinkers. But he does not make the comfort such as can be received without effort and change of heart on the part of the average seeker.

"My true comfort can never lie in my temporal attainment of my goal. For it is my first business, as a moral agent, and as a servant of God, to set before myself a goal that, in time, simply cannot be attained. Woe unto them that are at ease in Zion." (Ib. p. 407).

"Wherein, then, can comfort truly be found? I reply, In the consciousness, <u>first</u> , that the ideal sorrows of our finitude are identically God's own sorrows, and have their purpose and meaning in the divine life as such significant sorrows; and in the assurance, <u>secondly</u>, that God's fulfillment in the eternal order -- a fulfillment in which we too, as finally and eternally fulfilled individuals, share - is to be won, not as the mystic supposed, without finitude and

"sorrow, but through the very bitterness of tribulation, and through overcoming the world. In being faithful to our task we are temporally expressing the triumph whereby God overcomes in eternity the temporal world and its tribulations."

"I say, our sorrows are identically God's own sorrows. This consequence flows directly from our idealism. And we accept this consequence heartily. It contains the only ground for a genuine Theodicy. The Absolute knows all that we know, and knows it just as we know it. For not one instant can we think of our finite experience first 'absorbed' or 'transmuted' and then reduced, in an ineffable fashion, to its unity in the divine life. The eternal fulfillment is not won by ignoring what we find present to ourselves xx when we sorrow, but by including this our experience of sorrow in a richer life," and

" The comfort... lies precisely here: -- I sorrow. But the sorrow not only mine. This same sorrow, just as it is for me, is God's sorrow. And yet, since my will is here also, and consciously, one with the divine Will, God who here, in me, aims at what I temporally miss, not only possesses, in the eternal world, the goal after which I strive, but comes to possess it even through and because of my sorrow. Through this my tribulation the Absolute triumph, then, is won. In the Absolute I am fulfilled. Yet my very fulfillment, and God's, implies, includes, demands, and therefore can transcend, this very sorrow." (Ib. pp. 407,8,and 9.)

Before going on from Royce, we had better recall that all of Royce's theodicy depends upon the distinction between 'time' and 'eternity' -- a distinction very difficult to get. If one fails to get this distinction, he cannot understand, let alone accept, the solution offered by Royce. Let me quote again; he speaks best for himself.

"The world is not <u>now</u> good. (p. 383) --- the world, seen from the eternal point of view, is indeed not <u>further</u> subject to change. --- the eternal point of view includes in its single glance the whole of time, and therefore includes a knowledge and estimate of all the changes that finite agents, acting in time, really work in their own world, namely in the temporal world that is future to their own deeds, and subject to their own will." (p. 369, Ib.).

(2) Not purpose but caprice can explain the relation of the part to the Whole. This, when urged,is due to the feeling that cause, or purpose working upon the will of God would be a limitation in God. To escape from such a limitation of deity many thinkers have thought God acting without purpose or choice, simply acting. Nothing other than God is of enough worth to lead him to choice. This explanation of divine action may well be termed 'caprice'.

Duns Scotus (-1308) is a classical example of one who holds such a view of God in reference to the finite world. He was a thorough-going scholastic, and sought to harmonize the truths of revelation of the catholic church with the dictates of reason. His view of evil, its earhtly origin, its continuance, and its final destruction were of the conventional order, as he was an orthodox monk. We need not, then, speak of these in detail.

How good and evil came to be such in this world of the finite and temporal was a question with Scotus. Scotus was opposed to Thomistic philosophy which made 'intelligence' supreme in God. This, so Scotus thought, made God the subject of his own 'intelligence; He was its slave. Such would never do. God is free; will, not Intelligence, is supreme with God. God makes the moral law binding in the world, not because it is good, but because he wills it. We need not ask why. God wills it, and that makes it good. Good and evil are merely matters of God's will. That is why we may be absolved from sin; not a moral law above God, but God himself is the sole arbiter.

Scotus is the champion of God's unmoral freedom. A quotation from Weber's discussion of Duns Scotus in his History of

Philosophy, p. 250 (Thilly's trans.) wil illustrate the attitude of Scotus.

> "Goodness, justice, and the moral law are absolute, only in so far as they are willed by God; if they were absolute independently of the divine will, God's power would be limited by a law not depending on him, and he would no longer be the highest freedom, or, consequently, the Supreme Being. In reality the good is therefore good only because it is God's pleasure that it should be so. God could, by virtue of his suprme liberty, supercede the moral law which now governs us by a new law ..;.. above all, he could -- and who knows but what he really does in many cases? -- exempt us from doing good without our ceasing, on that account, to be good. In the creation as in the government of this world, God knows no other law, no other principle, no other rule, than his own freedom."

Such is the Scotistic view of God's activity. It can be called 'caprice'.

(3) Metaphysical limitations of deity make the part imperfect while the Whole is perfect. Let us look at a few representatives of this class of reflective thinkers.

Spinoza thought of God as the perfect Being. He called God Substance. There is necessarily but one Substance, and it is Perfect. God is not external to the universe, but the whole of it. That we find the life of God expressed in differing forms is not due to purposive-choice or caprice, but to the nature of God. God cannot do otherwise.

> "God is not a cause that is external and works with free will, but the indwelling cause, working from the pure necessity of his nature. The freedom of God consists just in this, that he is subject to no foriegn compulsion, to no determination from without, but works only from himself, out of his own nature; it does not consist in this, that he might determine arbitrarily to work or not to work, to work in this way or in a different way; on the contrary, his working is so necessarily determined by the laws of his nature, as it is necessarily given in the nature of the triangle, that its angles are equal to two right angles. --- perfection consists just in this, that it abides from eternity to eternity in the same actuality out of which all that is real has proceeded with necessity, and always with the same necessity proceeds." (Pfleiderer: Phil. of Rel. vol. i p. 46).

Spinoza does not make God out to be 'personal'. God for him is impersonal. "God is the cosmical substance". God is the law-giver of the universe. This leads to Spinoza's view of evil, his Ethics. Man's sole business is obedience to God, and this is through being true to his own nature. Anything that hides this duty from man is an evil. Repentence does no good; only activity amounts to anything. Man should be free to follow his own nature, his inward determination, and not be influenced by outward nature.

> "Under the influence of the passions man is in a state of slavery, for he is moved by outward causes, his capacity for action is arrested, and thus in part denied, he is apart of nature, a link, devoid of independence, of the causal nexus of things. But this state is not that which answers to man's true nature. For the essential part of man is his power to act of himself according to the laws of his nature, but in passion this power is destroyed by the influence of outward causes, namely, the outward provocations that excite the passionate affections." (Ib. p.53).

> "Now virtue, according to Spinoza, is nothing but the power or faculty to act in conformity to the laws of one's own nature, or, which is the same thing, to maintain one's own being; the impulse to self-preservation is the first and only foundation of virtue; what furthers it is called good, what hurts it, evil. (Ib. p. 54).

Can man escape from the strong passions that draw him away from his own nature? The only thing that will be of help is the finding of an opposite and stronger affection, to subdue the bad one. As all morality for Spinoza is based on the spontaneous action of reason implanted in man, the help is naturally found in reason. Reason thru experience or precept can mould the life's action to secure this freedom from external restraint. But best is it served by the reason's contemplation of God.

> "Yet this knowledge .... the fruit of experience, gained by induction, does not lead at once, or by itself, to perfect peace and quiet of the spirit. This only arise from the ... stage of knowledge in whihh

"man contemplates things and himself according to their timeless nature and ground, under the form of eternity or in God." (Ib. p. 58).

This contemplation of God must be purely intellectual and not passionate. It must be the disinterested view of the philosopher.

"Virtue is the power of understanding; or, still better, it is man's nature in so far as this has the power of producing certain effects which can be explained by the laws of that nature alone. To be virtuous is to be strong, or to act; to be vicious is to be weak, or passive." (Weber: Hist. of Phil. p. 339).

"Repentence is doubly bad; for he who regrest is weak and is conscious of his weakness. The man who orders his life according to the dictates of reason will therefore labor with all his might to rise above pity and vain regrets. He will help his neighbor as well as improve himself, but he will do it in the name of reason.

"For the philosopher, who is convinced of the necessity of human actions, nothing merits hatred, derision, contempt, or pity. From his absolute standpoint of reason, even the crimes of a Nero are neither good nor bad, but simply necessary acts. Detrminism makes the philosopher optimistic, and raises him, by gradual stages of perfection, to that disinterested love of nature which gives everything its value in the whole of things, to that amor intellectualis Dei , or philosophical love of nature, which is the summit of virtue." (Ib. p. 340).

Why this love of God is so disinterested is further explained.

"The philosophical love of God, on the other hand is an absolutely disinterested feeling; its object is not an individual who acts arbitrarily and from whom we expect favors, but a being superior to love and to hate. This God does not love like men; for to love is to feel pleasure, and to feel pleasure is to pass from less to greater perfection; now the infinitely perfect being cannot be augmented.

One of the great evils of the empirical world is death. This evil is removed where immortality becomes a fact. Man becomes conscious of his immortality through !intellectual love of God.'

"The difference between God and the soul, or substance and mode, is obliterated; the loved object becomes the loving subject, and conversely. The intellectual love of man towards God is identical with the love of God towards himself. Owing to this transformation

"of natures, the human soul, which is perishable in so far as its functions are connected with the life of the body, is immortal in its diviner part, the intellect. By the immortality of the soul we mean, not so much the infinite duration of the person as the consciousness that its substance is eternal. The certainty that the substance of our personality is imperishable, because it is God, banishes from the soul of the philosopher all fear of death, and fills him with an unmixed joy." (Ib. p. 342).

Let us all become philosophers; such is the easiest way to solve the problem of evil.

Leibniz gives us a philosophy dealing chiefly with the relation of the finite and the Infinite. This is contained in his Monadology. Perhaps we had better state briefly the main points of Leibniz' system before attempting to give his explanation of the existence of evil in a world which he considers to be the best possible creation of a perfect God.

As we find suggested in the title 'Monadology' the great point with Leibniz is the monad. This is a simple substance, elemental. It enters into compounds, but is not itself compound. These monads are no two alike, but form an infinite series of imperceptable variations from the lowest monad to the highest. They are absolutely independent of each other, as far as one's influencing the other through external physical contact. The monad, as Leibniz says, is without windows; nothing can pass from one to the other. For this reason the action of a monad is determined by its own inner nature. Monads are automatons. How then a perfect Whole? whence came this monad's nature? The monad's nature, which is the sole cause of its actions, is the creation of the Supreme Monad. By its creation the monad is eternally determined in its nature. Monads are independent and self determining when once created.

Does this freedom of self-determination work discord? No. Though absolutely independent of each other, the monads are harmonious. This is due to a pre-established harmony, established at creation. Here one might say that the individual monads influenced each other, but indirectly. Their needs are met by each other, since they were forseen by the Supreme Monad and prepared for in advance, thus insuring harmony. Now there is a necessary distinction between God, the Supreme Monad and the individual, common monads.

> "38. .... the final reason of things must be found in a necessary substance, in which the detail of changes exists eminently, as their source. And this substance we call God.
> 41. .... God is perfect, perfection being nothing but the magnitude of positive reality taken exactly, setting aside the limits or bounds in that which is limited. And where there are no bounds, that is to say, in God, perfection is absolutely infinite.
> 42. ....creatures have their perfections from the influence of God, but they have their imperfections from their own nature, which is incapable of existence without limits. For it is by this that they are distinguished from God." (Leibniz: Monod. p. 205, Rand: Mod. Class. Phil.)

Imperfection is a necessary limitation of the finite. For this reason we place Leibniz in this class. The existence of evil is due to the metaphysical limitations of deity.

Starting with this philosophy Leibniz felt the need of defending God against the implications of the presence of evil. Is God morally responsible for evil? Is there a preponderance of evil in the world? These questions Leibniz undertook to answer in a manner that would uphold the perfection of his Supreme Monad.

God is not responsible for evil. Traditional treatment of evil would establish this point through appeal to the responsibility incurred by an individual in his free choice of a course of action. Leibniz refused this escape for a reason that was very fundamental with

his system of thought. A freedom that would thus bear with it complete responsibility for results would be a freedom destructive of Leibniz' doctrine that nothing happens without a sufficient cause, that the universe of acts is predetermined. Leibniz refuses such a view of freedom, as Pfleidere says, because,

> "Man never finds himself in a perfect equipoise; there is always a preponderating reason which determines his choice, and turns the inclination of the will towards on side or the other; a choice without any determining reason, proceeding out of pure indifference, would be nothing but chance; but such a thing is a chimera, and never occurs in Nature. .....According to Leibniz, everything is foreordained in man as well as every where else; his soul is sort of a 'spiritual automaton', every occurence in which follows with necessity from the conditions once given." (Pfleiderer: Phil. of Rel. vol. i. p. 79-80).

Leibniz holds on to an attenuated form of freedom, which is certainly not much more than determinism when we consider the pre-established harmony of the monads.

> "His (man's) freedom consists in this alone, that it is his own nature from which all his willing and doing proceed, and his nature is independent of all that is outside of it, independent even of the will of God, inasmuch as He also makes no change in the essence or nature of things which present themselves to Him as part-ideas in the total idea of a possible world, but as they are, in the state of pure possibility, calls them into being by His almighty 'fiat', together with all that is contained in the best of worlds so chosen. ..... Since ... everything has been arranged together from the begining, the world is endowed by the creative determination of God, which has established it, with a kind of necessity, and nothing can be changed in it." (Ibid. p. 80-81).

This last, the refusal of an escape through free-will, would seem to fasen the responsibility of evil irrevocably upon God. But not so thinks Leibniz. A number of reasons he advances. God willed to make this the perfect world, but could not due to the metaphysical limitations of his undertaking.

"Leibniz adopts the distinction drawn by theologians between the

> "'antecedent' and the 'consequent' wills of God. According to the first God wills what is good as such, and aims simply at perfection; but the real event cannot answer perfectly to this ideal purpose, because it is conditioned by the eternal truths or the essentially necessary essence of things, which are independent of the will of God; and from the conflict of that ideal purpose with the various conditions of its realization, there results the best possible world as the actual object of the'consequent' (realizing) will. In so far then God wills evil, not according to his absolute (antecedent) will, but according to his relative (consequent) will; he permits it, not as an end in itself, but as an accessory accompaniement of the good which he could not otherwise realise". (Ib. p. 83).

This reminds one of the Greek fates. Here surely we must understand God not as Absolute, but in some way subject to limitations forcing upon him the only possible ~~wakkd~~ world -- one of evil.

Leibniz is not content with such a result. Leibniz will not yield God's omniscience, omnipotence, or moral perfection. Another escape remains. To the question of whether a better could not be formed without evil, he gives a reply which is well expressed by Pfleiderer:

> "...it is very questionable whether such an Utopian world would be really better, and richer in life and in all things than the present one. ..... many things that appear to the superficial eye to be evil may be seen from another side to be good or else a means to a good which could not be attained without it. Who would value health that had not been ill? Who would choose always to feed on sweets and not wish for sour and bitter things for the sake of variety? What would a picture be without shade or harmony?" (Ib. p. 81).

This is good for consolation, but scarcely as reason, yet Leibniz makes much of it. He finds evil, not in matter or in the choice of a wrong end, but in the ideal nature of man himself, which is one of the objects of the divine mind. Such could not be attained without evil. Evil is the necessary condition of such attainment. Thus does Leibniz explain the existence of evils: they are the 'sine qua non' of good. He classes evils in reference to this view.

"Leibniz ... distinguishes evils of three kinds; metaphysical evil,

consisting merely in imperfection, such as necessarily adheres to every creature; physical evil, consisting in suffering; and moral evil, consisting in wickedness. The two latter are not essentially (absolutely) necessary, but they are relatively necessary as ingredients of the best possible world; they could not, therefore, be avoided by God if he wished to realise, and morally he must have wished to realize, the best possible world. He therefore allows evil and wickedness as a 'sine qua non' of good, with which, in the idea of the best world, they are inseparably connected." (Ib. p. 81).

Critics of Leibniz pointed out that God, if he made a world in which evil existed must ~~xixhax~~ be lacking either in wisdom, power or goodness. This is the great traditional argument thrown against most theistic or monistic views. Leibniz will not grant its validity. He affirms that the world has evil in it, but that such a world is the best possible world, much better than one without evil, since "evil may be accompanied by a greater good." The examples that Leibniz gives all fall under the criticism of Royce cited above, in which he says that such explanations justify the surgery but not the need for the disease.

"For example, a general of an army will prefer a great victory with a slight wound to a condition without wound and without victory. .... In this I have followed the opinion of St. Augustine, who said a hundred times, that God had permitted evil in order to bring about good, that is, a greater good; and that of Thomas Aquinas, that the permitting of evil tends to the good of the universe. I have shown that the ancients have called Adam's fall 'felix culpa', a happy sin, because it had been retrieved with immense advantage by the incarnation of the Son of God, who has given to the universe something nobler than anything that ever would have been among creatures except for it. ..... this universe must be in reality better than every other possible universe." (Duncan's trans. of the Phil. Works of Leibniz, p. 284-5.)

Leibniz also felt the need of showing that this is the best conceivable world. In order to do this we feel that he was forced to resort to some arguments that seem amusing, to say the least. There must be shown to be more good than evil in the world, to support Leibniz' view. He states the syllogism of his opponent and criticses it.

"If there is more evil than good in intelligent creatures, then there is more evil than good in the whole work of God.

Now there is more evil than good in intelligent creatures.

****

Therefore, there is more evil than good in the whole work of God."

(Ibid. p. 285).

Leibniz denies both the major and the minor premises.

"As to the major, I do not admit it at all, because this pretended deduction from a part to the whole, from intelligent creatures to all creatures, supposes tacitly and without proof that creatures destitute of reason cannot enter into comparison nor into account with those which possess it." (Ibid.).

And he asks why cannot the surplus of good, on the otherhand, which is in the non-intelligent creatures, compensate for any lack in the intelligent creatures who are so limited in number. Again, he denies the minor premise.

"There is no need even of granting that there is more evil than good in the human race, because it is possible, and in fact very probable, that the glory and the perfection of the blessed are incomparably greater than the misery and the imperfection of the damned, and that here the excellence of the total good in the smaller number exceeds the total evil in the greater number. The blessed approach the Divinity, by means of a divine Mediator, as near as may suit these creatures, and make such progress in good as is impossible for the damned to make in evil, approach as nearly as they may to the nature of demons. God is infinite, and the devil is limited; the good does and may go to infinity, while evil has its bounds." (Ib. p. 286)

Still another ground has Leibniz for refusing assent to this premise. He might admit that there was more evil than good in the human race, but this would not prove that there were more evil in intelligent creatures.

"For there is an inconceivable number of genii, and perhaps of other rational creatures". (Ib, p. 286).

This last sounds more humorous than serious!

Leibniz' appeal to a future life as a possible vindication of God's justice sounds very much the same as the above. I quote

again from Pfleiderer.

> "Granted that experience tells us of unsolved discords in this life, such as the prosperity of the wicked, and the sufferings of the innocent, yet reason and religion bid us expect from another life the solution of such problems. ..... we may perhaps comfort ourselves with the hope that all will be made blessed at the end of all things; or even were it the case that the great number of men was not saved, yet the comfort would always remain to us, that the other innumerable worlds may be inhabited by reasonable beings, with regard to whom nothing can prevent us from assuming that the majority of them are happy, so that in spite of the many who are damned there will yet be a large balance on the right side." (Pfleid. Phil. of Rel. vol. i, p. 81).

Such argument may gain an admittance of pure possibility -- but of what worth is such? It can be of worth only as defending a logical system, which is prized by the reflective mind, without regard to other things.

Leibniz says that God is not morally responsible for evil. It is possible that one could but ought not prevent sin, for one of three reasons: (1) because -- if a human being -- he might sin by such interference; (2) because -- if God -- he ~~might~~ would necessitate an unreasonable act; and (3) because one may forsee the evil yet prefer it to the absence of an ultimate good.

4. THE UNCONSCIOUS WILL.

Here we are entering upon a World View which does not need the traditional theodicy -- it has no wise, self-conscious, all-powerful God directing the world, and with whose ominous attributes the presence of evil must be reconciled. And yet none the less truly evil exists in this world. Among the philosophers in the above class one will find scarcely a pessimist; but in this class the thought is divided between pessimism and creative optimism, from Schopenhauer to Bergson and Doan. Let us briefly examine the statements of several representatives of this group.

Arthur Schopenhauer is the classic example of the exponents of the Unconscious Will. To him the Will is the absolute. In this he is indebted to Kant, Fichte, and Schelling. Let us look more closely, though necessarily briefly, at the philosophical system of Schopenhauer.

As already mentioned, the Will was the Absolute for this thinker. With the great majority of reflective minds, such as Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Hegel, and other rationalists, the great thing was 'thought'. Not so in Schopenhauer's view. The chief, fundamental thing in man, plants, animals, and inorganic -- falsely so-called -- matter, is the 'Will-to-be'. This he works out in his great work, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung. Considered from our point of view, of conscious choosing, directing action, then, the Will is blind, a great tireless urge rushing into existence. The entire universe is Will objectifying itself, rushing into bodily form. Underneath what we call the struggle for existence is this indominable will seizing means for preserving its 'existence'. The intelligence, thought, that other philosophers make fundamental in their systems, with Schopenhauer is merely one of the means adopted by the Will-to-be, in order to secure existence. It is one of the most efficient means to this end.

> "(Where other means do not suffice), the will provides itself with a still more efficient safeguard, the most efficient of all, intelligence, which, in man, supersedes all the others. The intellect is all the more powerful a weapon because it can conceal the will under false appearances, while, in the case of animals, the intent is always manifest and always of a definite character." (Weber: Hist. of Phil. p. 549).

This Will that so adopts means is not a 'person'. It is an unconscious force which brings forth conscious beings, just as it brings forth the plants, the lower forms of animal life, and the inorganic matter.

"... that which the Eleatics call the 'ἓν καὶ πᾶν'; Spinoza substance Schelling, the absolute; Schopenhauer calls will. But he denies, with pantheism, that this principle is a person. He regards will as the unconscious force which produces specific beings, individuals living in space and time. It is that which, not being, strives to be, becomes life, objectifies itself in individual existence; it is, in a word, the will-to-be." (Ib. p. 551.).

From Plato Schopenhauer borrows the doctrine of Ideas. The universal will expresses itself in time under the direction of unchanging laws. These laws are according to immutable types, which Plato called Ideas. These forms are eternal, and it is through them that the Will ever expresses itself.

"These ideas or constant forms in which the will objectifies itself in the same species, form an ascending scale, from the most elementary being to man. They are independent of time and space, eternal and immutable, like the will itself, while individuals become and never are. ..... Inasmuch as the different stages of the voluntary phenomenon contend with each other for the matter, space, and time which they need, the struggle for existence arises which characterizes nature. Each organism represents the idea of which it is a copy, minus the amount of force expended to overcome the inferior ideas which oppose it." (Ib. p. 552).

In regard to his philosophy Schopenhauer is an absolute pessimist. He defines evil very inclusively. Evil is existence. Existence is the result of the 'Will-to-be'. He calls existence evil because existence is the insatiable craving for existence; with the end of the craving ends existence. The little good there seems to be is merely a cessation of a stage of pain or displeasure, and such a state is necessarily but fleeting. All existence is evil, radically evil.

"Unless suffering is the direct and immediate object of life, our existence must entirely fail of its aim.

"Evil is just what is positive; it makes its own existence felt. It is good which is negative; in other words, happiness and satisfaction always imply some desire fulfilled, some state of pain brought to an end.

"The pleasure in this world, it has been said, outweighs the pain; or, at any rate, there is an even balance between the two. If the reader wishes to see shortly whether this statement is true, let him compare the respective feelings of two animals, one of which is engaged in eating the other". (Ib. p. 12).

" We are like lambs in a field, disporting oursleves under the eye of the butcher, who chooses out first one and then another for his prey. (Ib. p. 12).

"If you try to imagine, as nearly as you can, what an amount of misery, pain and suffering of every kind the sun shines upon in its course, you will admit that it would be better if, on the earth as little as on the moon, the sun were able to call forth the phenomena of life; and if, here as there, the surface were still in a crystalline state. (p. 13).

"You may look upon life as an unprofitable episode, disturbing the the blessed calm of non-existence. (Ib. 13).

"If children were brought into the world by an act of pure reason alone, would the human race continue to exist? Would not a man rather have so much sympathy with the coming generation as to spare it the burden of existence? or, at any rate, not to take it upon himself to impose that burden upon it in cold blood. (Ib. p. 15).

"How shall a man be proud, when his conception is a crime, his birth a penalty, his life a labour, and his death a necessity? (Schop. On Hum. Nat. p. 5, of Saunders trans.).

"In the heart of every man there lies a wild beast which only waits for an opportunity to storm and rage, in its desire to inflict pain on others, or, if they stand in his way, to kill them. ..... People may call it the radical evil of human nature. I say, however, that it is the will to live, which, more and more ~~bitterly~~ embittered by the constant sufferings of existence, seeks to alleviate its own torment by causinf torment in others. (Ib. p. 22).

I may be pardoned for thus quoting so much from Schopenhauer in this limited thesis, when one considers how important it is, from his point of view, to establish the utter worthlessness of existence. That point once established, the reader then is in a fair position to understand, and, perhaps, accept Schopenhauer's treatment of evil.

Where lies the responsibility for evil? There is no such thing as responsibility in the theistic sense, where free-will is appeal-

ed to as a solution. There is nothing on which the responsibility can be laid, unless we wish to call it due to the unconscious will, for such it comes from. But an unconscious activity is hardly spoken of as 'responsible'. We must say that evil is just a fact of existence, an inevitable fact of existence, which springs from the Will-to-be.

Is there an escape from this evil of existence? Schopenhauer finds the escape in the negation of the desire to be. This can only come when consciousness reaches such a state that it sees the utter uselessness of existence, and, turning back upon the Will, negates it. Schopenhauer thinks of individuals as being able to do this with success. In this he is depending upon Hindu thought which has greatly influenced him. Also in this Schopenhauer is in disagreement with Von Hartmann, who sees no hope for the individual to escape; the escape must be through the universal negation of the Will, not through individual action. But we will consider Von Hartmann in the next section. Schopenhauer thinks the individual can escape.

> "The will is the endless source of all life, and hence also the origin of all evil. The world which it produces, instead of being the 'best possible world', is the worst of all." (Weber, p. 552).

> "What is the use of this mighty effort, this merciless, never-ending struggle? Life is its goal, and life is necessary, irremediable suffering. The more life is perfected, i. e., advanced in the scale of intelligence, the unhappier it becomes. Man who is capable of conceiving ideas suffers infinitely more than the ignorant brute. Laughter and tears are peculiarly human phenomena." (Ib. p. 553).

> "Since being is synonymous with suffering, positive happiness is an eternal Utopia. Only negative well-being, consisting in the cessation of suffering, is possible, and this can be realized only when the will, enlightened as to the inanity of life and its pleasures by the intelligence, turns against itself, negates itself, renounces being, life, and enjoyment." (Ib. p. 553)

This negation of the individuals will is chiefly performed in recognis-

ing that the individual, as such, has no existence apart from the one universal will-to-be. The individaul is in all things; he is the only existent reality, simply because he is not an individual. This is drawn from Buddhism. When the individual cares no longer for his personal existence but recognises that he is in all things, then is evil reduced to the minimum.

In Schopenhauers Dialogue on Immortality, which is found in Saunders' Studies in Pessimsim, the folly of the individual's claim to an ever persisting personal individuality is shown.

"Thras. 'I tell you I wont exist unless I can have my individuality. .... Don't you see that my individuality, be it what it may, is my very self? .....I want to exist, I, I.'

Phil. 'When you say I, I, I want to exist, it is not you alone that says this. Everything says it, absolutely that has the faintest trace of consciousness. It follows then that this desire of yours is just the part of you that is not individual -- the part that is common to all things without distinction. It is the cry, not of the individual, but of existence itself.'" (Saunders: Studies in Pess. p. 56-58).

Again,

> "The ultimate foundation of morality is the truth which in the Vedas and the Vedanta receives its expression in the established, mystical formula, Tat twam asi (this is thyself), which is spoken with reference to everything living, be it man or beast, and is called the Mahavakya, the great word." (Schop. Hum. Nat. trans. by Saunders. p. 28).

This is but a meagre escape from the evil of existence. It is not satisfactory; it cannot be called more than pity of others. It does not do way with the fate of existence which is but partly represented by the individual, and will continue in unabated anguish even though a few enlightened ones rise to a conscious stage where the will-to-be can be negated. Even such for these is no escape if the individual has learned the great lesson of the formula "Tat twam asi". He cannot die, for, as

an individual he has no real existence. This leads us to the pupil of Schopenhauer and the great formulator of his system.

Eduard von Hartmann is an optimistic pessimist, if one may use such a paradoxical expression. Schopenhauer had no joy in the results of his philosophy. He was defeated and had to accept his conclusions. But Von Hartmann revelled in the pessimistic conclusions. Perhaps this was due to his being a formulator, not having brought the philosophy out of his own inner life, as Schopenhauer did. At least Von Hartmann takes a more cheerful tone.

Von Hartmann accepts his master's pessimistic philosophy. All is vanity, vanity. All existence is sheer evil, to remedied in but one way, and that through negation of the will-to-be. Such negation can come only through the highest attainment of consciousness. Consciousness must become so clear that it sees the folly of existence. When it oes so, then existence will cease, not till then. But as the source of the evil is cosmic in proportions, being the result of an universal, unwearying, unerring, constant, indefatigable, unconscious will, then, must the remedy be of like proprtions. The individual cannot negate such a will-to-be. The individual can do nothing better than welcome the advance of all conscious life to its highest level, that the uselessness of existence may be realized in cosmic proportions. The end of existence is the negation of the desire for existence. Consciousness is is an end in that it alone makes clear this folly of desire. As long as the major part of the universal will desires existence, existence will continue. The ripening of all existence into the conscious state is the only hope. This lies no doubt beyond the reach of humanity, but

humanity can add its mite to the final end of cosmic consciousness that negates the will-to-be. This is easiest found in Von Hartmann's very interesting work on the Philosophy of the Unconscious.

In summary we may say that the great point with both this philsophers is the affirmation and negation of the will-to-be. In a sense we cannot say that this solution of the problem of evil is distinctly 'reflective'. The strong point of the whole philosophy is that it gives an empirical basis for all its assertions. From this point we might better say that the philosophy is the outcome of the attitude toward e vil Yet since the personal attitude toward the problem of evil has become a philosophy we may rightly speak of this being a solution of the reflective mind. We are justified in this by the wonderful statement made by Von Hartmann as to the purpose of his philosophical study. Let me quote what he says:

> "Philosophy .... has but a single eye for truth, unconcerned whether what it finds suits the emotional judgment entangled in the illusion of instinct or not. Philosophy is hard, cold, and insensitive as a stone; floating in the ether of pure thought, it endeavors after the icy cognition of what is, its causes, and its essenses. If the strength of man is unequal to the task of enduring the results of thought, and the heart, convulsed with woe, stiffens with horror, breaks into despair, or softlt dissolves into world-pain, and for any of these reasons the practical psychological machinery gets out of gear through such knowledge, -- then philosophy registers these facts as valuable psychological material for its investigations."
> (Phil. of the Uncon. vol. iii, p, 118).

Schopenhauer and Von Hartmann are the father of certain modern developments of philosophy. But in these philosophies the negation of the will, which makes one a pessimist is either ignored or denied. Thes developments are best represented by Professor F. C. Doan and Henri Bergson. We will attempt to state their positions briefly.

Henri Bergson and Professor F. C. Doan are in most respects alike in their philosophical views. Neither will accept a static view of the universe, whether expressing itself in mechanical or idealistic forms. At most, behind phenomena, we can find but a blind urge -- blind, not absolutely perhaps, but blind as far as we are accustomed to use this expression as meaning 'foreknowledge. The distant end is not seen by life, for such an end does not exist. Bergson finds it difficult to express the deep truths about life, for our intellect, as he says, has been evolved for the particular function of handling objects external to our own life, material objects. For such work the intellect is well fitted. But in dealing with growing life it is woefully inefficient. Life cannot be measured as something fixed. It is perpetual flux.

As to the place of consciousness in the evolution of life, perhaps these two men are not in complete agreement. They agree that a consciousness such as man possesses is the product of long ages of evolution; it has not existed 'from the begining'. They agree that only a small fraction of the cosmic life now possesses such consciousness. Here we use consciousness as meaning 'self-consciousness'. Bergson holds that this consciousness is one of the 'turns' of evolution, not necessarily a 'goal'. The growing life at one point turned in the direction of plants, at another in the direction of instinctive animal activity, and at another in the direction of self-consciousness, which marks man. Each is a part of the cosmic life, and we cannot say that one is growing into the other, or that one or another is the goal of life. Professor Doan, on the other hand, views all life as struggling upward, reaching out for conscious life, that conscious life is the

goal of evolution.

Perhaps in the view of neither of these men would there be absolute evil, at least, not for Bergson. Evil would depend upon what part of the evolutionary process one occupied. The evils of the conscious life might be very real, yet particulary restricted to that part of life. A fellowfeeling in all the cosmos would be absent. With Prof. Doan, it would be otherwise. To him, since, in a sense, there is an end to evolution, it being the self-conscious life, evil would be more positive. He might say that evil was anything opposing this self-enlightenment of the cosmic life processes. But both men in their views are, as yet, too recently before the public for one to fully understand them as they deserve. They are bringing to us views of great suggestive worth.

As with Schopenhauer and Von Hartmann, the instinctive -- blind, if you will, -- is more potent in directing life than is intellect. Where the calm reflective thought tends to pronounce the Whole to be of 'marvellous perfection', they would have us give more weight to our instinctive feeling, which tells us that all is not well. "Woe to them that are at ease in Zion!" The advance of life is never ending; our own part is of importance in directing it.

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We have, so far in this chapter, considered some of the great theodicyes presented by the reflective mind. The briefness of a thesis necessitated a rather hasty and superficial consideration of them. But at least

we have seen that most of the approaches to the problem of evil were made with a purpose, that of defending a World View. This may, or may not, be a severe arraignment of the exponents of a theodicy. This we will consider in the following chapter, The Responce of the Introspective Mind. This statement can hold in regard to every one of the philosophers here considered, from Leibniz, in whom the offence is the most grave, to Bergson and Doan, who, of all, are the least bound by a 'system', though not completely free.

After having considered the Responses of the mind-attitudes thus far, it might be well to consider the value of their different contributions, how much is to be accepted, if any.



CHAPTER VII.

THE RESPONSE OF THE CRITICAL MIND.

Indirect but important in its bearing upon the problem of evil is the response of the critical mind. The destructive work of criticism has had about as much to do with the great number of theodicies as has the problem of evil itself. Criticism has been a spur to the formation of new and more satisfactory theodicies. The most distressing fact is that none of these have proved so very satisfactory. Criticism has played havoc just as quickly with the stong as with the weak explanations of the problem of evil. There is a critical mind-attitude that lives but to destroy. One of its chief works is the undermining of theodicies. In this it has been eminently successful, as witness the great numbers of theories that are being offered as proof against criticism. There always seems to be room for still another theodicy.

Men have at times found opportunity to draw a little aside from the rest of their fellow men and apply Socrates famous motto: Know thyself. They have not confined its application solely to themselves any more than Socrates did; they have been interested in knowing their neighbors. Perhaps this has been through a feeling that 'my neighbor and myself are one". Perhaps, but the slogan has been adopted by the school of critics, and nothing seems to stand before it. It is a call to analyse -- how came these ideas, of what value are they, if any? The relation of this to evil is indirect. The critical mind-attitude offers no solution of the problem of evil, but it throws light on the value of many offered.

There are two modes of approach to questions under criticism. One may take up singly the different specific arguments advanced in support of a theory, showing their fallacy; or one may ignore the individual premises of a theory and strike boldly at the root of the whole matter and destroy the foundations from which the premises themselves have been drawn. The former is the old, the latter the new method. The latter is gaining ground in much of criticism.

In criticising theodicies men have thought it necessary to knock down evry rampart erected. The modern assailant thinks that a single shell well aimed and dropped overhead will drive all defends from behind all the ramparts. English Deism valiently entered into a long controversy with Theism in regard to miracles and the nature of revelation. These questions were examined in minutest detail. Perhaps it was well that such was so. And the same detailed work was immediately undertaken by English scepticism in lowering the ramparts of the Deists. Intuition and Nature as revealers of the character of God were closely examined. The contest went against the Deists only as their ramparts one after another were thus levelled. Such is a tedious and not altogether necessary way of proceding.

A more sweeping method may be employed. In the special case of theodicies, the individual premises of each solution need not be examined and destroyed, that would be hopeless -- but theodicies in general of the same kind may be classed together and their validity examined regardless of their individual arguments.

In this method we are not interested in assertaining whether Leibniz can maintain his argument that this is the best possible

of worlds -- perhaps it is, who knows? -- but in ascertaining whether Leibniz is 'talking to the question' or not. Query: Do we have a theodicy or merely a self-characterization of Leibniz? Do the sponsors of theodicies talk about evil, in their solutions, or about themselves, their own mind-attitudes? The answer of the critical mind is that we have no theodicies but descriptions of mind-attitudes from the men themselves. In reading Leibniz' Theodicy one learns less of evil and more of Leibniz' nature.

In the second chapter of this thesis we spoke of the Response of the Apprehensive mind. We need not here make any elaborate statement of 'apprehensive' arguments. It is sufficient to state that men responded to evil in a state of 'congealed fear'. Their very breath they hardly dared call their own. All theodicies advanced in such a state said little about evil in itself; they testified to the state of fear and that alone, which is far removed from the problem under consideration. Here we have received no reliable testimony concerning evil, we have learned only the effect of evil upon men of an apprehensive turn of mind. That falls short of a theodicy.

Many will agree with the above, but will they with what follows? The Suggestible mind is to be treated in the same way. The two mind-attitudes, Apprehensive and Suggestible, are essentially the same. The far wider acceptance of 'suggestible' views is no argument against this oneness. Fear is cowering and thus unfits men for the struggle for existence. This fact does not disprove their like nature. One is negative while the other is positive in response; other differenee have they not.

The Suggestible mind, in all its solutions,is passing a vote of confidence. Now the question rises, I a psoitive response any more reliable than a negative response? Are they not of the same nature and subject to the same limitations? The suggestible mind, for practical purposes, fits a man better for the needs of life, but it says practically nothing in regard to evil. It merely gives us a very clear picture of its won make up, its own way of responding, its dominant mind attitude. It is the triumphant soul that rises superior to its evils, picturing, in the full confidence of truth, as really existent that which it most desires. The fallacy of ontological arguments has been so often pointed out that it need not be set forth here. The presence of a desire or an idea does not necessarily prove the material existence of what that idea pictures. Indeed one of the greatest evils that the cultured man finds in life is the very disparity between his cherished ideals and the hard facts of life. If there were not such a chasm between what we hope for and what we receive there would be no evil worth considering. Ontological arguments lie underneath the whole response of the Suggestible mind. This fact, to the Critical mind, points out that here, again, we have less of theodicy and more of human nature.

In Chapter V of this thesis we spoke briefly of the response of the Empirical Mind. Those who see the dangers of the responses of other mind attitudes tend to be satisfied with the empirical mind. It has the good merit of courageously undertaking the conquoring of evil. Evil is fact; that we know, and that we ought to concern ourselves with. Questions of theodicy, in the strict sense, are absent.

All such are carefully evaded.

Is the Empirical Mind any more worthy of such enthroning as final arbiter than other mind attitudes? Does it speak any more authoritatively concerning evil, or does it merely picture itself to us? Practically all we gain form the empirical mind is a statement that it is disgusted with the inadequate theodicies offered and will not encumber ground with more of its own making. Isn't this more of interesting human nature than of theodicy? The Critical Mind answers, Yes.

The Reflective Mind, as we saw in Chapter VI, has passionately sought for harmony, and,incidentally, produced theodicies. The fact that theodicies are here simply endless shows the popularity of such approaches, and also discloses their futility. Though seeking for harmony of World View, yet disparity results. The Reflective Mind would claim for itself the right to speak, since it leaves, as it supposes, personal feelings far behind. Yet the Critical Mind sees again the self-characterization of the philosopher in all that he does and says. He is showing up his own nature more than anything else when he speaks.

The Critical Mind has simply raised in this the question of epistemology. Can we know any truth? Here is the bearing of the Critical Mind upon theodicy. In dealing with the problem of evil today the chief problem is not the nature, the cause, or the extent of evil; the chief problem is to surmount the criticism of the Critical mind, the general errors it points out. Not,What is evil? but, Have we a basis for the begining of a theodicy? Socrates, the father of criticism, urged men to 'know themselves'. When we become imbued with this idea no word falls from human lips that speaks of any thing other than man himself.

Man may have the words God, Christ, Heaven, Devil, Hell often on his lips; but the Critical Mind is not deceived. They are words words, nothing more: all tell of but one thing, the nature of the man who speaks. No word refers to God, but to ourselves. The Critical Mind is not deceived. We say Devil; we say God; we say natural Law; we say 'pre-established harmony' -- that's what we say; what we mean is, 'I am fearful of destruction'; or, 'I am confident that I cannot be destroyed'; or, 'I will do something for myself'; or, 'I love harmony'. We do not speak of evil; we speak of oursleves. It is a hopeless task to find out more than this.

"I sent my Soul through the Invisible,
Some letter of that after-life to spell:
And by and by my Soul return'd to me,
And answer'd "I Myself am Heav'n and Hell":

Heav'n but the Vision of fulfill'd Desire,
And Hell the Shadow from a Soul on fire." (Omar).

Know thyself, and thou wilt know nothing else! To conclude, the Critical Mind is destructive of all theodicies. It may undermine one's trust in theories of evil by attacking the individual premises upon which such theories are based. Its quickest work, and the most telling, is accompished by throwing distrust upon any attempts at 'truth'. In man's theories are found, not 'truth', but a picture of man himself. Theodicies are offered to us, but the Critical Mind declares that they are not theodicies but self-characterizations. If a man would be wise he will 'know himself' and see how utterly incompetant he is to arrive at any definite conclusion in regard to such matters as evil. 'Know thyself', and thou wilt know nothing else.

CHAPTER VIII.

CONCLUSION -- RESPONSE OF THE CREATIVE MIND.

On leaving a church, where a pwerful preacher of the Calvinistic persuasion had been picturing in glowing words the eternal miseries of the damned, an Irishmen ejaculated: "It's a lie. There's no constitution that would stand for it". He could give no answer to the arguments of the minister, but his own nature told him that a fallacy make be felt where it cannot be readily pointed out. Such is the feeling toward the whole sale criticism indulged in at the close of the last chapter. It simply cannot be true. There is no constitution that can stand for it.

The man who desires to handle the problem of evil must first establish some grounds for his theodicy to rest upon. Such is the greatest difficulty. But often almost of its own accord and unnoticed emerges a new truth that gives life a new start. An escape from the sceptical position of the last chapter can be found, but it is not through the denying of criticism; it comes through its full acceptance Common to all of us, and yet showing itself in varying degrees, is a mind-attitude of great value, which needs careful development. It is the Creative Mind-attitude. Poetry, the arts and the sciences, and some thought of other kinds has made it fairly familiar to us. There is at present a radical need that the Creative Mind become the dominant attitude of our minds. In the intellectual and the spiritual world is h this especially urgent. This mind-attitude is essential to our solut-

ion of the problem of evil. If the result of criticism is accepted, I see no other possible way of approaching anything satisfactory as a solution. When the pathway does not open smoothly before us the spirit of man must rise to the occasion, must create of itself a "highway for our God".

That sounds rather 'ultra'. What shall we create? New grounds, where old ones have been lost? No, that would be of no avail. We have seen rampart after rampart come crashing to the ground before the advance of criticism. Afew more or less in number would be of little consequence either way. If we merely created another barrier to criticism, it would only be a prey to some later critic. The work on which a theodicy is to be built must be more thorough and more wide in its scope. A new rampart is simply 'anti-critical'; more is needed.

The Critical Mind has sounded its far-heard battle cry: Know thyself, -- and our idols have fallen, have crumbled in dust at our feet. Not all our reason, or tears, or hope,is of avail. Can there be no rallying cry? Why all this consternation? Is it a capital offense to be human? Let the Creative Mind sound a new note for life. Let her read anew Socrates' words, 'Know thyself' as 'Be thyself'. We have been studious to learn what we are, why should we not now practise <u>being</u> oursleves? We need confidence in ourselves more than anything else, until it will be nor argument against a thing to say that it is human. We need confidence, a manly self-reliance. Let the Creative Mind quicken our visions, by inspiring confidence among us. We tend to let this become an old, a stale world we live in -- all its visions seen,

all its wondrous beauties marred by the mere words that other men have used! Oh, how we need self-reliance! A child of the Twentieth Century, I would stand as in that old garden of Eden again, each day for me the rosy dawn of a new world. There would I live the life of my life, all my own, nor fear that it was human. The Creative Mind bids me be myself: "Fear not! be human!"

The Creative mind may waste its energies in other fields, but here is its great service to mankind. Let it create in us a confidence in human nature. We need not new ramparts against evil. We need men to mann the ones we already possess. A rumor from criticism has spread through our camps that all our work is 'human'. The disaffection must be allayed. How shall it be easier done, than by shewing men that there is no weakness in being human. We do not need to be told of the discovery of some new argument in regard to God; we need courage to use what we have already. The work of the Creative mind is the rehabilitation of the old through a creation of confidence in the minds of men so that they will not fear to use arguments simply because they are distinctly human, any more than a man would fear to eat because he had learned that his methods of digestion were purely human being developed along with the rest of his body.

We need not hope to evade or turn back criticism. Criticism shows us the path of life. Why should we not then welcome it? Criticism is not destructive. It does not say: This thou shalt not do. It simply says: This thou art. Why draw the conclusions of an apprehensive mind rathe than of the Creative mind? Does not the Creative Mind urge us to be what Criticism shows us to be? The let us make no

bones about it. If it is a human way to argue, this using of an ontological or a cosmological or a teleological supposition, why not be human? I know of nothing more that our lives are fitted for. Create in thyself, O Man, a new spirit! Be thyself, and fear not that thyself is human!

Under the Apprehensive, the Suggestible, the Empirical, and the Reflective mind-attitudes we have considered the chief theodicies that have been offered as solutions of evil. The Critical Mind made us very sceptical in regard to them all; they were merely expressions of the human spirit. We were in danger of thinking that to be a grevious fault, but the Creative Mind tells us that such would have been far from the truth. The Critical Mind had simply said: This is the way you human beings act. It did not say that it was wrong so to act. So with these different mind-attitudes we are still free to work. But our study has shown us an important point. No one of these mind-attitudes has the right to usurp the field of consciousness. The goal of life is certainly a fullness of life. In approaching our problem we have to give wider range to our investigation; we must not be dominated by any one attitude until we lose the good of the others. The Creative Mind in telling us to be our selves, also bids us seek a fullness of life which is the normal state of division between these mind-attitudes, as shown in A of Figure i, on page 92. The stream of consciousness normally has many phases, all of which are essential to fullness of life. A theodicy is bound to be rather unsatisfactory that takes into consideration only one phase.



Fig. i. Cross-section. Stream of Consciousness.

A cross section of the stream of consciousness shows at least four distinct phases under normal conditions, (A). Any one phase may usurp the whole field of consciousness. If such is permitted to continue it produces an abnormal condition of consciousness, where life is one sided, fullness of life being lost, (B', C', D', E').

A. Normal Condition of the Stream of Consciousness.

Divided between B, C, D, and E.

B. The Spiritual (Suggestible) Field of Consciousness.

C. The Aesthetic (Reflective) Field of Consciousness.

D. The Scientific (Empirical) Field of Consciousness.

E. The Ethical (Apprehensive) Field of Consciousness.

B', C', D', E' are, respectively, abnormal manifestations of B,C,D, and E.

Normally life has varied interests. In our lives four of the chief interests are represented by the mind-attitudes that we have been studying. The great difficulty with our theodicies has not been that men have been expressing but their own natures in the solutions offered -- it would not be desireable to avoid such a necessity, so testifies the Creative Mind -- but the difficulty has been in the fact that our theodicies have not been true to normal life. They have not been true to life. They have considered on small side of life and approached the problem of evil from that single point of view. He who was of an apprehensive turn of mind forgot, or ignored, all other interests of life. Apprehension dominated the whole field of consciousness, and solutions were offered that were not true to life, normal life, which in the long run must be the judge of all such attempts. The Critical Mind has been of service to us in this very point. It has shown clearly that these solutions were speaking less of evil than of this one dominant mind-attitude that was usurping the whole field of consciousness. To this extent then are such solutions inadequate: in so far as they are expressive of one phase of life alone. Fullness of life is the judge. Thus, likewise erred the Suggestible, the Empirical, and the Reflective Minds. Not that they were human; rather that they were too far removed from human, being expressive of only one phase of the stream of consciousness. This can be best understood by a reference to the Fig. i on page 92. A.represents the normal life which is the one demanded in a satisfactory solution of the problems of evil. All sides of life must be represented. In A. are B, C, D, and E representing our four mind-attitudes. B', C', D', and E' represent the abnormal

condition produced by giving over the whole life to one mind-attitude, as has been the case with the solutions of evil we have studied.

In the remainer of this chapter we shall attempt to answer some of the great questions of theodicy propounded on page 4 of the Introduction. We shall find it necessary to express our own mind-attitude in so doing, but shall not be ashamed or fearful of so doing. In reference to the Critical Mind, we hope to take cognizance of its findings and 'be true to ourselves' in the fullest sense of the words, finding the proper expression of 'human life',not in any one of our four chief mind-attitudes, but in a normal equilibrium of the four. The Apprehensive Mind says something about evil; its testimony shall not be ignored. The Suggestible Mind has much to say; likewise the Empirical, and the Reflective Minds. No one must be excluded. Their testimony on subjects will, in cases, be flatly contradictory -- that forms the real problem for our theodicy. There may be some way around the difficulty. That remains to be seen.

I. WHAT IS EVIL?

Perhaps an introductory word will be permitted on the 'point of view'. Everything depends upon one's point of view. The limitations of all human explanations is the fact that one can speak only for men, from man's point of view. Therefore, it is said, we have no right to speak of evils out side of man himself; we must assume man to be the centre of the universe; he himself the standard of values. In a sense he is, but that'sense' need not be exaggerated. If I say that this is assuming too much of a 'homocentric' view, I am told that such is necessary, for

whole discussion is from man's 'point of view' and must stick to that. I would like, in such a case, to make a necessary distinction between fundamental and accessory assumptions of 'point of view'. In the fundamental class are such as no man (homo sapiens) can avoid and still deal with creatures of his species, a rather limited, but absolutely necessary group of assumptions, which constitute the 'human point of view',which the Creative Mind bids us trust. The other class are accessory, they follow in the train of the fundamental assumptions but are not necessary. Without these man can readily have relations with his fellows.

The assumptions that are fundamental to a human point of view are, I think, readily classed under three headings. (1).Personal experience, contact with life of many phases at first hand. This contact is restricted to sensation and perception -- the world of empirical knowledge. (2) A certain rational sense, a seeing of relationships, as between cause and effect, and the drawing of conclusions in accordance with the evidence. (3) The use of words, and phrase of common accepted usage among men. Language is essential to the expression of experience and to the drawing of conclusions. Of these three there is not one that would unfit a man for jury service in the most critical case at law -- and this is one such critical case! In these fundamentals there is ~~nothing~~ *little* to predjudice the jury to one decision above another. In these the element of 'personal equation' is reduced to the minimum, but not absolutely destroyed. Now it is utter folly to assert that since there is an 'element' of 'personal equation' therefore we should throw open the doors of the jury box to all manner of jurors, regardless of the amount of such 'personal equation'. A lawyer always recognises this

necessary limitation, but he is wise enough to restrict it as much as possible.

Now the class of human limitations which we have called 'accessory' are what no lawyer would permit on the jury where the least important case is to be tried. They are ultimate conclusions fixed upon prior to the examination of the evidence to be presented. They are the assumptions of one mind-attitude that desires to over-rule the whole evidence in its own favor, in the consideration of theodicies. These crop out in the most of our definitions of evil. Some were listed on pages 13 to 15. In these nothing is treated as evil that does not agree with the ultimate conclusions of the author. Such are human weaknesses too often present, but it is possible to eliminate them. They are not fundamental to discussion. I wish to insist upon this distinction. I know I am necessarily speaking from a 'human point of view', but 'human' does not necessarily include 'accessory' assumptions. The two can, and must, be kept apart.

Now we are ready to say what evil is. The bearing of the above on this definition is apparent. If an accessory assumption was admitted as essential to the 'human point of view', and my ultimate conclusion placed man as the goal of evolution, then my definition would restrict evil to the life of man, or anything that separated the cosmic life from approaching to man's degree of perfection, which would be thought to be the highest. Our definition need not be thus vitiated. There is no 'ultimate' conclusion of such wide acceptance that it can claim to be fundamental to human investigation.

In Chapter II, we defined evil as "anything detructive of

worth. Reference can be made to it on page 15. We said that it was but a tentative definition. Now we may say that this definition meets all the needs of theodicy and can be given as an ultimate definition. Evil is anything in whole or in part destructive of 'worth'. Worth is to be determined by our mind-attitudes.

The Apprehensive Mind declares that evil which is frought with terrors for the human soul, whether such evils actually materialise as destructive forces or not. The unseen but felt danger is even greater than the danger of experience. These, from our present Critical point of view, are mere 'figments of the imagination'. But our point of view is presumptious if it desires to rule out what have been, historically, the greatest of evils, namely unseen, malignant forces personified as devils. These were thought to be arrayed against the life of man, threatening it with destruction. As such they were destructive of the 'worth' of man, what man deemed of worth, and so must be said to be evils.

Our Suggestible Mind was more fertile. There were more phases to its 'worth' and accordingly more evils. The unseen powers of evil are present, and,in addition, a new evil, that of infidelity (unfaithfullness) to a beneficent power (one or many) which was engaged in the same battle against the malign forces as man was engaged in. Sin (a disobedience of the Will of God), ritual defilements, incorrect 'beliefs' in regard to deity, and such like, were all evils, being destructive of worth as represented in the beneficent power fighting on man's side against personified evil. Now the Suggestible Mind still lives among us. Its evils have not all vanished. A definition of evil must be broad enough to include such. This I think our definition of evil as

'anything destructive of worth' satisfies. What the Suggestible Mind declares of worth is taken into account.

The Empirical Mind declares evil to be anything obstructing man's normal living for some three score years on this earth. It rather artificially restricts evil to such life, by refusing to consider anything more. Yet its truth must be recognised. Such evils are chiefly physical. Bacteria, inadequate means of clothing and feeding of the poor, unsanitary conditions of life, and ignorance that fails to meet these practical needs are evils. There is no reason why we should deny that these things are evils. The Empirical mind says that they are and spends its life in remedying them. The only ground on which one can deny these things to be evil is that of some ultimate theory he wishes to read into every thing. The Suggestible Mind, gaining complete victory over consciousness, has often declared these things not to be evil, simply because they could be seen to work in the long run for spiritual development and a greater need of the assistance of the benign powers at hand. Very well, but by what right can one phase of our normal conscious life usurp the whole field and rule out every other consideration. It is preposterous. The spiritual welfare of man is what the Suggestible Mind declares to be of 'worth', but other phases of the same mind declare some other things also to be of 'worth'. The evils pointed out by the Empirical Mind are <u>real</u> evils, not to be set aside by some ultimate conclusion such as the Suggestible Mind has too long put forward, unless indeed we are content with the woefully inadequate theodicies now accepted by many. The Creative Mind bids us be more than one-sided.

The Reflective Mind has spoken much of other evils, sometimes classifying them as metaphysical, physical, and moral, but underneath all such we find that the chief evil for the Reflective Mind is that of inconsistency. A modern turn sometimes shows itself as anti-rational. This I think is a mistake. The Reason of man has a large claim upon us, and what it calls evil must be recognised, unless, as before, we merely desire to continue the unprofitable war of one mind-attitude against another. The Reflective Mind's evils are those of the rest of the world, but chiefly as they are destructive of a consistent World View. Such a World View is declared of 'worth' by the Reflective Mind. There is no reason why we should define evil so narrowly as to exclude this which so many men claim.

So far evil has been defined as 'anything destructive of worth', and worth has been confined to the life of man. Now one of the remarkable features of the human mind is that it can appreciate and state fairly an evil which it itself is not experiencing. We learn this in our relation ~~between~~ with our fellow men. Now, if we restrict ourselves only to those fundamental assumptions which are necessary to the expression of our thought, leaving out all accessory assumptions, we can speak of the evils not depending upon man for their existence. There are evils among plants, among animals lower than ourselves, and in inanimate things, rocks and chemicals.

How do we know this? We know it by inference. If anyone objects to our arguing by 'inference' since it is merely a human way of proceeding, I have no consideration for his objection. The Creative Mind bids me be human, and if such a method of procedure is

humam I may say that that is all we can expect to be. Now there is no other way than by inference that I can declare any evil to exist for my neighbor. Who is so foolish as to declare a neighbors evils non-existent? And yet, in regard to our neighbors we can go no further with ~~other~~ our proof than to say that our neighbor acts just as we would in his place if the things about him were trying to destroy our 'worth'. Well that is argument by inference. That is the same argument used to prove the existence of evil in animals, plants, and stones. Their natures are somewhat different from ours, but they act just as we would act if in their place and brought face to face with evils. They behave as though beset by evils. Animals fight, scheme, and die due to what, in our own lives, we call evil. Trees do likewise. Witness the attempts of plant life to provide against extermination. Some of our attempts along the same line are rather puerile in comparison. Stones declare it an evil to be destroyed, by the very opposition they offer to the elements of nature that are ever attempting to reduce them to sand and dust and still lower forms. All nature acts just as man would act in the same conditions if facing evil. Therefore, by inferential argument, we may say that there are positive evils in all the world outside of man.

A friend said to me once when I expressed this view to him, that I had no right to call the death of an animal evil; perhaps it was the best thing that could possibly happen to it,for me to slay and use it as food. Perhaps! Right there is where my friend permited an 'accessory' assumption to enter in. He himself had limited all evil in the human sphere to such things as checked the development of

the spiritual life, which he felt to be the goal of the Cosmic Life's evolution. Is this not a case of the Suggestible Mind dominating the field of consciousness which belongs of right to more than the Suggestible Mind? There is the great danger of letting one phase of consciousness get the upper hand; it rules out every thing else, and looks at the world through wilfully colored glasses.

Since we find evil outside of man, our ultimate definition must take into consideration these others 'worths' of the animal, the plant and the inanimate world. Evil is greater than man. Evil reaches out its tentacles into evry corner of our universe, drawing all life into a common brotherhood, in the experience of evil. We cannot say that evil is solely that which destroys human'worth'. What is it then? On page 102 will be found two figures, ii and iii, which may help in understanding the explanation of evil which I would offer. In Fig. ii, evil is seen as that which is destructive of 'worth' peculiar to man. The idea of growth, or evolution, of the world life is commonly accepted. It has a bearing on the problem of evil. What are at present seen as evils may be but 'good in the making'. Now what is that 'good'? Is it man's chief product, consciousness or not? Our human conceit says, Yes. So says the Figure. Now is it?

If we say that man's achievement is the test of the evolution of the world life, then, as some do, we must say that those things alone are evil which obstruct the manifestation of the whole Cosmos as self-conscious. This would be denying that the things which are pointed out as evils for the plant and animal and inanimate life are not evils at all; that there is no real evil except where there is striving toward



Fig. ii. Homocentric Progress.

All values are dependant upon positions relative to man's present attainments in evolution. Evil is anything checking the Cosmic Life's progress toward the goal man has already attained.

(This lettering holds for Fig. iii below, also).

A. Line of Man's evolution -- to goal 5, Consciousness.

B. Line of Animal evolution -- to goal 4, Instinct.

C. Line of Plant evolution -- to goal 3, Organic Form.

D. Line of Mineral evolution -- to goal 2, Crystalization.

E. Line of unknown evolutions -- to a primal goal 1, Unknown, ?



In this figure there is no attempt at comparison between the sizes or distances from the centre. Each sector is to be taken by itself as a manifestation of the Life of the Cosmos, depending in no way upon other parts for its value as an expression. The arrows suggest an infinity of evolution ahead of each, not implying a final end common to all.

Fig. iii. Multi-centric Progress.

No one standard of values. Every expression of life has evils of its own; no one dictates to the others. Fuller life is the goal.

the goal seen so far attained by man in his awaking to consciousness. This is Homocentric Progress, a progress where man is the taken as the standard of values.

The objections to such a view are many. If the goal of Cosmic Life is this consciousness, why then is its expression so restricted, found, as far as we can tell, only in men walking about on this 'mustard seed of an earth'? All kinds of speculative theories can be advanced to answer this objection, but the only strong point about them is that they are so nebular that no telescope can be found strong enough to detect either their truth or their error; they are simply theories. If the Cosmic Life is bent on but one thing, and that one thing be the self-consciousness found in man, why does all the Cosmos seem to be arrayed against man? There is but one defender of this presumptious claim: that is man himself. He is the self-anointed goal of evolution. Everything else disputes it with him, and disputes it to the bitter death. If there is a single goal ahead of all, why are even the men who defend such a view so much at variance?

The simple truth is, there is no ground for a view of Homocentric Progress. Man has nothing but what he has gained in a life and death struggle with nature and warring animal life. He retains nothing but what he holds by the right of might. A Homocentric Progress does not gibe with the facts.

In Fig. iii, on page 102, is another diagram, illustrating a view of the world progress that seems to fit more nearly into the facts. To coin a word, let us call this other view of world evolution Multicentric Progress. There is no one goal for the Cosmic Life, and there is

no one standard for the determination of 'worth'. Man has his given sector of the whole Cosmic Life in which to express himself. He does so and his Sector determines what is 'worth' in it for him. Evil for man is anything that combats man in his proper sphere of development. Animals other than man have their fields of expression. They have a part of the World Life to express. Its standard of value lies within it. Anything obstructing its life expression is evil. Animal 'worth' lies within the Sector in which this one particular phase of the Cosmic Life is seeking expression. Evils are opponents of this expression. So with the inanimate mineral world. It has a value as an expression of the Cosmic Life that depends in no way upon its relation to man. Its evils are dependent upon its own 'worths' and in no way dependant upon man's sphere of expression.

Now there are two classes of these evils: (1) moral, and (2) physical. The application of these is my own. We are accustomed in the moral sphere of our activity to call that an evil which tends to bar us from the fullest possible expression of our moral natures. This is usually found to be some defect in our willing. It is called a moral evil. Where the Suggestible Mind has usurped the field of consciousness it is termed sin. This is very good. But I would not limit moral thus to the volitional and so-called 'moral' fields. Make it wider in its application. A moral evil is any destruction of 'worth' which results through the weakness of the nature of any expression of the Cosmic Life. In man it would include sin, and also weakness of his physical body and of his mental processes and of his other organs, which in any way in a

crucial moment rendered man unfit for maintaining his power of expressing the form of the Cosmic Life shown normally in him. So there would be moral evils in the animal world. Such would be any weakness, of instinct muscle, or organ, that rendered defeat possible in the hour of trial. And such also would be the moral evils of the inanimate world. A moral evil is any weakness within the self (human, animal, or mineral) that renders it incompetent to express its own life fully and satisfactorily.

The Physical ills of the Cosmic Life are of a different class. They result not from within, but from conflict between the different mainfestations of the World Life. All expressions of this Life are restricted to space and time, with the limitations that are inherent in such. Space and time are not infinite. Within them are waged a ceaseless battle for supremacy. In Fig. iii, page 102, the different Sectors are expanding. They conflict. They branch out, invading each other's fields, and producing the evils we have called Physical. Such evils are the result of competion for time and space in which all must find expression.

To sum up our definition of evil. Evil is anything destructive of worth. Worth lies in all fields of the Cosmic Life's expressions, in man, in animals, in plants, in minerals. All these evils fall into two classes, moral and physical. The moral are inherent weaknesses; the physical are evils of competition within the limitations of time and space.

2. WHEN DID EVIL BEGIN, WHEN WILL IT CEASE?

Evil arose when the first impulse of the Cosmic Life met check in its

attempt at expression. It came either in the moral (an innate weakness) side of expression or in the physical side.

Why did it arise there? Was the Cosmic Life ignorant or fumbling in its work? No, such terms can not be applied to the Cosmos any more justly than their opposite terms. They are terms applicable only to men, and the Cosmos is not a man. When the first expression was made, if there ever was a first, the Cosmic Life did not act as men would act in such circumstances. Each expression sprang up, in and of itself without a director. Each, human, animal, plant, and mineral, etc., merely followed out its own lines, learned by experience what best to do, and tried to do it. Conflict produced physical evils; inner slowness of learning and doing produced the moral evils.

When will evils cease? As long as the Cosmos exists, never. Physical evils will always exist as long as different phases of the cosmic life continue to seek for themselves fuller and fuller life. Moral ills, never; as long as new conditions arise, a certain amount incapacity to meet their needs will persist.

3. HOW DOES EVIL AFFECT GOD ?

God is the Fullness of the expression of Life. Does evil destroy this perfection of God?

No. God is interested in every expression of his life, but since evry ill arises from expressions as they express themselves, in the greatest evil God does not suffer. Some form of expression always suffers, but its suffering means the victory of some other phase of the World Life. Where expression fails in one place it wins in an

other. A Titantic may sink -- physical and moral evils are there with bitter harshness in human experience -- yet the life of God has not for a moment faltered. One expression of the life of God went down before another, but God faltered not. The Eternal is unwearing, unfaltering, unhindered, though we fail adequately to express its Life.

4. HOW DOES EVIL AFFECT MAN ?

Perhaps I have not a right to single man out as the only one to be considered. Other forms of life have an equal value. Yet as a man, my chief concern is in what effect evil has upon my own life and the life of my fellows.

Evil is a challenge to duty. Man, when true to himself, rises to the need of the hour. To him is delegated the pwoer of expressing a part of the Universal life. To him it seems the most important part. No doubt it is. Then should man rise to meet the problem of evil determined to make his expression of the universal life the fullest, the most complete, the nearest to the heart of the Eternal. He finds numerous ways of expressing this. The Apprehensive, the Suggestible, the Empirical, and the Reflective Minds are a few such ways in the reach of man. No one is sufficient. Evil is a challenge to the fullest life of which we are capable. I cannot help thinking of the World as the Republic of God. Into my hands is delegated the power of expressing the needs of the life of the Whole. Into the hands of others is delegated an equal right of expressing other phases of the Eternal life. An animal, a tree are speaking for God just as much as I, but I am determined in my life that I shall express all that lies in my power. Some

things are not delegated to me for expression. I must recognize my part as only a part, and not the Whole.

Now there is a difficulty that is always hard to get over. I think the difficulty becomes much less here. Where two animals fall each a victim to the other's craving for existence, or where a Titantic sinks before an Iceberg that will not yield its alotted time and space for all the souls that may be on the ill-fated ship, what comfort is there in the thought of God? Should not one cry out and execrate a God that suffers mere 'physical biggness' to defeat the precious souls of human beings? No, not unless one has let one mind-attitude dominate his whole field of consciousness, not unless man can picture himself as the self-sufficient centre of the Universe. It is hard to die, just as hard for the animal as for the man. But man may prepare himself somewhat better for it. He may see before hand what all will see in the end, that no life is ever destroyed. You may fail to be the sole expression of God's life -- you were foolish if you ever thought you were -- but God's life, which is your own, cannot fail of expression. When animals die in the death-clasp one of another, neither dies. Each finds the other no longer an opponent but a friend. Each was trying to express the life dear to both, the Life of God behind them both. Each wakes to feel not the cruel hug of a life-destroying enemy, but the gentle embrace of one whose aims and hopes are the same. In death enemies become lovers. The cold waters of the Atlantic seem no pleasant end for life, yet "underneath are the Everlasting Arms", and the drowning man finds even in the berg a friend in death -- both were but expressing the Life of All.

Evil on one hand teaches man the need of a courageous self-reliance. He must be himself and express as fully as possible the Life within him. This courage must be sufficient, as it is with the Suggestible Mind, to tell him that with his breath does not expire the cause for which he works and dies. He must see himself so much as an expression of the Life of the Eternal that he fears not to die. It will live on as a part of the Eternal. On the otherhand evil teaches man a needed humility. "Thou art not the Whole of God's Life. Be content to do thy part, and know that it is no small part, O Man, that I assign to thee", saith the Lord thy God, if we may paraphrase the prophets. Humility is needed and is taught by evil. A man must not think that he is the sole and best expression of God's life; willing he must be when the time comes to yield his place to another.

Perhaps if man once grasped the great secret of being an expression of the universal Life, havoc would be wrought. If it were not for pain, which stands as a dark sentry at the borders of life and scares us back to our duty in life, might not one gladly shift into other forms of life? As a man I am content to express the Life that is my life, but as God just as truly makes the trees on our campus grow, why should I not be willing to be a tree? Certainly I would be serving as well there as here. Only that dark sentry pain that afflicts every one who draws near to the unseen bridge arching the chasm between my life and the life of all about me, drives one back from the leading of fantasy to the duty before him, which is expressing the Life within his life. Beyond that Bridge there is neither pain nor death.

We have now drawn to a conclusion a long thesis. We have examined the different Mind-attitudes, and have found no ground for distrusting our attempts to solve the problem of evil as long as we are willing to see life in broad enough terms. The Creative Mind bids us <u>be</u> what we are. In doing this we are serving the purpose of our Creation, using that word in the sense of growth. There is an escape from evil, and that is by a courageous trust of the Life in one-self.

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