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THE CATEGORIES
OF
ACTIVITY and GROWTH
APPLIED TO
THE IDEA OF GOD.

AN OUTLINE ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

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Albert Levitt,

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This thesis is an attempt to describe the relation of the ideas of growth and activity to the idea of God. We shall divide it into three sections, as follows:

Section 1. Historical; in which we shall discuss the idea of God as held by some of the modern philosophers;

Section 2. Theoretical; in which we hope to show that a man's philosophy of religion consists in an inner experience of a power which we call God, and which experience has no cognitive content; and, an attempt to explain this experience, which explanation should be based upon the concepts of modern science.

Section 3. Practical; showing the practical value of the idea of God as an Absolute Infinite Intelligence and as a Growing Activity.

In the first section we shall use the term God to mean that power or substance which underlies everything, which definition, we shall assume to be self-evident, self-explanatory, and readily understood by all. In our theoretical section we shall give a different interpretation of the term God.

PART ONE: HISTORICAL

KANT.

That we cannot get beyond the realm of phenomena by means of pure reason is the fundamental proposition of the Critique of the Pure Reason. That we can form no conception of things as they really are or may be but only as they impress us, is Kant's insistence. True it is that time and space are to Kant Transcendental "Dinge an sich", but this is due to the fact, undoubtedly, that modern psychology with its experiential origin of the ideas of time and space had not yet arisen. We may venture to believe that were Kant living in these days he too would be willing to consider time and space as the result of sense experience, (I mean, of course, our knowledge of time and space). There is to be sure, an open inconsistency in Kant's two ideas concerning time and space, namely, first, that they are transcendental and unknowable, and yet, secondly, related to us and to our experience. How he brought these two mutually exclusive ideas together it is hard for us to gather. But this is a matter of metaphysics with which we here have at present no great concern.

In his idea of God, however, Kant cannot be accused, with truth, of being either vague or inconsistent. He makes a sharp cleavage between the transcendental world and the world of our experience. God, whatever he may be out there, somewhere, cannot be apprehended by our reason. If there at all he was as though he were not in existence, for the human reason could not get to him. All argumentation and reasoning about him are futile for knowledge and reason do not extend to the region where "things in themselves" exist. The theistic arguments are invalid and they prove nothing. This was a tremendous break with the past that Kant made. Had the neighbors who timed their watches by Kant's daily walk known the revolutionary ideas teeming in their time-ball's brain they would not have joked about him so complacently. Yet Kant's position anent the theistic arguments is irrefuta-

ble (though there are many still, -lay, clerical, philosophical and others, who, while professedly followers of Kant are hopelessly muddled concerning Kant's position and meaning) as a glance for the sake of refreshing our memories will show.

The most important of the theistic arguments is the Ontological, for though the Cosmological and Teleological and the Moral arguments claim to be, or have it claimed for them to be, distinct bits of reasoning, Kant conclusively shows that they all ultimately fall back upon the Ontological for their real force, which argument, briefly stated, is this, to follow Anselm:

God is a being than which nothing greater can be thought. There is in the mind of man the idea of such a Being: but such a Being must exist outside the mind of man, for if it did not, it would not be that than which nothing greater can be thought. Therefore, God exists not only as an idea in the mind but also outside the mind as a reality. That is, to think a thing as existing proves that the thing thought really exists. We think God exists; therefore he does exist.

(Here an interesting sidethought may be inserted. Why should God be considered as *Ens Perfectissimum*, as Anselm considers him to be? Is it not possible for a power to be absolutely perfect in everything but goodness, in place of which there is evil and hate, not goodness and love to a perfect degree? The orthodox church teaches the real existence of such a power i.e. Satan. If the thought of Satan makes his existence real then there may be two perfect powers, each a God because of his absolute perfection). It is this argument that Kant utterly disposes of, for as he says (Sec.4, Trans. Dial.):

"To think of a being of the highest reality, a Being in whom no reality is wanting, in no way settles the question whether that Being does or does not exist. For although my conception of the possible real content of a thing may want nothing, it may be only a conception, and relatively to

my whole state of thinking this may be a-wanting;- that I have no knowledge whether the object of my conception is also possible a posteriori..... The conception of a supreme being is in many respects a most valuable idea but just because it is only an idea; it is quite incapable by itself of extending our knowledge of possible experience."

That is all we can say of any idea which we may have is that the idea is there, not that of which the idea is, also exists. That this can not be accepted by so many people is due to the terrible connotation of the idea of God, for it can be shown that with less exalted ideas there is no difficulty with, or hesitancy in accepting, this proposition. For example: I am able to think of a cow with six heads and ten legs, and can even draw a good picture of it, yet my idea of this cow in no way involves its actuality. I can conceive of a State where all men are absolutely equal in every respect (what a deadly condition that would be!) yet my idea of it does not make the State to be. The idea of God as an idea does not differ from the idea of such a cow or such an ideally perfect state. The reason why the Ontological argument appeals so strongly is not because of its indubitable reasoning but because the belief in an absolutely perfect being meets a real need of the people who hold it. It is possible to conceive of God as not good but evil, as we hold these things, in proof of which we need only recall Calvinism and the preaching of Edwards. Why does that repel the greater portion of humanity today? Is it unthinkability? Hardly, as its existence shows. Yet granting that it is unthinkable, is such unthinkability due to an inherent inability of the mind? Not at all. It is due to the other fact, that our emotional nature is repelled. We do not want such a God so we say that he is unthinkable. (James' Varieties of Religious Experience, Page 438). The emotional content and the cognitive content of the God-experience are constantly being confused and jumbled together by countless persons who because of this lack of discrimination balk at the proposition that thinking God to be does not necessarily make God's existence sure.

In all the foregoing one thing has been admitted as absolutely established, namely, that it is possible to have a clear-cut conception of God as infinite, perfect Being. At this point one may legitimately ask, can we think of an infinite God? or for that matter infinite anything? Can we get a clear conception of an infinite universe? We can with reason say "no". Try it. Attempt to conceive of an infinite mass of butter for instance. Start with the idea of a small lump of butter lying in a small field. This is easily conceived and even visualized in the mind's eye, as it were. Now begin to smear this butter up, down, around, till it fills the whole field and flows over into the next, and on and on, and out and out and over the whole city and state and country and the world over and the whole universe of suns and stars. Can you do that and have a clear conception of the thing you are doing? Hardly. There are two possible results. First, you get the feeling (mark that the feeling, not a clear-cut conception) that there is still some place where the butter is not, or secondly, one has a feeling of infinite greasiness that is actually nauseating; but in neither case is there a definite idea of the butter as infinite. The wider the extent of your thinking, the more and more indefinite it becomes till at last there is no finite or infinite but some That without clear-cut cognitive content at all. Here then we find that the Ontological argument is fallacious in toto. First, we cannot think God as infinite; Second, granting the possibility of thinking God as infinite, such ability proves the existence of nothing but the idea. The question of actual existence is still an open one.

The Cosmological argument meets the same fate at the hands of Kant as does the Ontological. Kant shows that it is impossible to deduce God as a cause from the world as an effect. The argument goes as follows:-

If anything exists, an absolutely necessary being exists. Now at least I exist. Hence an absolutely necessary Being exists. This is the argument according to Leibnitz. According to Anselm the argument reasons,

1. From motion to a first moving principle unmoved by anything else.

2. From effects to a first cause.

3. From the contingent to the absolutely necessary.

Kant shows that though this argument seems to take its start in experience, it is in reality only a sham start, for soon it leaves experience and appeals to the concepts of pure reason i.e. the ontological argument. For it is quite obvious that all the argument advanced can do is to help us reach a concept of a pure, necessary, unconditioned being, but this does not insure the real existence of the thing conceived, as has been shown above.

But again here are several fallacies in the argument. For granting that you can have in experience motion that has a mover behind it, and it in turn a mover behind it, you cannot legitimately stop at some one mover and say that it is unmoved by anything else. All we may really assume is an endless chain of moved and mover. So, too, in regard to finite and infinite, necessary and contingent, secondary cause and primary cause; all that one may infer from his facts is an endless chain. I say endless because there is no reason why it should stop.

The teleological, or as Kant calls it, the physico-theological argument, fares no better. ^{It} goes, we will remember, in this wise.

There is everywhere evidence in the universe that things were designed according to some definite plan. Great adaptations of things to things and surroundings; such as stamen and pistil in two flowers so as to allow fertilization by bees, etc.; hence there must be a designer. These adaptations are perfect, hence there must be a perfect designer. But there is no real evidence that there is design in the world, that is design in particular. There is enough evidence "on the whole", but not enough in particular things. Then too, granting that you have proved design you can prove only a designer, not a perfect designer. To do that you must reason from the contingent to the necessary, from the imperfect to the perfect, that is, you are using the Cosmological argument which rests in the ontological which

rests on nothing. Hence your argument is no argument.

Therefore, says Kant, reason in its purely speculative use is quite incapable of proving the existence of a Supreme Being. At the same time it is of very great value in this way, that it is able to correct our knowledge of that Being, should it be possible to obtain a knowledge of it in any other way, to bring it into harmony with itself and with all the aims of our intelligence and to purify it of all that is inconsistent with the conception of an original being, and of all admixture of empirical limitation.

The Supreme Being is for purely speculative reason a mere ideal, but still a perfectly faultless ideal, which completes and crowns the whole of human knowledge. And if it should turn out that there is a moral theology which is able to supply what is deficient in speculative theology, we should then find that transcendental theology is no longer merely problematic, but is indispensable, in the determination of the conception of a Supreme Being, and in the continual criticism of reason, which is so often deluded by sense and is not always in harmony even with its own ideas." (Page 222 Watson's Secections).

This moral theology Kant does find and he expresses it in the Critique of the Practical Reason, at which we will now look.

God, says Kant, is a postulate of the moral law. The moral law drives us to seek the highest good; hence if we ought to seek the highest good, it must be possible, and so I assume God to be in order to make the highest good realizable and so rational. In other words it is "morally necessary to hold to the existence of God." This means then, that we assume God to be for practical purposes. We create him; we put him out into the universe..Whether or not he is really there we cannot know. Our pure reason can never find him there. Our practical reason demands that he be there. So we put him there.

It is a question at this point if Kant's categorical imperative was not really his God. If it was not then we may assume that Kant needed

for his own inner religious life the conception of a probability of a perfect, all-completed being he called God; for the moral law was only a driving imperative to do good and promised no time of rest and accomplishment of all good. There would always be more to do. That is, God would be process; God would be growth, continual growth and change. Was Kant brave enough to hold to this belief? One cannot say. Let us hope he was. For to our mind there is a great inconsistency between the highest good being in existence and our striving for it; especially as our endeavors were to be based upon no hope of our being rewarded for our striving. Why strive for the highest good if we have already postulated it? To postulate the possibility of attaining the highest good is sufficient for all practical purposes, while to assume the actuality of the Highest Good vitiates the categorical imperative. The categorical imperative would seem more heroic and compelling if we postulated not the possibility but the utter impossibility of ever attaining the Highest Good and yet drive resistlessly on and on. Effort, struggle, advance, the unceasing good-doing, in the face of utter inachievableness of complete victory, that is the true imperative.

Be that as it may, in the mind of Kant, God was and is beyond the bound of pure reason and is a postulate of the practical reason, a postulate compelled by the moral law. How men can read Kant and say that they understand and follow him and still hold to an intellectual proof of the existence of God we cannot quite understand. There is a blind spot somewhere. To us God is a postulate; yet we must reserve for a future time our discussion as to the meaning of the word "God", for at the present and for some time to come we shall assume that "God" means that which is perfectly explicable to and understandable by all.

Here we shall leave Kant and consider the idea of God as found in the writings of Fichte.

FICHTE

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"Being", says Fichte, in his "Way toward the Blessed Life," is simple, unchangeable, ever the same; therefore, is also the true life, simple, unchangeable, ever the same. The central point of all life is love, the true life loves the one Unchangeable, Eternal." "The object of the love of the true life is what we mean by the name God, or ought to mean by the name. The element, the atmosphere, the substantial form of the true life is thought. The true life and its blessedness consists in a union with the Unchangeable and the Eternal; but the Eternal can be comprehended only by thought and is in no other way apprehensible by us: The One and Unchangeable is apprehended as the foundation of ourselves and of the world; and this in a double respect. Partly as the cause from wherein it arises that all things have existences and have not remained in mere nothingness; partly that in Him and in his essential nature, which in this way only is conceivable to us, but in all other ways remains wholly unconceivable, is contained the cause why all things exist as they are and in no other way." "In the mind--in the self--supporting the life of thought--life itself subsists, for beyond the mind there is no true existence. To live truly means to think truly and to discern the truth. It is only in the highest light of thought that the God-head is revealed, and it is to be apprehended by no other sense whatever. It is only the light of pure knowledge thoroughly transparent to itself and in free possession of all that it contains, which by means of this clearness can guarantee its unalterable endurance. No man can rise to true virtue, to God-like activity, creating the true and the good in this world, who does not lovingly embrace the god-head in clear comprehension, while he who does so embrace it will thus act without either formal intention or possible reward and cannot act otherwise. Pure thought is itself the divine existence, and on the other hand the divine existence in its immediate essence is nothing else than pure thought.

This long string of excerpts from Fichte's words (and the list possible is not exhausted by any means) is put here to make plain and absolutely clear two ideas that Fichte wishes particularly to enforce anent his ideas of God.

1. God is absolute, simple, unchanging, the same.
2. God can be reached only through thought.
3. Through all-embracing comprehension and only through that.

So much, we say, is clear, and when we ask what does Fichte mean by "thought" the meaning is not quite so evident. He does not ^{mean} certain sensations and feelings, even if they are of the highest spiritual type. He says that explicitly. (Lect.1. W.T.B.L.) He does not mean anything connected with our sensuous world. He defends this distinctly in his "Defense against the charge of atheism," when he says, "the central point of the strife between me and my opponents is this, that we stand in two different worlds and talk about two different worlds; they about the world of sense and I about the strictly super-sensuous world."

This super-sensuous world is the realm of pure being, of *sein*; the sensuous world is the world of appearance of *Dasein*. In order to get to pure thought, we must rise above *Dasein* into *Sein*; that is, we must get to the essence of all things by leaving everything behind that has any definite content or emanation from sense. "Thought" says Fichte, "in its high and proper form is that which creates its own purely spiritual object absolutely from itself without the aid of an outward sense and without any reference whatever to such a sense." But we may ask what is this spiritual object? It must be in the super-sensuous world, but what is this super-sensuous world and how do we get there? To say that we get there by rising above the *Dasein* does not tell us how to rise!

The difficulty may be looked at in two ways. According to the first Fichte is trying to explain things from the outside; even his own experience (shall I say religious experience?). For an experience of great

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strength he must have had to be driven to write about it. According to the second Fichte tries to explain all things subjectively. The difficulty comes in trying to reconcile the following three factors:

1. The idea of ^uGod as one unchanging and eternal.
2. The multiplicity of things in the universe.
3. An intense experience of some power, active and driving, which he can trace to no sense experience.

Let us first see where an external approach, as it were, will take us. God as one unchanging and eternal will be a fixed and static being; if not a scholastic substance, the *Ens Perfectissimum* and *End Realissimum* of the Scholastics, at least a definite quantity or quality in some super-sensuous sphere. The universe is a shifting multiplicity of appearances and of appearances only. God is, the universe is not; yet the universe seems to be. How did it get its seemingness? How to reconcile the two? Fichte, trying to reconcile them does as we might expect; he propounds an elaborate metaphysical system, which can belikened only to some of the metaphysical gyrations of Valentine the Gnostic. For all that the elaborate working out of the properties of *Dasein* and *Sein* is, is an attempt to get a different thing out of the same thing, to get a multiplicity out of a unity, which unity and multiplicity shall be at the same time and in the same place the same and yet different. Even his experience would be viewed objectively. That is, God would be apprehended by reason, that is created by our reason, for it is of God and God is self-created, self-existent. We in our super-sensuous substance are the same as God. Hence God the Universe and we are one, unchanging and eternal.

So much we would get objectively. But subjectively--what a difference there is! and in the case of Fichte we may venture to believe that the subjective method was the method par excellence. Viewed in this light the seeming contradiction of Fichte's idea of God, as found in his earlier and later works disappears. A consistent advance and progress is evident.

The same things are being talked of in the "Science of Knowledge", "The Way toward the Blessed Life", and the "Grund Unseres Glauben an eine Got-tliche Regierung?" Let us examine this a bit.

We referred above to an experience of Fichte's which we ventured to call a religious experience. By this we mean that Fichte must have at various times in his life been in communion with a power that he considered not himself. We cannot give extracts from his writings that will prove this hypothesis, but no one reading Fichte, even if only a few of his writings are read, and these hastily and inadequately, can avoid the feeling that the author was a man of intense religious emotions and had experience of some sort or other with a power he liked to call God. This experience on the part of Fichte, I must ask you to take for granted. Absolute proof for it there is none, (at least so far as I know), of probability for it there is a great deal. Read his writings and you will feel what I mean. Let us see if we can ascertain what the experience was and how it came about and how it determined the two ideas of Fichte concerning God and the universe.

Let us suppose that Fichte is sitting in his study some night thinking about the Ego. His brain is keenly alert and working. He follows his analysis of himself point by point, back, back, back--. Each new idea or thought is scrutinized, dissected and classified, and then another taken on. Suddenly he arrives at a point where he himself as himself, as a self-conscious ego vanishes. Specific intellectual content there is none. Only a pulsing, throbbing energy. Life,-life, dynamic and powerful, onswEEPing, onrushing energy. No thought, no concept, no percept, no thesis, antithesis, or synthesis--only energy and activity.

Then the return moment comes and Fichte finds himself again as him-self. He is shaking and trembling. He feels that some terrific energy has had him in its grasp. What it is, where it is, how it is, he cannot say. All he knows is that there was a "somewhat"---whether himself or not he cannot say.

As an analytic philosopher; as a philosopher who believes in the subjective origin of all things; he is keenly interested in his experience and after recovering from the effects of this first experience, he deliberately sets about to see if he can induce this condition once more. "He succeeds. He succeeds a third and a fourth time and then he begins to reason about it and to try to explain it. His reasoning would probably be as follows.

1. This realm of my experience is a realm of activity, of force. In each of my experiences I have found this force. It is always the same, always one, always unchangingly powerful.

2. This "somewhat" is not sensuous surely, for I as I am not; sensation, perception, all sense experience are not. It must therefore be a super-sensuous realm.

3. Then, too, I get this experience through thinking. At a certain point of my thinking I vanish. Thinking as my thinking vanishes. Yet there is some activity there. "Let me call it "pure thought", not thought connected with our brains and bodies but "pure thought".

4. When I receive consciousness--that is self-consciousness,--I find the external world again. Can this world be my consciousness? Is my self-consciousness the world? Am I the creator of the world about me? Am I the destroyer of the world? It seems to be so, and yet to believe it would be enough to drive me insane! It is too stupendous for me! I as I, a finite being, here today and gone tomorrow, cannot be the maker of the world! There is only one who can do that; he is God! In my experience I must be reaching God. It is he who is unchanging, dynamic power. He is and this "is" (dasein) is consciousness in me and is the world. God, as it were, thickens up into me and thus into the world. I can get to him only by getting away from and above my consciousness, and by plunging into Pure Thought, which is God and yet which is at the same time myself. But God surely must be love; for love is the greatest of all things, and do I find love in my experience?

At this point we can suppose Fichte as renewing his experiments for

the purpose of finding love, if there, in Gdd. And he does find it there. How he comes to find it there is in this wise. While trying to reach the realm of Pure Thought, love is so powerfully in the foreground of his thought, that when the transition point is reached Fichte carries over with him the love he wishes to find, and it is there! Then he seeks for other of the emotions which he would attribute to God and he finds them there. Then he says:

5. I find all the great and worthy emotions in Pure Thought. Hence, my real life, my real, emotional, affectionate nature, when acting virtuously is the through-shining of God.

6. I find also that there in that realm of Pure Thought, I seem to be infinite, all-embracing. Nothing of me as limited seems to be. But when I am conscious again my limitations appear once more.

Here his reasoning would appear to stop, so far, at least as my knowledge of his writings goes. The above may seem to some artificial and far-fetched. True it is that we have presumed to ascribe to Fichte an experience which he himself does not describe; true it is that to postulate feelings and mental processes in another is merely to describe what we ourselves would do under similar conditions. But this hypothesis advanced by us seems to meet and account for certain facts reported as true, hence the hypothesis may well be a valid one. And does not this experience we have described give the facts Fichte describes as being valid for him and for all in religious and philosophical matters? Surely they do give an explanation of the passages with which we opened this section of our discussion. Recall them and see if they do not yield their full value to this hypothesis. The following extracts will also do the same.

"Raise thyself to the standing-point of religion, and all these veils are drawn aside. The world with its dead principle disappears before thee, and the godhead once more resumes its place within thee, in its first and original form, a life as thine own life, which thou oughtest to live and

shalt live! Still the one irreversible form of Reflexion remains--the infinitude in thee of this Divine Life which in God himself is but one; but this form troubles thee not, for thou desirest it and lovest it; it does not embarrass thee for thou art able to explain it. In that which the holy man does, lives, and loves, God appears no longer surrounded by shadows....but as his own immediate and efficient life; and the question that is unanswerable from the mere empty and imaginary conception of God-'what is God?'- is here answered--'He is that which he who is devoted to Him and inspired by Him does', --wouldst thou behold ^uGod face to face as he is himself, seek him not beyond the skies, thou canst find him wherever thou art. Behold the lives of his devoted ones, and thou beholdest Him; resign thyself to Him and thou wilt find Him within thine own breast."

"True religion, notwithstanding that it raises the view of those who are inspired by it to its own region, nevertheless, retain their life firmly domain of action, and of right moral action. The true and real religious life is not alone percipient and contemplative, does not merely brood over devout thoughts, but is essentially active. It consists as we have seen in the intimate consciousness that God actually lives, moves and perfects his world in us. If therefore there is no real life, if no activity and no visible work procede forth from us, then is God not active in us." "That the divine life actually lives in us is inseparable from religion."

"He (the truly religious man) conceives of his work as action, which because it is his world he creates in which alone he can live and find all enjoyment for himself. This action again he does not will for the sake of a result in the world of sense;- he is in no respect anxious about the result or no result that may ensue, for he lives only in action as action,-but he wills it because it is the will of God in him, and his own peculiar portion of being; and so does his life flow onwards, simple and pure, knowing, willing, desiring nothing else than this--never wandering from this center, neither

moved nor troubled by aught external to itself."

"As soon as a man by an act of the Highest Freedom, surrenders and lays aside his personal and individual freedom and independence, he becomes a partaker of the Only True, Being, the Divine and of all that is contained therein."

(Way Toward the Blessed Life)

"The Ego posits itself as infinite in so far as its activity is directed upon itself or returns in itself; for then the product of this activity being the Ego again is infinite. The Ego posits itself as finite in so far as its activity is directed upon a non-Ego which it opposes to itself."

(Wissenschaftslehre)

"The conception of God cannot be determined by categories of existence but only by predicates of an activity."

This then is the result of our discussion. Fichte had an intense religious experience of a mystical type as a result of which he conceived of God as an eternal, unchanging activity, working himself out in men. God in essence and man in essence are one. Man can reach God only by raising himself above the sensuous sphere to the realm of Pure Thought; that is by opening up his soul to the God in him. This God essence in man is infinite and creative. God and man in essence are the same. The sensible world is merely the result of the self consciousness of God. God is activity; God is eternal and unchanging; God is in man; God is man. Man can get to God only by surrendering himself to his real self. This is Fichte as we understand him.

SCHOPENHAUER

According to Schopenhauer, there are in the universe two things, Will and Idea. The Idea is somehow an objectification, a thickening up, as it were, of the Will. The Will is the real ultimate of existence. (The transition from the unity of the real to the multiplicity of the unreal Idea is to our mind not quite clearly made; but this is aside from our main discussion, and we will not linger with it here and now.) This much we can know: the Will is the thing-in-itself. The Will is (to use our term for what Schopenhauer calls Will) God. The Will is first manifested to man in man himself. He sees himself and the world and reflects upon that which he sees. He finds by reflection that the ultimate thing in himself is will. Then he transfers this knowledge of himself as will into the cosmos and finds that there too the ultimate of things is will.

The Will is entirely different from its phenomenal appearance. This Will is uncaused, free and independent. It is, however, hindered by the phenomena. (This we do not quite understand. At one and the same time the Will is unlike the phenomena, and yet the phenomena is "subjectified Will", "concrete Will".)

The Will though revealing itself through a multiplicity of forms is one and the same and not only this but also it is revealed absolutely and completely in one and the same phenomena. The destruction of one bit of this will would mean the destruction of the entire universe. "The Will reveals itself as completely and as much in one oak as in millions; their number and their multiplicity in space and time has no meaning with regard to it, but only in regard to the multiplicity of individuals who know in time and space and who are themselves multiplied and dispersed in these. The multiplicity of these individuals itself belongs not to the Will but only to its manifestations. We may therefore say, per impossible, if a simple real existence, even the most insignificant were to be entirely annihilated

the whole world would necessarily perish with it. The just mystic Angelus feels this when he says:

"I know God cannot live an instant without me;
He must give up the ghose, if I should cease to be."

The Will has different grades of subjectifications. The lowest ⁱⁿ are the universal forces of nature, the highest in the intellect of man. These forces then are simply the Will and as such are uncaused and groundless. Still, as we have said before, the Will is hindered and bound by the phenomena. That is, there is a constant strife between the Will as manifested in one Phenomenon and the Will as manifested in another phenomenon. Through this constant strife comes the existence of nature. This strife goes on forever. As the Will works through the ideas it passes through an evolution. That is, it becomes more and more hindered in its action. The lower the idea, the more the Will moves in darkness, the greater its unerring certainty. In these lower forms the Will moves as a blind impulse unhindered and unswayed. But as the ideas become more sharply developed (say as Man) the will is only hindered by the development. Instincts disappear and with it its infallibility. "Deliberation begets irresolution and uncertainty." In its essence the striving of the will is unceasing, unending, unerring. When the ideas take the form of thinking animals, the Will can then know what it wills here and there in isolated places, but still it is impossible for it to know what it wills in general. This can all be summed up in his resume, as follows:-

".....This world in which we live and have our being is in its nature through and through Will and at the same time through and through Idea: that this idea, as such, already presupposes a form, object and subject, is therefore, relative: and if we ask what remains if we take away this form and all those forms which are subordinate to it, and which expresses the principle of sufficient reason, the answer must be that as something toto genere different from idea, this can be nothing but will, which is thus

properly the thing-in-itself. Everyone finds that he is himself this will, in which the real nature of the world consists, and he also finds that he is the knowing subject, whose idea the whole world is, the world which exists only in relation to his consciousness, as its necessary supporter. Everyone is thus himself in a double aspect the whole world, the microcosm; finds both sides whole and complete in himself. And what he thus recognizes as his own real being, also exhausts the being of the whole world, the macrocosm; thus the world like man, is through and through Will, and through and through idea, and nothing more than this." (Book 2, Part 29.)

This Will, so far as our individual life is concerned, can be denied or asserted. For, say Schopenhauer, "Life accompanies the will as the shadow does the body; if will exists so will life, the world exist. The present alone is that which always exists and remains immovable."

The individual exists as such only as phenomena; as essence he is the will. But the phenomena once being in existence desires still to be; puts forth every bit of power it can to be. It is the love of life that gives us pain and misery; this love of life for individuality is due to our thinking power as phenomena of the Will. That is, we are what we will ourselves to be. There is an opposite to this, namely, the denial of the will to be. It is possible for us to fight down this desire for individuality and for individual life, and to go back to the primitive blind, instinctive will. This, as Schopenhauer admits, results in the utter annihilation of the individual as such, and the total loss of phenomena, so far as the individual is a phenomenon.

Here we may arrive at some interesting deductions. The existence of the ultimate reality is postulated by Schopenhauer as being Will. Will, in its essence is blind and unconscious. This will reaches self-consciousness only in the higher animals. We agreed that what Schopenhauer calls will we call God. (That is, the underlying substance of all things is God.) If

we accept the thesis of Schopenhauer, that God is will, we are led to the conclusion that God reached and does reach self-consciousness only in the higher animals; from which it follows that the highest forms of God's self-consciousness is found in man. (Of course we are led to say this last thing, that man is the highest form of animal life, because we are men. If we were not men I wonder if we would be so sanguine about this matter.

When one considers the marvelous nature of the so-called lower types of animal life, one must confess that man is very imperfect in many respects. The bee with its wonderful honey cells, so perfectly constructed from a mathematical standpoint, leaves man far behind. The keenness of sight on the part of animals, and their keenness of smell are so far in advance of man's that we may almost say that we do not have these functions at all. To be sure we say that these are merely instinctive, but to call them by a certain special name, which is connoted in our minds with inferiority does not make of them inferior things. I realize that some one may urge the old, old argument that we are reasoning being while the lower animals are not. But I venture to say that I feel sure that there is sufficient evidence to support this view, that what we call reason and the higher mental faculties are not absent from the lower animals. One need only to mention the sagacity of a hunted fox, or the diabolical cunning of a weasel. But we have digressed too long already).

Then, to~~ok~~, if men can deny the will to be and go back to a state of unconsciousness, it is conceivably possible that, if all men were to deny the will to live God would no longer be a thinking, self-conscious being of the present highest type. If it were possible for all the higher animals to deny the will to live, then God would be reduced again to the primeval unity of mere blind will. Now if we consider God to be God only in so far as he is self-conscious in his activity, we can say that when the will of God gets back to its primeval state of blind unconsciousness, that God is practically dead!

Nietzsche

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To discuss Nietzsche's idea of God is a difficult if not an absolutely hopeless task. Every man has a perfect right to whatever interpretation he chooses to put upon Nietzsche, for the latter did not live to complete his great work, which would have cleared up a great many difficulties and misunderstandings, namely, his work called "The Trans-valuation of All Values." It is a great pity that the author died before the book was completed.

To be sure, we can cast Nietzsche aside after a hasty perusal of his other works and say "Ah, he is an atheist; he is a dangerous man;" but no one can read closely and thoughtfully even one of his books (particularly, "Thus Spake Zarathustra") and not have borne in upon him a tremendous conviction that Nietzsche must have had a religious and moral experience terrific in its gripping power and insatiable in its strive upward.

What is this "Will to power" of which he is so often talking? What and who is this "Übermensch", this "beyond man" that Nietzsche wants us all to be? Surely this driving imperative was as potent and influential in the life of Nietzsche as is the idea of God in the mind of the average, nay, of the common man who is not a believer in Nietzsche. What was this experience that raised him above and beyond good and evil? This preaching of a message so brave, strong and stirring could only come because of an experience of a very God-soul. Surely the pleading that we sacrifice our lives so that the men who come after us be nearer perfection is a more stirring message, a more heroic utterance than the message that pleads with us to be good for the sake of our own individual salvation. It takes a hero to give his life for another; any coward can follow the instinct for self-preservation.

If ever a man felt the drive toward higher things it was Nietzsche, and yet he is called an atheist. Why? Because he dared to say "Tod sind alle Götter". Because he dared to say that the idea of a salvation through

vicarious atonement was a device of small minds and cowardly hearts, and he was right. It is the unbrave soul that needs a certainty of all things, who dares not face the unknown with steadfast heart and dauntless will.

"Only the coward is not immortal", says Novalis, somewhere. Nietzsche says the same. It is the heroic soul that dares to stand face to face with God and say; "Thus I am and so; Thou art the judge. Judge me, I do not fear! If I am worthy of damnation, I do not plead for mercy; I shall take my punishment as becomes a god; for I am a god even as Thou; for I am a part of Thee. If I am to receive a reward, I ask only this; that my reward be further opportunity for battle, for progress for achievement of righteousness." These are not the words of Nietzsche, but they do reflect his spirit, yea, it is only the coward who yearns for a time of eternal rest, eternal calm, eternal peace, eternal death! The true man says with Browning,

"I was ever a fighter
So one fight more."

and ~~for~~ this bravery, for this manliness, for this indomitable courage, Nietzsche is branded an atheist. Well may he say; "God is dead and man is no more. Oh, for the Beyond-Man."

But to return to our central theme. The god of Christendom was not the god of Nietzsche. The god of the orthodox Christian was to Nietzsche a debasing idol made in the image of weak men. This was due in its turn to the smothering, (so Nietzsche thought) of the strong elements in man, the elements of cruelty and oppression. The argument advanced is interesting to say the least. It runs thus.

The instinctive primitive desire in man was and is the hunting of someone; the punishment of someone. For the semi-barbarous man was of a roving warlike, adventurous disposition. In course of time civilization forced men to live in peace and in society. All the instincts, therefore, of torture were turned inward in man upon himself; accordingly he developed a strong disease-idea! a bad conscience. To quote: "All instincts which did not discharge

themselves outward will receive an inward direction; this is what I call the internal nature of man. It is only by this process that that grows up to man which later on is called his soul. Those terrible bulwarks by means of which a political organization guarded itself against the ancient instincts of freedom (punishments are first of all among these bulwarks) affected the results, that all these instincts of wild, free and roving man were turned against man himself. Enmity, cruelty, the pleasures of persecution, of surprise, of change, of destruction, all these turned against the owners of such instincts: that is the origin of conscience."

Nietzsche then takes up the question of early religious sacrifices--sacrifices to ancestors--animistic worship, etc. and says that this is due to a system of debtor and credit being established by man. "The conviction prevails that the family exists only through the service and sacrifice of its ancestors and that these sacrifices and services must be paid back by other sacrifices and services. Thus a guilt is acknowledged which, moreover, grows continually inasmuch as these ancestors in their past existences as mighty spirits never cease to supply the family with new advantages and advances out of their store of power." But, he continues, these advances are not given for nothing. How can they be paid back? The suspicion that they can never be paid back remains and grows. Then there begins the feeling that there is never to come this ability to pay back what is owed to the ancestors. The stronger the clan grows the greater the fear becomes, for it means just so much more to pay back. He continues; "suppose this rough kind of logic to be carried through by the fantasy of growing fear, the progenitors of the mightiest clan must at least have grown to immense dimensions and have been pushed into the darkness of a divine awfulness and unimaginableness. The progenitors will of necessity, become at last transformed into a God."

"The feeling of obligation toward the God-head kept steadily increasing for several thousand years in the same proportion in which the

concept of God and the feeling of dependence from God grew and were elevated." Therefore the rise of the Christian God as being the maximum God so far attained has given rise also to the maximum feeling of guilt on earth."

Now as this debt grows, the feeling that a final reckoning must some day be made grows and so grows, too, the feeling that it would take an infinite being to pay the price. So all of a sudden we find ourselves face to face with a paradoxical and frightful expedient which afforded at least temporary relief to tortured humanity, that master stroke of Christianity: God himself sacrificing himself for the guilt of man: God himself making himself paid; God being alone able to redeem from man what for himself had become irredeemable; the creditor sacrificing himself for his debtor for love--would you believe ? for love of his debtor?"

And this is the God that Nietzsche denies. Well may he deny him--for this God is a God of weaklings, for He, the Superior sacrifices himself for the inferior. But Nietzsche demands that sacrifice be made not for that which is lower but for that which is higher. He denies the God whom he believes to be inferior even to himself, and for this he is called an atheist by those who do believe in such a God concept as that advanced by orthodox Christianity. But why? Surely Nietzsche had a God. Surely the Will to Power was a God for Nietzsche of such power and strength that its demands were not lightly met. Must the God be the orthodox God and him only? Why? But of this later.

Now I end even as I began. It is a pity that Nietzsche does not tell us who and what his God is. This only we can know: He is not the God of orthodoxy; but what he is--the positive message of Nietzsche concerning God we do not know.

At this point we will stop our historical view of the idea of God and in the next section we shall see where it is that all this leads us. We shall in that section have to consider Feuerbach and Fechner in passing, and also look into a bit of metaphysics and popular science.

PART TWO: THEORETICAL

In this section of our discussion, we leave the historical field and take to our own modern ways of thinking. We shall discuss two things, first; our religious experience, and then our attempt to explain this experience in terms of thought. It is granted, I am sure, by all that each of us does have some experience of a power he calls God, and that we do try to find some basis for our belief in rational experience. We say we believe or do not believe in God. Well, what do we mean? It is this giving of meaning to our experience, to our belief, that now concerns us. Let it be admitted once for all that so far as every person's inner life is concerned, the experience is the important thing, whether we can get a rational interpretation of it or not.

A rational interpretation implies thinking. Thinking implies data upon which to think. What shall those data be? The classicla writers on the philosophy of religion all seem to take their start from Thought itself. John Caird says, in his Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, page 3, "Whatever is real is rational; and with all that is rational philosophy claims to deal. It does not confine itself to finite things, or content itself with observing and classifying physical phenomena, or with empirical generalizations as to the nature and the life of man.....In other words so far from resting in what is finite and relative, the peculiar domain of philosophy is absolute truth.....In all provinces of investigation it seeks as its peculiar employment to penetrate beneath the surface-show of things, beneath empirical appearances and accidents and to find the ultimate meaning and essence. Its aim is to discover, not what seems, but what is, and why it is; to bind together objects and events in the links of necessary thought, and to find their last ground and reason in that which comprehends and transcends all..the nature of God himself....Religion so far from forming an exception to the all embracing sphere of philosophy

is rather just that province which lies nearest to it, for, in one point of view, religion and philosophy have common objects and a common content, and in the explanation of religion, philosophy may be said to be at the same time explaining itself."

Mr. T. H. Green, in his famous "Introduction to Hume", says: "Berkeley, in his over-hasty zeal for God, had missed the only true way of finding God in the world which lies in the discovery that the world is thought." (page 189)

In this thesis I wish to depart from the classical philosophers and their method. I mean to apply a thorough-going empiricism. I believe that all my thought concerning myself and the universe are modified if not really induced by my sense experience, by the knowledge I acquire through my senses. My ideas come through study and observation. My ideas of God, man, the soul, came through my observations of God, man, and so on. In this part of our philosophy of religion I wish to base everything upon modern science, and modern scientific conceptions. Notice that I say, "based upon" modern science. This is important. One can readily see that there are two ways of approaching the results of modern science. First, we can try and square the results of modern science with our ideas of God, man, etc. The other way is to make your ideas of God, man, etc. agree with Science and its conceptions. There is a vast difference between these two modes of approach. For example: when the theory of evolution was promulgated, men set about to find out what an all-perfect, master-mechanic God meant by it. They said it was God's way of manifesting Himself to man. This was the first method. It was putting the theory of evolution into our idea of God. But the other method would be to ask, if, granting the truth of the evolutionary hypothesis and starting from it, it did not show that not only man but also, perhaps, God himself had evolved and was evolving still.

One may legitimately ask why one should base one's philosophy of religion upon science, for religion is essentially a matter of spiritual experience and science is avowedly materialistic? The answer is very plain.

Though religion is a matter of experience the interpretation of the experience is not a matter to be decided only by the experience but by all kinds of data that bear upon the experience. And these data are furnished by science, which results we must take into consideration. At this moment let me define what I mean by science. I do not mean only the material science, but also the sciences of the religions, comparative religions, and also psychology and the psychology of religion. Metaphysics, if you insist, may also be considered only it must be a metaphysic that grows out of the results of the sciences. The great trouble has been and is, that dogmatic religion has fought science tooth and nail, and even the most liberal of the Churches have been shy of accepting scientific results if they interfered with their beliefs.

Mr. Galloway well says (Principles of Religious Development, page 160) "The dispute between science and religion is not so much one between science and the religious spirit as between science and the theology which has grown out of religion, and which has pushed its dogmas into the scientific field." It might perhaps be better expressed to say that dogmatic theology refuses to accept the results of modern science, for the dogmas were in the field before modern science came on.

But the meaning is clear. Our theology, for this is what we mean when we speak of an intellectual interpretation of the religious experience, should be hospitable to science. I go a bit farther and say that it ought to be based upon science. The reason seems to be quite obvious, Science deals with the cold hard facts; she has no desire except to discover so far as is possible things as they are. Ultimate knowledge, as we shall show later, cannot, of course, be obtained but Science does make the nearest approach to the facts. She studies the earth, the suns and the stars; with her crucibles and retorts; in laboratories and fields and forests; on mountain-tops and in streams she seeks for things as they are. Her explanations must be accepted in these matters. Our only insistence must be that science shall also consider

sider, as I have already defined her as being, the results of psychology and the results of the S.P.R.. I grant to science the right to say that my ideas of God shall be in accord with her discoveries; but I demand in return that science study my religious emotions, and after putting them to the test and abstracting the essential from the non-essential elements that she use the essential elements as data in the formulation of her theories, upon which I am to base my belief.

You see, I am frankly saying to Science, "Behold, I have an experience of a religious nature. Take it; test it; prove it; tell me what it means; show me to what beliefs it ought to lead." This means that I am building my theology, my intellectual interpretation of my inner experience upon science.

It may be objected at this point that after all I am dealing with thought. The scientist, it will be said, takes his facts and thinks about them. Well, I reply, when you base your interpretation upon thought, are you not thinking about thought? I fail to see any difference between thinking, as such when thinking about thought or when thinking about the construction of the universe. Unless, to be sure, I am willing to admit, that which is open as yet to proving, namely, that all things ultimately are Thought, that we have in some mysterious fashion an infallible guide in a mystical something or other which is called thought, which admission I cannot conscientiously make.

To build up a complete philosophy of religion upon the basis of scientific results would be the work of several life-times. Fortunately in this paper I need only to deal with one concept, albeit one of great and central importance, namely the concept of God. We shall here ask, in what sort of a God will Science permit us to believe. First as to what I mean by God. I mean by "God" the entire universe, from the planet upon which we live, to the farthestmost fixed star: the universe with its fixed structure and its tremendous energy streams. All things that all, physical and

spiritual, material and psychic, all put together--that is God! Pantheism, you say. Very well, then, pantheism, if by pantheism you mean and will understand not only God in all things, but God as as things. "Alle Dingen sind Gott" says an old German poet, and with that I agree.

To attempt to say all that might be possible about God, with such an all-embracing definition as we have given is a hopeless task in this paper or for that matter in this life. I can suggest only in vague outline some salient facts, or if you prefer, thoughts that bear upon the subject.

We shall discuss two things, first the religious experience as given us by the psychology of religion, and secondly, the two scientific facts, the theory of evolution and the electron theory of matter.

I. The religious experience.

In beginning this section of our discussion, let me recall the fact that in the beginning of the paper we defined God as "The underlying substance of all things". We, then, in the pages on the philosophers, Kant, etc., took it for granted that this definition meant something, that when we talked about God, all of us understood just what was meant when we heard the word God. But now it is for us to consider closely this word, and in doing this we shall find that it means to most of us almost nothing,--so far as our definition goes. To say that--God is the underlying substance of all things-- does not tell us what that substance is! Is it spirit? Is it matter? Is it some ether-- hypothetical or demonstrated? You will instinctively reply that it is one or the other or the third or all or none, depending on your mental constitution, bias, or need. But after all, is not nescience really our portion? I want to drive this home-- carefully and emphatically--that the agnostic position is the only position tenable so far as logic and reason are concerned.

Turn to Science. There, if anywhere, one would have the right to say--"I am on safe grounds here; I know this or that or the other. With

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microscope and telescope, with scalpel and hammer, I have found out thus and so to be true. Mathematics above all is a science founded upon irrefutable, demonstrable reasoning."

But let us look at this for a moment. Take the field of geometry. We are all more or less familiar with Euclid. Granting certain axioms to be true such as- a straight line is the shortest distance between two points--then we can demonstrate the rest. But recall this fact. We grant certain facts to be self-evident. We do not prove them. We cannot prove them. Nay, more, the axiom given by Euclid that, through a given point one straight line and only one can be drawn parallel to another straight line--upon which the rest of Euclid practically depends has never been proven, and the great mathematicians have given up the attempt to prove it, and assigned that proof to the limbo of science, along with perpetual motion and such like. The proposition is accepted and used but the proof of its mathematical truth is still wanting. Not only is this true, but this also; mathematicians have started non-Euclidian geometries based upon assumptions antithetical to some of the axioms of Euclid, and have shown that such non-Euclidian geometries are tenable and demonstrable. I refer to the work of Lobachewsky and Riemann. Poincare's words on this subject of mathematical certainty are pertinent and instructive. In speaking of mathematical theories he says: (Science and Hypothesis; P. 161)

"But these (theories) are merely names of the images we substitute for the real objects which nature will hide forever from our eyes.... The true relation between these objects are the only reality we can attain,, and the sole condition is that the same relations shall exist between these objects as between the images we are forced to put in their places. If the relations are known to us what does it matter if we think it convenient to replace one image by another."

In other branches of Science the masters are compelled to say with Omar:

88.

"Myself when young did eagerly frequent
Doctor and Saint, and heard great argument
About it and about; but evermore
Came out by the same door wherein I went."

We say, surely we know what matter is; we handle it, change its form, etc.

But, says Mr. Duncan, (The New Knowledge D.2)

"What matter is in itself and by itself is quite hopeless of answer and concerns only metaphysicians. The "Ding an sich" is forever outside the province of science. Science is naive; she takes things as they come, content with some such practical definition as will serve to differentiate matter from all other forms of non-matter." Science, you see, does not know what matter is.

Professor Newcomb in speaking of the nebular hypothesis says: (Astronomy for Everybody, Page 106) "Even if we accept it, we still have open the question: how did the nebula itself originate and how did it begin to contract? This brings us to the boundary where science can propound a question but cannot answer it."

Compare this with a quotation from a letter of Newton to Mr. Bently concerning the law of gravity.

"Gravity must be caused by an agent acting constantly according to certain laws, but whether this agent be material or immaterial I have left to the consideration of my hearers." He did not know!

Says Carl Snyder; "Every child is familiar with gravitation from the time it begins to walk, but the profoundest philosophers know nothing of its cause and science has not discovered anything concerning it except a few general facts."

"Professor Dubois-Reymond has made the assertion", says Mons. Boutroux, "that the universe involves seven enigmas, and that of these four at least are unsoluble so far as we are concerned. Ignorabimus! that he declares, was to be the last word of science in regard to these matters. These four transcendent enigmas were, according to Dubois-Reymond, the essence of matter and force; the origin of movement; the origin of simple sen-

sation and free-will." Prof. Haeckle, at the end of "The Riddle of the Universe" says:

"In truth the last foundations of nature is as unutterable by our minds as it was by the mind of an Anaximander or an Empedocles; of a Spinoza or a Newton; of a Kant or a Goethe. We must ever confess that this substance becomes in its essential constitution, the more mysterious and the more enigmatical in proportion as we penetrate into the knowledge of its attributes and of its evolution. We do not know the thing-in-itself which lies beneath knowable phenomena."

"But why should we trouble ourselves about this Thing-in-itself? since we have not the means of studying it, since we cannot even be sure whether it exists? Let us leave the barren task of brooding on this unintelligible phantom to the metaphysicians; and let us like genuine scientists take pleasure in the immense headway that has been made in our science and in our philosophy."

Ignorabimus, that is the cry. The ultimate nature of things is unknown. Not however, as Herbert Spencer says, "Unknowable", only thus far unknown. What the future has in store for us we cannot say. Things may be knowable though still thus far unknown.

Nor is this ignorance confined to science alone. Philosophy to, confesses her nescience. Recall Kant's criticism of the Ontological Argument for the existence of God. Your idea is there but the reality of the "that" for which your idea would stand is not known. Says Prof. James, in speaking of the thinness of the structures erected by the neo-Hegelians:

"If philosophy is more a matter of passionate vision than of logic- and I believe it is- logic only finding reasons for the visions afterward-- must not such thinness either come from the vision being defective in the disciples, or from their passion matched with Fechner's or with Hegel's own passion, being as moon-light is unto sunlight, or as water unto wine." "Thought deals solely with surfaces, it can name the thinness of real-

ity but it cannot fathom it; and its sufficiency here is essential and permanent, not temporary."

In the light of these facts it appears to me to be a waste of time and energy to insist upon it that either matter or energy or thought is the ultimate of all things. Why should the idealist insist upon it that there is no existence save in the idea? Why should the realist insist upon the existence of an ultimate real such as time or space or matter? When Berkeley says that there is nothing outside the ideas of man, he is telling the truth yet not the whole truth. It is true that this stone paperweight in front of me, is for me that which my ideas of it are--ideas which I get from my sense organs. But to say that there is no stone there at all is going a little too far for me, I believe. To say that in its essence the stone weight is not what my idea of it is, is a statement that can be made and challenged without either party being in danger of defeat--for the stone for me is my idea of the stone. Its ultimate essence aside from its effect on me--is unknown to me. When the realist-Prof. Booden for example- says that because I go to Chicago to see my friend-- therefore I prove the actuality of time, I agree, but when he would tell me that Time is and must be thus and so irrespective of its relation to me, I have the perfect right to challenge his assertion. For aside from my experience of time, time does not exist for me. My experience of time may not coincide with the essence of time in itself, but I can only know it through my experience of it. Fichte says, in speaking of the Ego, (I quote from memory) that the Ego posits itself, then it posits the non-Ego; then the Ego modifies the non-Ego and in its turn the Ego is modified by the non-Ego. Now it Fichte means that the non-Ego is only a non-existent postulate of the Ego, then he is only saying that there is nothing but the ego which posits and modifies itself. He is an idealist pure and simple, and the realist has a case against him. For the non-Ego is a real thing. But if we accept the non-ego as a real thing we can use Fichte's formula with right and understanding. It would be some-

thing like this:

The Ego posits itself: it is affected by something not itself, therefore it posits the non-ego. But the non-ego in itself cannot be known to the ego, for in its effects upon the ego the non-ego is modified by the ego's sense experience. So the ego is affected not by the non-ego but by the non-ego as modified by the ego, that is by the sense experience of the ego.

To put this more simply using the stone paperweight again as an illustration:

I postulate myself as existing. The stone is there. I postulate the existence of the stone. My sense experience modifies the stone. It may or may not be what I experience it to be. My experience of the stone modifies me--I would not eat the stone for example. It follows then that I am affected by the stone as the stone is after being modified by me. And furthermore, the stone, if not in essence, at least in its relations to me, is modified, affected by my idea of the stone as modified for me by my sense experience.

And is not this relationship the important matter? A thing is what it does. A stone wall stops me when I run into it. Water wets me if I tumble into it. Food appeases my hunger if I eat enough of it. Those are the important things about the stone wall, the water and the food at the time I am affected by them. To be told that there is an old stone fence in an adjoining county, would not impede my walk down town after supper tonight. The knowledge that meat has risen so many cents a pound does not affect me if I am a vegetarian. To hear that Mr. Jones of Kalamazoo (said Mr. Jones being an entire stranger) has inherited a hundred thousand dollars, affects me mildly if at all. To learn that I have inherited a like amount would affect me with some degree of force. My relation to the object is a great factor. The essence of things are not known. Things are for us, as we are affected by them.

As in science and philosophy, so too in the sphere of religion, we as thinkers must be agnostic. Do you know that there is in you such an entity as a soul? Can anyone dissect himself or someone else and say "lo here - lo there- the soul!" Can you prove the truth of immortality? Even if you accept the evidence as advanced in the reports of the S. P.R. one is still in doubt. The case has not been proven definitely. Can you prove the existence of God? Can you know him in thought? Can you get a clear-cut, definitely outlined idea of God? An idea, through which, as it were, you can stick a pin and then put it in a glass cabinet, properly labelled? Non-cognitive, rather, is one's experience of God. "Canst thou by searching find out God?" Job puts it well when he says "I uttered that which I understood not: ythings too wonderful for me which I knew not." In your moments of deepest religious experience when you feel yourself in closest touch with the universal Soul, are you thinking, reasoning, knowing? Are you not rather pouring yourself out in feeling and emotion? Prof. James has this fact in mind when he writes the following in speaking of mysticism:

"The handiest of marks by which I classify a state of mind is negative. The subject immediately says that it defies expression, that no adequate report of its contents can be given....In this peculiarity mystical states are more like states of feeling than like states of intellect."

(Varieties 380)

With this rather lengthy discussion in mind let us ask ourselves if we know God. Must not our answer be negative? Yet you will say and say with perfect right and truth "God is. I am positive of it; I feel Him-- I commune with Him--He is and that is all that there is to it. I cannot dissect Him or pigeon-hole Him--If I could He would not be God. But I experience Him- so He is." And it is this experience of God, this feeling for God, that accounts for the vagueness that characterises the answer to such a question as "What is God?" One instinctively starts to say "God is--", then one pauses--"God is-is--why God is God. 'ou know what God is." Not

very definite, is it? Can we make it any more definite? Let us see. Before we begin, however, let us accept as fundamental, that we are to talk not about absolute, ultimate things, but about things that have real, practical values and bearing. When we say God we mean a something- we mean a power perhaps ourselves, perhaps not ourselves, a power we feel but cannot define. Of absolutes we cannot talk, of realities we can and must talk. Still while we cannot define absolutely we do try and want to try to give some explanation of the "that" we experience. Although we are mystics we are also rationalists. Reason, intellect, is a part of our nature. We like to feel that the experience we have has some foundation in tangible facts-- some relation to our intellect. So we often say God is the First Cause. Now you and I do not experience Him as the first cause. Some of us would say God is omnipotent, omniscient, etc. Yet we do not experience Him as such. These are terms we use to give us some feeling that we have an intellectual hold on our experience. I trust that this will be made clearer and enforced in the following pages. But even now it is evident that when we say "God" we mean two things. First the power we experience in our moments of communion and secondly our attempts to define, to intellectualize this experience. (See appendix, the paper on the "Self", from the conclusions of which I am unable as yet to get away.) These two points would make up our philosophy of religion. Our definition for a philosophy of religion would be this. An examination of the religious experience and its interpretation in the light of modern scientific conceptions.

THE RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE.

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The religious experience of the mystic is obviously one in which the mystic as an individual is lost-swallowed up as it were,- in the universal infinitude. Mental processes are gone. There is a "Somewhat". What it is, how it is, when it is, one cannot say. There are two types of mysticism, the active and the passive. The characteristic of the first, the active type, is that there is a feeling that one is held in the grip of a strong intense, pulsing, tremendously dynamic power. The approach into this condition may be in two ways. One way is for the mystic to let himself go into the universal whole. He surrenders himself. In this way I would characterize my own experience. (See appendix already alluded to).

The second method is characterised by the fact that the subject seems to take the universe into himself. This is the experience of a friend of mine who describes his preliminary sensations before total self-consciousness is lost as though he were drawing the cosmos into himself." He was swallowing the world and all. It was powerful action on his part.

This active mystic experience results in a powerful drive to do--one wants to act-- to achieve, to accomplish something. What to do is not known, for the experience is void of cognition; but there is a drive to do something.

The passive type of mysticism seems to be marked by a gentle, peaceful relaxation into the calmness of the universal Soul. It is as though the mystic entered upon an eternal calmness. It is a yielding of oneself. Emerson sums it up when he says:

"Beauty through my senses stole;
I yielded myself to the perfect whole."

Tennyson has somewhere a passage (In 'In Memoriam, I think) where he describes the feelings of the poet when wrapped in the ecstasy of true communion

with Nature, as a state of wonderful calm. Plotinus describes his experience as one of great peace and calmness. It is pre-eminently the condition of the Buddhist mystic, who wants to lose all desire, all identity, all action and to attain to Nirvana.

The characteristic to which I wish to call your attention in particular is this; the mystic state is one which has no cognitive content. This seems to be the general opinion of the subjects. They never can tell you what it is that they experience. It is indescribable. On this point Professor James is very illuminating. He says (a portion of which I have already cited): "The handiest marks by which I classify a state of mind as mystical is negative. The subject of it immediately says that it defies expression, that no adequate report of its contents can be given in words. It follows from this that its quality must be directly experienced; it cannot be imparted or transferred to others. In this peculiarity the mystical states are more like states of feeling than like states of intellect. No person can make to another who has never had a certain feeling in what the quality or worth of it consists." (V.R.E. p 380).

Speaking of the Buddhistic mystic experience called dhyana he says: "There seems to be four stages recognized in dyhana. The first stage comes through concentration of mind upon one point. It excludes desire but not discernment or judgment; it is still intellectual. In the second stage the intellectual functions drop off, and the satisfied sense of unity remains. In the third stage the satisfaction departs and the indifference begins. In the fourth stage the indifference, memory and self-consciousness are perfected. (Just what 'memory' and 'self-consciousness' mean in this connection is doubtful. They cannot be the faculties familiar to us in the lower life.") page 341

To bring the matter a little closer home let us look at some conversion experiences. A characteristic of the conversion experience is that the transition point from 'sin' to 'grace' is a point made up of non-cognitive elements. The convert somehow feels that he has been saved or has received

'grace', or uses some similar expression, but he is never able at that time or afterwards to explain the transition. This transition point seems to be pure feeling or feeling-will, never is it knowledge. A good illustration of this is found in the words of Saint Paul, an illustration which I do not recall that anyone has used in this connection before. He says in his epistle to the Corinthians; "I must needs glory though it is not expedient; but I will come to visions and revelations of the Lord; I know a man in Christ fourteen years (whether in the body I know not, or whether of the body I know not, God knoweth). such a one caught up even to the third heaven, (whether in the body or apart from the body, I know not, God knoweth), how that he was caught up even into its paradise, and heard unspeakable words which it is not lawful for a man to utter." 2 Cor.12.1ff.

The phrase to be noted is "whether in the body or apart from the body I know not", for it shows that the experience was such that true self consciousness was gone.

Another case is that of T.W.D. (cited by Prof. James, page 215) He was brought to an acute paroxysm of consciousness of sin, ate nothing all day, locked himself in his room in the evening in complete despair crying aloud 'How long, O Lord, how long', and after repeating this in similar language several times, he says, I seemed to sink away into a state of insensibility. When I came to myself again I was on my knees praying not for myself but for others." The transition point is non-explicable here. Here is another case, that of Mr. H.S. Hadley.

"On Tuesday I sat in Harlem, homeless, friendless, dying drunkard.....I had often said I would never be a tramp; I will never be cornered for when that time comes, if ever it does come, I will find a home in the bottom of the river.' But the Lord so ordered it that when the time did come, I was not able to walk one quarter of the way to the river. As I sat there thinking, I seemed to feel some great and mighty presence. I did not know then what it was. I did learn afterward that it was Jesus the sinner's

friend. The ,afterward' was after a visit to Jerry McCauley's mission where Hadley was technically converted. Then follows the account of his accepting Jesus, and he says "Neverwith mortal tongue can I describe that moment. Although up to that moment my soul had been filled with indescribable gloom I felt the glorious brightness of the sun, shining into my heart. I felt I was a free man."

Note that he seemes to have felt some great and mighty presence, that he "did not then know" what it was. This will be of importance a little later when we consider the giving of content to the experience of communion and conversion.

John Wesley wrote "In London alone I found six hundred and fifty-two members of society who were exceedingly clear in their experience and whose testimony I could see no reason to doubt. And every one of these (without a single exception) hasdeclared that his deliverance from sin was instantaneous: that the change was wrought in a moment."

That this instantaneous change was not always a change from bad to good is shown by this case (James p.198 note 2)

"One night I was seized on getting into bed with a rigor such a Swedenborg describes as coming over him with a sense of holiness, but over me with a sense of guilt. During the whole night I lay under the influence of the rigor, and from its inception I felt that I was under the curse of God. I have never done one act of duty in my life--sins against God and man--beginning as far as my memory goes back--a wild cat in human shape."

The question that drives insisently at us is "what is this moment of conversion, this power that is felt? After the experience men call it Christ, Buddha, God, according to their particular environments, creeds and theologies, Etc. But what is it that fits all these things so well? My impression would be, both from my own experience, and from the

examination of reports of the experiences of others, that the mystic experience itself is without any intellectual content. That after the experience the subject, in trying to explain his experience much use such terminology as is familiar to him. This would account for the diversity of reports as to what it was that was experienced: some saying that it was Jesus, and others God, and others this, that, or the other particular thing. Then, too, I believe that it is possible to put whatever content you please into this experience, which content then always is found there. This appears paradoxical. What I mean is this. We can, while getting to the X point (see appendix) so charge our minds with any desire or ideal, that after we have regained self-consciousness we feel sure that we have actually found the idea or desire with which we have charged our minds. The intensification of our feelings would be due to the force we had experienced having increased that idea or desire with which we had charged our minds--brains--souls--what you please. To put it briefly our mystic experience will intensify and strengthen that which we give it. What we take with us into a state of communion we bring back intensified. This can be and has been verified (in my own case at least) by experiment with reading matter and thoughts. In regard to this, the last case we have cited is interesting. It would be interesting to know what the writer's frame of mind^{was}.

Prof. James well says, "The fact is that mystical feelings of enlargement, union and emancipation has no specific intellectual content, whatever of its own. It is capable of forming matrimonial alliances with material furnished by the most diverse philosophies and theologies, provided only that they can find a place in their framework for its peculiar emotional mood."

"All these intellectual operations (the science of religion etc.) whether they be constructive or comparative and critical, presuppose immediate experiences as their subject matter. They are interpretative and inductive operations, operations after the fact, sonsequent upon

religious feelings, not co-ordinate with it, not independent of what is ascertained."

Herrmann is interesting on this point. Mon.Boutroux thus speaks of Hermann":

"One of the most serious difficulties which Ritschlianism presents is that evoked by Wilhelm Herrman, the famous disciple of his master. According to Ritschl the religious consciousness ought to recognize and apprehend itself in the formulas of Holy Writ. But the theological formulas that one finds in Paul for instance, represents religious experiences which are peculiar to him, and which we ourselves have probably not enjoyed. How then can we adopt these formulas?....The solution that Herrmann proposes consists in separating two things which are for Ritschl closely united: the ground work & the content of faith. The ground work, that is faith properly socalled--is absolutely necessary, and is the same for all believers.....But the special content of faith, the definite form of dogma represents a mere determinate which may vary with individuals. This content therefore can be legitimately expressed in different ways in accordance with the various experiences. "Later on" Herrmann no longer desired any other ground of faith than the impression felt by the individual in contemplating the inward life of Jesus. The angry God and the merciful Lord of the Bible, corresponding to the two-fold feeling of sin and redemption, are no longer for him, in any sense realities in themselves, origination^{of} our soul states; our soul states are the only reality, divine justice and pity being merely more or less subjective interpretation of them. Everything which is not individual faith, pure and simple is merely a symbolic expression of that faith."

Boutroux goes on to criticize this by saying "it is subjectively without content", and quotes Pfleiderer as reproaching Hermann for making the object of religion merely imaginary. Pfleiderer says "to place God outside the sphere of knowledge is to regard him as a mere object of aspir-

ation. It is to maintain the existence of God solely on the ground that God is salutary, comforting and inspiring without asking if that belief is not contradicted by the teachings of science. Such a faith is incapable of proving that it is not a purely subjective delusion." Prof. Pfleiderer is right. Belief in God is then ⁱⁿcapable of proof. It is a matter of entire subjectivity. Kant settled that for all time, it seems to me.

The reason why I have spent so much time on this point in trying to show that the religious experience as such is without definite content of an intellectual kind, is because so many people say that they experience God as this, that, or the other, attribute. But the evidences produced by the authorities would all tend to show that such contentions are erroneous. The recognition of this point is of great importance because of its practical bearing upon our interpretation of the religious experiences. If our experience is, as I believe, without intellectual content, then, when we say that God is a spirit, or that He is omnipotent, or that Christ came to us, we are simply trying to explain, to account for, our experience in some way so that we are able to account for our experience in a rational fashion. No one really likes to be subject to an experience which he cannot at all explain. And even if we are not mystic in our natures, if we have no such moments of self-annihilation, of self-absorption, such as we have been discussing, yet all of us do have a belief that there is some underlying power, force, demon, God, call it what you will. We do have our feelings of awe, reverence, trust, fear, love, or disdain toward this force. Even here we cannot say we know anything about this power, so far as ultimates are concerned. Says Mr. Galloway in the work already cited, (page 142) "Thinking is not so much revealed in determining the religious attitudes and moods as in developing the world view, within which religious works, and which goes to form meaning. Its action at the primitive stage is naïve, not deliberate; and enabled to abstract and gen-

eralize it can only avail itself of sensuous images and analogies. The animistic reading of natural phenomena betrays an unconscious use of the principles of analogy, for it is an instinctive projection of man's experience into things, a construction of them in terms of his own life. And the untrammelled activity of belief, fashions a world which is the reflection of human hopes and fears and needs. The ultimate principles from which proof proceeds cannot themselves be proved. Even the speculative regress on a world-ground is not a proof in the strict sense, For we cannot execute the return movement and show how the ground necessarily posits the world of experience. And accordingly when we regard God as the unconditioned source of all values our attitude is one of faith; it represents our practical demands and spiritual needs and not a logical inference. No basis on which our theoretical arguments proceed could give this result as a logical conclusion."

Let us then for the sake of simplicity call this power we experience God. We all say that God is this, that, or the other, or deny Him existence altogether. What is it that determines our ideas of God? I think it is our desires. We make God what we wish him to be. Literally we create our idea of God, in our own image. It is the human element; the human experience that fashions our ideas of God. As far back as the time of Aristotle this last idea was known and formulated, for, says Aristotle in "The Politics";

"Men say that Gods have a king because they themselves either are or were in ancient times under the rule of a king. For they imagine not only the form of a god but their ways of life to be like their own."

Feuerbach is wonderfully illuminating and pertinent at this point. In his "Essence of Christianity", he says; "Man first unconsciously and involuntarily creates God in his own image, and after that God consciously and voluntarily creates man in his own image. Hence the position of Theological one-sidedness that the revelation of God holds an even pace with

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with the development of the human race. Naturally, for the revelation of God is nothing else than the revelation, the self-unfolding of human nature." (p 118).

"The essence of faith is that which man wishes actually is; he wishes to be immortal, therefore he is immortal; he wishes for the existence of the being who can do everything which is improbable to Nature and reason, therefore such a being exists; he wishes for a world that corresponds to the desires of the heart, a world of unlimited subjectivity, i. e. of unperturbed feelings, of uninterrupted bliss, while nevertheless there exists a world the opposite of that that subjective one, hence this world must pass away, as God or absolute subjectivity must remain." (p128)

The more empty life is the fuller and more concrete is God. The impoverishing of the real world and the enriching of God is one act. Only the poor man has a rich God. God springs out of his feelings of a want; what man is in need of, whether this be a definite and therefore conscious or an unconscious need--that is God."

"The idea of a Divine Being is essentially an abstracted, distilled idea. It is obvious that this abstraction is no arbitrary one, but is determined by the essential stand-point of man. As he is, as he thinks, so does he make his abstraction." (p 77)

In the "Essence of Religion", Feuerbach is equally pertinent. There he says, "what I ask and wish for that I inspire and enchant by my wishes. While under the influence of an effect, and religion roots only in effect, in feeling-- man places his essence without himself, he treats as living, what is without life, as arbitrary, what has no will; he animates the objects with his sighs; for he cannot possibly in a state of effect address himself to an insensible being." "Nature enchanted by human feeling, Nature agreeing with an assimilated to man's feeling, that is, nature herself endowed with feeling, is Nature such as she is, an object of religion a divine being. The wish is the origin, ~~of~~ the very essence of religion----

the essences of the gods is nothing but the essence of the wish."

He who has no wishes has no Gods either. Why did the Greeks lay such a stress upon immortality and happiness of the gods? Because they themselves did not wish to be mortal and unhappy. Where no lamentations about man's mortality and misery are heard, no hymns are heard in favor of the immortal and happy gods." (page 37)

The method by which we get and follow our beliefs, beliefs based upon our wishes is thus described by Prof. James.

"A conception of the world arises in you somehow, no matter how. Is it true or not you ask?"

It might be true, somewhere, you say, for it is not self-contradictory. It may be true, you continue, even here and now. It is fit to be true. It would be well if it were true, it ought to be true, you presently feel.

It must be true something persuasive in you whispers next, and then as a final result. It shall be held for true, you decide; it shall be as if it were true for you. And you acting thus may in certain cases be a means to making it securely true in the end.

Not one step in this process is logical yet it is the way in which monists and pluralists alike espouse and hold fast to their visions." (Pluralistic Universe p.329)

Now I venture to believe that all people who think about their religion at all, follow just this course mapped out by Prof. James. They realize a power in the universe, and they proceed to put into that power certain attributes which they wish to find true and which they ought to be the attributes of God. So far then this must be our conclusion:

(1) The religious experience, as such, is without intellectual content of any kind, and

(2) The intellectual interpretation we put upon our experience depends upon our desires, our environment, and our position in the scale

of civilization. We experience a "somewhat". We create our idea of the "somewhat" in our own image.

THE INTELLECTUAL INTERPRETATION OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE.

We have now reached the point where we are to talk about our intellectual definition of the religious experience, or rather to attempt to put such an interpretation upon it as will square off with modern science. In doing this we are to deal with two scientific facts, namely the law of evolution, and the electron theory of the structure of matter.

The first of these propositions need hardly be more than mentioned in these days when evolution is the key-note of all our thinking. The only thing we should note concerning it is that we here start with the evolutionary hypothesis, and shall make our ideas square off with this rather than attempt to fit it into our pre-conceived ideas. We shall accept the fact that growth, that the change in development from the lower to a higher form of life is the salient point in the life of the universe. And with this, too, we must realize that it is possible to have the accompanying antithesis to growth, namely, deterioration. The universe is not only developing and combining but it is also deteriorating and disintegrating. There are really constantly two tendencies, one the tendency to build up and the other the tendency to break down, and life as we call it is just this constant warfare between these two tendencies.

The Electron Theory is a recent comer into the scientific field. Yet, but recenently arrived, it has been irrefutably demonstrated. It is really more than a mere theory, for it is being used as a working hypothesis and all matters relating to chemistry and physics and now being refor-

ulated in terms based on the electric nature of matter. There are three writers of accepted authority in this field now; Prof. T. J. Thomson, Mon. E. E. Fournier, and Prof. H. C. Jones. There are several other writers who have dealt with this matter in a popular and general way, such as Righi, Snyder and Duncan, but the real masters in the field are the three named above.

The results obtained by the work of Prof. Thomson shows that what we ordinarily call matter is not matter at all, but electricity, and energy. The mass of any given object depends upon the speed with which the negative particles of electricity, the electrons, which are in the bit of matter, so-called, are traveling. I shall give the principle points as given by Prof. Thomson. He says (page 46 "Electricity and Matter" 1904)

"The mass of any particle increases with the velocity as shown by the following table: the first column contains the values of the particles expressed in centimeters; per second, the second column the value of the fraction E/M where E is the charge and M the mass of the particle.

Table L.

$V \times M$	$V \times M - 10$	$E/M \times 10^{-7}$
	2.83	.62
	2.72	.77
	2.59	.975
	2.48	1.17
	2.36	1.31

"Kauffman on the assumption that a charged body behaved like a metal sphere, the distribution of the lines of force of which when moving had been determined by G. F. C. Searle, came to the conclusion that when the particle was moving slowly the electrical mass was about 1/4th of the whole mass. He was careful to point out that this fraction depends on the assumption we make as to the nature of the moving body, as for example, whether it is ellipsoidal, insulating or conducting; and that with other assumptions his experiments might show that the whole mass was electri-

cal, which he evidently regarded as the most probable result." (page 47)

"I have calculated the ratio of the masses of the rapidly moving particles given out by radium to the mass of the same particle when at rest, or moving slowly, on the assumption that the whole of the mass was due to the charge and have compared these results with the values of the same ratio as determined by Kauffmann's experiments. The results are given in table two, the first column of which contains the value of V the velocities of the particles, the second P the number of times the mass of particles moving with this velocity exceeds the mass of the same particle when at rest....the third column the value of this quantity found by Kauffmann in his experiments.

Table II.

Vx10-10cm	P	P'
2.85	3.1	3.09
2.72	2.42	2.43
2.59	2.00	2.04
2.48	1.66	1.83
2.36	1.5	1.65

These results report the view that the whole mass of these electrified particles arises from their charge (page 49)

"One view of the constitution of matter....is that the atoms of the various elements are collections of positive and negative charges held together mainly by their electric attractions, and moreover, that the negatively electrified particles in the atom (corpuscles, I have termed them) are identical with those small negatively electrified particles, whose properties we have been discussing. On this view of the constitution of matter part of the mass of any body would be the mass of the ether dragged along by the Faraday Tubes stretching across the atoms between the positive and negatively electrified constituents. The view I wish to put before you is that it is not merely a part of the mass of the body which arises in this way, but that the whole mass is just the mass of ether surrounding

the body which is carried along by the Faraday tubes associated with the atoms of the body. In fact that all mass is mass of the ether, all momentum, momentum of the ether, and all kinetic energy of the ether. This view it should be said, requires the density of the ether to be immensely greater than that of any known substance." (page 50-51).

"We shall show that there are strong reasons for supposing that we have what may be called an atomic structure; any charge being built up of finite individual charges, all equal to each other, just as in an atomic theory of matter a quantity of hydrogen is built up of small particles called atoms, all the atoms being equal to each other." (page 71).

Prof. Jones of John Hopkins University says, in speaking of the work of Prof. Thomson, (The Electrical Nature of Matter) "If the whole mass of corpuscles are electrical, why assume that the corpuscles contain any so-called matter at all? All the properties of the corpuscle including the two propositions we have been accustomed to associate with matter, inertia and mass, are accounted for by the electrical charge of the corpuscle. Since we know things only by their properties, and since all the properties of the corpuscle are accounted for by the electrical charge associated with it, why assume that the corpuscle contains anything but the electrical charge? It is obvious that there is no reason for so doing.

"The corpuscle is then nothing but a disembodied electrical charge, containing nothing material as we have been accustomed to use the term. It is electricity and nothing but electricity. With these new conceptions a new term was introduced, and now instead of speaking of the corpuscle we speak of the 'electron'. The electron then is a disembodied electrical charge, containing no matter, and is the term we shall hereafter use for this ultimate unit, of which we shall learn that all so-called matter is probably composed." (page 21)

30.
"The electron is the ultimate unit of all matter. The atoms are made up of electrons or disembodied electrical charges, in rapid motion, the atom of one elementary substance, differing from the atom from another elementary substance only in the number and arrangement of electrons contained in it. Thus we have, at last, the ultimate unit of matter, of which all forms of matter are composed, and the remarkable feature is that this ultimate unit of which all matter is composed is not matter at all as we ordinarily understand the term but electricity." (page 22)

"What we know in the universe, and all that we know is changes in energy. In order to have something to which we can mentally attach energy, we have created in our imagination, matter. Matter is purely an hypothesis and energy is the only reality." (page 22)

"All atoms of whatsoever kind are made up of electrons which are nothing but negative particles of electricity in rapid motion." (page 29)

"The atomic masses of the chemical atoms are as different as one and one hundredth for hydrogen, and two hundred and thirty eight and five tenths for uranium, and all the intermediate orders of magnitude are met with. These masses are due to the electrical charges or electrons of which the atoms of all the elements are composed." (29)

"Thomson's Conception of the Atom".

"The electrons are moving with high velocity in orbits within the atoms, occupying a relatively small part of the volume occupied by the atom as a whole. The spaces between the electrons in an atom are relatively enormous, compared with the spaces occupied by the electrons themselves. But the electrons are negative electrical charges, and we cannot have negative electricity without a corresponding positive charge. Where is the positive electricity corresponding to the negative units?

Thomson supposes the atom (Phil. Mag. march 1904). to be made up of a sphere of uniform positive electrifications, through which the electrons or negative particles are distributed. These electrons are, as we have

seen enormous distances apart compared with the systems actually occupied by them, like the planets in the solar system, and move with very high velocity. The corpuscles are so distributed through the positive sphere as to be in dynamical equilibrium under the forces that are acting upon them. These are the attractions of the positive electricity for the negative electrons and the repulsive of one negative electron by another". (Page 30)

These citations show that ultimately there is no such thing as matter and that all things are finally reducible to energy and power. These two kinds of electricity combine and recombine to form the elements and to make up what we call matter. For convenience sake, however, we can still continue to use the terms matter and energy, and although we must never forget that ultimately when we say that matter reacts upon force or vice versa we are really saying that it is force acting and reacting upon force. It is interesting at this point to know and to note that light, heat, and electricity are practically interchangeable terms now; and it will be shown later that perhaps electricity is at the foundation of all real life as we call our existence. The work of Prof. Loeb in California in the production of the sea-urchin takes on a new meaning, and a new power, but that, perhaps we shall have time to consider again at some greater length later on.

Let us note one thing carefully: namely, that in the nature of electricity there are two manifestations, a negative and a positive. We need not consider here the fact that really what we call negative electricity is positive electricity, and what we call positive electricity is negative electricity. This thing only need be noted, that we have two kinds of electricity, and these two are constantly acting upon and breaking up each other. If a particle loses a negative ~~ion~~^{it} and becomes a cation, and if the positive ion it becomes an anion. The structure of matter is due to the fact that these forces are kept in equilibrium. With the ground thus somewhat cleared and these two facts noted, and realizing that we are going to use them as the basis of our ideas of God let us go on to the consideration of that idea.

We said in our attempted definition of God that He was the entire universe. Nothing that exists is outside of God. He is the all-in-all of existence. That we call matter, that we call energy, both are God. Of course in our discussion we shall have to employ such terminology as we are ordinarily accustomed to use. We must be frankly anthropomorphic in our discussion. We cannot be otherwise. Beside the belief in God is essentially a human belief. It is the human quality of things that appeals to us. As developed at length in the preceding pages, it is the human element in God that quickens us and inspires us to life. So let us not be shocked and startled at the conclusions we shall arrive at as we follow our theme through.

I.

God has a body and a soul. The body of God is the material universe. The soul of God is the energy or energies in the universe.

We saw above that the forces of the universe are of two kinds, positive and negative. These are the tendencies to build up and the tendencies to break down. At times when the forces--positive and negative-- are equal we have a state of equilibrium, which equilibrium lasts no longer than the time when one or the other of the forces is reinforced.

These forces, I venture to believe, are the activity that Fichte felt; the "Will" of Schopenhauer described; the "Will to Power" that drove Nietzsche insane. Is this soul of God conscious of itself? Is it conscious of us? The answer to these questions must be "Yes", and "No".

Science stands emphatically upon the proposition that so far as evidence goes (excepting Man whom we shall treat later) there is nothing but a mechanical process going on in the universe. The action and reaction of forces, blind and relentless, these we find in the universe. There is no evidence for a self-conscious, thinking, feeling, personality.

"With few exceptions scientific men of the present men of the

present date hold the proposition that all physical action is mechanical, to be axiomatic, if not in the sense of being self-evident, at least in the sense of being an induction from all past scientific experience. And they deem the validity of the mechanical explanation of the phenomena of nature to be not only unquestionable, but absolute, exclusive, and final. They believe that this validity, if not conditioned either by the present state of human intelligence, or by the nature and extent of the phenomena which present themselves as objects of scientific investigation." (J.B. Stallo: Concepts and Theories of Modern Science.)

Sir Oliver Lodge lends additional weight to these words when he says:

"Modern science shows us a self-contained, self-sufficient universe, not in touch with anything beyond or above itself; the general trend and outline of it is known; nothing supernatural or miraculous, no intervention of beings other than ourselves being possible." (Science and Immortality.) Thus here we get our negative answer. For our positive answer we must go farther.

Schopenhauer was right, when he demanded our acceptance to the proposition that the essence of all things was what he called "Will", a Will blind and instinctive, yet instinctively unerring, so long as it was not hindered by Reason, the Idea. Hartmann, too, then was right when he made out his strong case in favor of the proposition that the soul of God was not blind only, but also unconscious. In the beginning when the nebulous star-dust was whirling and swirling about in space, there was no instrument infinite absolute intelligence, that spoke and said "Let the earth be evolved", and it was so. No, it was one vast chance-taking mass of blind energy, mechanically forming itself. How it started we cannot say. Somehow it did get started; somehow it is still kept going.

At this point the law of evolution begins its work. The soul of God, says, Science, did evolve, did grow. Beginning with its blind

swirling, it began to get turned into various directions; the suns, stars, and planets formed; on this planet the forces that were caught, as it were, continued to grow and change through many ages, until it arrived to form what we call life forces, and these life-forces develop ultimately into man's soul processes.

This will hardly be accepted without challenge. It needs a good deal of explanation. To do this explaining we must turn for a few moments to the body of God.

It will be recalled that Prof. Thomson showed that the so-called atoms of material substance were made up of electric particles, being held in the state of equilibrium, due to the attraction of the negative and positive particles, and the mutual repulsion of the negative particles upon one another. They could be broken up by the addition of either a positive or negative ion. Not only is this true, but carrying on the process a little farther we find that the various elements are formed in the same way. Now the total energy is not used up in the atoms. It is merely held in a state of equilibrium; remove the equilibrium and the forms are changed. I need not enter, even if I could, in the mysteries of analytic and synthetic chemistry here. The point to be noticed is that the various combinations of chemicals and their nature and forms are mutually determined. The two atoms of hydrogen and the one atom of oxygen, when they combine, form a different substance. And if we add a second atom of oxygen the action of the second atom is determined by this new form that has been made, and the action of the molecule of water is modified by the addition of the new atom of oxygen. Now spreading this proposition out over the entire universe we have this fact. The soul of God is modified, hindered and aided by his body, and in turn the body of God is modified, hindered and aided by His soul.

Or we could put it differently. There are in God two tendencies, one the tendency to reach and maintain an equilibrium, and the other the ten-

tendency to be and remain active and changing. These two tendencies mutually aid, hinder and modify each other; for the tendency toward change, may result in such a combination of the forces of God's soul that it would produce a state of calm and equilibrium; and in turn the establishment of this equilibrium would be just the state needed for the setting up of a new process of evolution. It is possible for the conditions of change and equilibrium to be present at the same time, but in different parts of the body and soul of God. This is shown by the fact that there are planets, so-called dead planets, such as our moon, which appear to be totally quiescent and also there are nebulae which are constantly forming and reforming and reforming and reforming. This would tend to show therefore, that in the soul and body of God there is a constant strain and stress, and wear and tear. There is in Him a constant change, a constant flux, as the ancient philosopher, Heraclitus put it. There are these terrific streams of energy acting and reacting upon one another, thickening up as it were, into stars and then into planets and men.

Of these planets our earth is one and for us the most important. The planet of which we know the most is this one. It has been studied and assayed and tried. Of the rest of the universe we know but very little and that little in terms of our own planet. The most that we can say of other planets and stars is that they may belike this one. More than this we cannot say. For us, this earth is the most important part of God's body and soul. His greatness and His worth have found themselves for us here. For it is upon this earth that the powers we hold the highest are found; the powers of love and kindness and love and justice. Here and here only, so far as we know, can friend clasp hand with friend, and lovers yield to their mutual bliss. In the rest of the universe we find power, power tremendous and unseen, power crushing and overwhelming, but only here do we find love.

Evolution tells us that this earth has evolved and given birth to various forms of life, of which the highest so far manifested is man.

It inevitably follows that the highest development therefore of the being of God is man. Whatever are the powers of man; whatever his desires and deeds; his aspirations and hopes; his degradation and sins; all these are too the powers, hopes, aspirations and sins of God. Man is literally the flower of the being of God. Outside of this planet God is still blind, instinctive, ploughing, plunging forces. Only on earth has he attained to a Self-conscious intelligence.

But at this point someone may reply, that although my logic is refutable, granting my definition of God, still there remains one point to be considered, namely the existence of consciousness. The question may be asked how did this consciousness arise. It surely is different from that which went before; how did it come about?

You will recall that there are three prominent schools that attempt to answer this question. The first, the naturalistic school, says that thought, consciousness, is but a function of the brain. The other and opposite school says that all action is from the mind upon the body. The third school says that there is a parallellism; Matter and mind working together and operating upon each other. Many and long have been the controversies between the three schools and the war is not yet over. But it seems to me that the time and energy spent by the disputants is so much time and energy wasted. For we have learned that there is no distinction of kind between so-called matter and mind, but only a difference of degree. We have learned that ultimately all so-called material things are electricity, energy. And it is a tenable hypothesis, that thought, consciousness, is just this electric stream passing through and being modified by other sections of the electric stream in the form of brain cells.

Mental telepathy will have some bearing upon this subject. You will doubtless concede that mental telepathy has been established as a scientific fact. What is the something, this 'thought' that passes from the brain of one person to the brain of another? To call it 'thought' does not

explain it,--no more is it explained when we call it electricity), but that something does pass from mind to mind, or brain to brain--whichever you prefer--we all admit. Now let us suppose that this passing something is a stream of electrons shot out by brain A and attracted by the positive particles of brain B. It is evident that if brain B is properly prepared it will receive the electrons from Brain A. "If it is prepared", you echo, perhaps. Well does not the evidence show that there must have been in every case of mental telepathy just this state of mental preparedness? There must be some method of connection. Not every one is a telepathist, at any rate to a marked and striking degree, (though it is claimed and perhaps rightly so, I am not fully qualified to say, that all brains are telepathic.) The electron theory does account for the phenomena as well if not better than any other theory. Surely an idealist of any type could and should be willing to accept this.

But after all the materialists may say, that the brain gets its impressions mainly through sensations. Very well. But what is sensation? Dubois-Raymond, you will remember, said it was one of the seven great enigmas. Let us try to present a solution of the theory by means of the electron theory. Take the sensation of touch for example. What happens when you put your hand upon a stone? You are placing a combination of positive and negative ions upon another combination of positive and negative ions. A mutual reaction, attraction and repulsion take place. This attraction and repulsion is carried along the nerves--themselves electrical particles--to the brain, a storehouse of electrical particles, and you have a condition resulting that we call smooth, rough, cold, or warm. Energy meets energy, they react upon and change one another, form new combinations of energy. We can get no nearer to an explanation than this even if we say and speak of a "Conscious Self" or an "Ego".

Or take the question of the origin of life. The idealist group say that life cannot come from dead matter; the materialist says that matter

does produce life. Well both are agreed. Matter is electricity, life is electricity. Surely electricity can produce electricity. "Perhaps" says the idealist, "for that is just the thing that is open to question." Well look at the facts. Prof. Loeb has taken protoplasm (unfertilized eggs) and developed from it a sea-urchin by means of immersion in salt water. By the addition of common salt he has increased or by the addition of fresh water he has decreased the activity of the sea-urchin. Now sodium chloride, we know, upon being placed in water breaks up into negative and positive ions. Could not the attraction of the electric particles in the water acting upon the electric particles of the sea-urchin account for this increased and decreased vitality of the sea-urchin? There would seem to be some connection between electricity and life.

Again it is a matter of common practice in the medical profession to use a normal salt solution in cases where there is great physical collapse. The venous injection of this solution causes a rallying and strengthening of the patient. Electricity again.

One more illustration. The use of a galvanic battery upon a decapitated frog, causes the frog's legs to contract. The brain is gone, the mind is gone, yet the function goes on. To call it reflex action due to the presence of a spinal cord is ~~not any better an action due to the presence of the spinal cord~~ ^{than} affords no better explanation than the one advanced by the electron theory. Electricity and life- or at any rate in this last instance life-like action again.

Life, thought, the soul, may very well be just electric streams. Matter and mind, so called, may just as well be different forms or manifestations of the one thing, electricity, in the same way that light and heat are.

At this point one may complain that I am giving away the case to the idealist or the materialist, to whichever class the objector may belong. But we must remember that I am not interested in either the one or

the other. I am starting from the facts of science and making my deductions from them. So it seems to me inevitable, that we are compelled to admit, as we said before starting on this long digression, that as God is the entire universe, and as man is the highest developed form in the universe, man is the highest being to which God has attained. And, as a natural conclusion from this it is borne in upon us by our observation of the present time and the history of the human race, it follows that the soul of God has achieved in its highest moments as the soul of the highest man that has ever existed upon the earth, call that man whom you will, Moses, Buddha, Zarathustra, or Jesus.

This too follows: With the advance of man and with his ennoblement God's highest being is advanced and ennobled. With the degradation of Man God's noble soul is degraded.

Thus far we can summarize the results:

God has risen from a blind, unconscious power into an intelligent, thinking, self-conscious being. His self-conscious being is only a very small part of himself, namely humanity. The development of humanity means the development of God. The disintegration of humanity means the disintegration of God.

With our idea of God as a growing activity we can well ask ourselves if such a God is a person, a Self, and if so in what way and with what meaning. The question is a difficult one. One way of approach is to ask ourselves--Is the individual man a Self, and if so How? Then we can use our results as an analogy to answer the larger question of the self-hood of God. This is the method we shall here follow.

A. Man as a Self.

The older view was that the Self or Soul is a thing in itself, a substance, a separate entity connected somehow and someway with the body for some particular purposes. Among the ancients Aristotle, and among the moderns Des Cartes, held to this view. I say that this was the

older view, for it has been almost universally rejected at the present time, and rightly rejected, we hold, for there is no evidence that will support such a presupposition.

The modern views are the empirical and the idealistic. The empirical view of the self may be summed up as its being a consciousness of a contrast between the man as he knows himself and the alter or the world about him, which contrast is a result of social life and conditions. Throughout all the changes of both the world external to him and even through many changes within himself a man is conscious of a something which remains indifferent and is constant.

The idealistic view as held by Prof. Royce, is that the self consists in the consciousness of a meaning to one's life, and the determination to carry out one's life plan. He says (W and I. p 276)

"By this meaning of my life-plan, by this possession of an ideal, by the intent always to remain another than my fellows despite my divinely planned unity with them--by this and not by the possession of any soul substance, I am defined and created a Self." Further in the same work, Prof. Royce puts the Self in ethical terms. He says: "You will know you are a Self precisely insofar as you intend to accomplish God's will by becoming one; and that you are an individual in so far as you purpose to do your Father's business in unique fashion, so that in this instant shall begin a work that can be finished only in eternity--a work that however closely it may be bound up with all the rest of the Divine life still remains in its expression distinguishable from all this other life."

The trouble with the first of these views, that the soul is a substance, is, as I see it, that there is no evidence to show that such an entity exists. The difficulty with the other two views is that they make the self to consist in a consciousness of the Ego as opposed to the Alter. The Empiricist says it is a consciousness of contrast, the idealist says

it is a consciousness of meaning. Now I venture to believe that the Self in a man is the condition in him of a constant action and interaction of material and physical elements, (to use the language of uncritical and everyday speech), that goes to make up his life. To put it tersely, a man's Self is his Life. Of this constant interaction consciousness is only one of the phases, an important, perhaps the important phase, but still only a phase. The consciousness of contrast, of meaning, of determination, etc. are only parts of the Self, not the whole of it. A man's self, I say, is his Life.

A man's life consists in the relation and the interaction between his body and his soul. These two are essential to his selfhood. You cannot destroy a part of one or the other without destroying or impairing his full-rounded selfhood. Strike a man on the head so as to form a blood-clot somewhere on his brain, and you change the flow, the interaction of his body and mind (soul); paralysis sets in, for example; you change his life, you change his Self. Cut out a section of a man's brain and you destroy his sense of contrast between himself and an external object; or his will to be a follower of an individual 'life-plan'. There is an intimate relation between the body of a man and what Prof. Royce would call the Self of a man. Now it appears to me that both the empiricist and the idealist are making an arbitrary distinction, a distinction that cannot be made without either wilfully or unconsciously shutting one's eyes to the facts, in order to do away completely with any but a spiritual interpretation of and meaning to the Self. I fail to see why, when a certain act depends upon a material condition as well as a spiritual volition, as for example, the following of a life-plan, the material condition should be arbitrarily eliminated. So far as we know the latter cannot go on without the presence of the former. The natural conclusion would be to include both in any definition that was to try and explain the one or the other.

A man's Self then would consist, according to our view, of the actions, reactions and interactions between his body and his soul. Not in any individual action, reaction or interaction, not in the sum total of these actions, reactions, and interactions, but in the relation, the condition, the harmony, the attunement between his body and soul which makes these things possible. Impair this attunement or destroy it, and you impair or destroy the Self.

A man has a soul, a squirt of electricity, if you please, acting through his body, another squirt of electricity. These two are the same in kind differing only in their degrees of thickness, as it were. In both there are varying degrees of intensity. The soul has its high and low moments. They quite often depend upon the physical conditions. The body has many organs with their diversified functions. The visceral organs -heart, lungs, and stomach- operate in man subconsciously. We are not aware of them and their action--unpleasantly aware of them, I mean- till some derangement sets in. Of our brain section we are somewhat more conscious but even here the most part goes on below the threshold of consciousness. Our limbs, at any rate up to the limits of fatigue, are our passively obeying servants.

We would consider in the main that our vital organs and our brain are our most important bodily parts. Any serious inhibition of these organs or their functions would inhibit the more important activities of the Self. Not all the atoms of the visceral organs or the neurons of the brain are used at the same time with the degree -the same degree, of intensity. We would also agree that the feelings of love, hope, fear, or distrust are mainly neural, although they do have some effect upon and are affected by the actions of the other parts of the body; but in the main the emotions are neural and not visceral in their origin and continuance. So as, after all, the intellectual and moral and emotional life is our most important life, practically, most important, we can say that the neural

part of our Self, our brain is the most important part of our Self.

B. God as a Self.

Applying the same method of approach and of reasoning to our idea of God as to our idea of Man, we find that the Self of God consists in the constant attunement of the various parts of his body and Soul. We need hardly more than call attention to the results of astronomy which point to the fact of there being some universal power that keeps the stars in their orbits. There is a harmony on a vast scale. Even as in our own body this harmony exists in the main as unrecognized until some accident gives notice that the unity has been destroyed, so too, the Self of God exists in a greater part unrecognized ~~until-some-accident-gives-notice~~ save in a dull subconscious fashion. The planets whirling through space, comets breaking and nebulae forming, are to the Self of God but as the breaking down and building up of the red and white corpuscles in our blood. The corpuscles are needed, the too great increase of the white corpuscles throw the self out of balance, but their formation and disintegration are subconscious. The arrangement, the order of the solar system is necessary to the Selfhood of God, but the harmony is a subconscious one.

As in man the neural part and function are of most practical and spiritual importance, so too in God the neural function and part is the most important. The Brain of God, as the brain of man, is the source of his Affections and intelligence. This brain of God is humanity. The millions and millions of human beings living all over the world are the neurons of the brain of God. The bushwhacker of Australia, the Patagonian, the aboriginal tribes of darkest Africa, represent the childhood of God, the time when the deeper convolutions of God the brain of God had not yet formed. As peoples and nations have evolved and become more and more civilized the brain of God has become more and more mature, till in the modern civilized community the aesthetic senses

as it were, have come into being. In the great intellectual, artistic, and spiritual geniuses of humanity we find the Brain of God developed along special lines and to great degrees of intensity.

In the continued development of Humanity we have the continued development of the Brain of God and in the loss of humanity the brain of God is lost; and with the loss and disintegration of the brain of God in that far, the Self of God is destroyed.

The question now arises as to whether or not such a God as we have described can be made an object of worship. Can He be called a personal God? It depends on the meaning given to personal. If by personal one means that to whom I as an individual can come, with whom I can hold communion and have comradeship then the evolving God is a personal God. For, do I want love- I find it manifested in humanity; do I want courage- I go to my friend; do I want power to continue the days and years of toil and striving-I need but open my soul to the Universe and it comes pouring in upon me. That which we take to the larger self of God we shall have strengthened. "To him that hath, shall be given".

Besides, this larger truth is evident. So far as the psychology of religion is concerned, any object, any idea, regardless of what that object or idea may be, can be made the source and goal of the religious experience. The stone fetish and the Absolute Idea are one and the same so far as the emotional value is concerned. The existence of manifold and diverse religions prove this. The Chinaman bowing before his Joss-stick, the Persian worshipping his sacred fire; the Roman catholic hanging precious jewels around the neck of the Virgin Mary; the Episcopalian bowing at the name of Jesus, the Arab praying to Allah, with his reiterated "Il Allah Allah; Mohammud Rasilud"; The Jew turning toward Jerusalem; all are animated by the same religious emotion. The various deities invoked are but the symbols used consciously or unconsciously as a result of the yearning of the Soul for man for his larger

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soul of man for his larger self, the soul of God; and all these symbols are efficacious. And it is just this efficaciousness, if I may be permitted to digress for a moment, this pragmatic value in all religions, that will be used to turn the tables in the fight against the Pragmatist by the adoption of the pragmatic formula. In the field of philosophy the exponents of any system can say that "it worked, hence it is true", and it will be true for him. In religion the orthodox churches can say, "our system of belief, our creeds, our methods are proving their practical value, why should we change?" Why indeed? In awakening the religious emotion anything will do—crystal gazing, beautiful music, the elevation of the Host. All religions work; as is shown by the fact that great and good men have belonged to each of the many religions of the world. The central fact and necessary fact is that we should believe, that we should have faith. You will recall Prof. James' words to the effect that the religious experience can accompany any theological position provided only that they find room for its peculiar manifestation. It narrows down fundamentally to the "Will to Believe". To believe so hard and so thoroughly that we are willing to risk the eternal existence of our soul upon this belief, That we are willing to take the dare that is offered; to run a risk; to hang our lives on a great perhaps, because the perhaps ought to be even if it is not.

The only advantage that a belief in an evolving God can have over any other belief is that it satisfies the intellect by bringing the idea of God into closer union with the facts of empirical science; and secondly, that it fills our individual lives with a deeper content of meaning. As I have said before, we do really count-- we do really work and accomplish, and in accomplishing we are really creating things for man and God. Evil in the universe is real tangible and earnest; but it is not here for some inexplicable reason, some mysterious man-developing purpose of God. It is here because God has not yet outgrown it. It is not the result of a fall from a higher state of perfection but the result of not having arisen to a higher

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state toward which we are striving. Growth of God and Man, of God in Man and Man in God, is real and constant, not seeming and impossible. We--all of us--do count. Life has a real meaning, a meaning that squares off with the facts of existence here and now. This squaring off with the facts can be the only specific claim that the Idea of God as Activity and Growth can make to a superiority over any other idea of Him. For, as we cannot repeat too often, there is no absolute truth of which we know. We do create God in our own image, in an image to which we are willing to bow down and worship, be that image the Sphinx, the Cross, or the spiritual "I Am." We believe in God, Man, Heaven, Hell, Immortality because of an inexplicable something within us that yearns for a something larger than itself. In this desire, in this yearning, we open ourselves out to the larger Soul of God--and that is worship and religion. As an object of this worship--anything will do, so long as it does not violate the demands of our reason. When such questions are asked as why is man here? Why is there evil in the world? What is the relation between God and Man? our idea of God answers them from the conceptions of science and not from obscure metaphysic. It appeals more and more strongly to men who are really active and alive, who are willing to run a risk, because it gives them real work to do, not in spite of--but because of their belief. The Growing God and the Active Man are Comrades and Friends, equal in quality though not in quantity; one in essence though not in extent; the same in soul though not in body.

3A.

Practical

After all this lengthy and tedious discourse that has preceded we may ask: Well, what of it? What practical effect does all this have? What value does this or any other idea of God have for me? The question would be well taken. For the real value of any idea is its workability? What will the idea of God help me and you to do.

Before proceeding to this discussion let me ask your indulgence for just a few more ground-clearing details.

Man has many qualities such as love, hope, courage, etc. These are, we must remember, but different manifestations of the Soul of God. This proviso in our minds we can speak of two things as though they were separate and distinct, namely the intellect and the heart.

That man is a rational being, a thinking being, a being with intellect, is granted by us all. This thinking process is due, as I see it, to a part of the Soul of God acting through a part of His Body. Let us call these parts respectively Thought and Brain. It is most obvious that thought is modified and determined by the brain. The experiments of the physiological p/sychologists show this. Cut away a section of a man's brain and he cannot see; cut away another and he cannot hear; cut away another and he cannot think, and you make an idiot of him. Only if there is the proper condition of brain can thought be manifest. Given this as true we may ask what is the value of man's thought of God?

Plainly this is true, God first became conscious of himself in Man. (If you wish to push this self-consciousness back as far as the origin of self-consciousness in the lower animals, as we call them, there can be no objection to that.) By reason of this self-consciousness God is able to direct and to modify himself, and his ways. The achievements of men in science and philosophy, and in all branches of art and industry are just the

means whereby God is directing his own forces and powers, turning them from blind haphazard deeds to consciously directed, fruitful results. Through the development of Man's soul God is able to gain control over His own body. It is for this reason that once God had achieved to Man's intellect that He was so eager for his development, that He is even now in countless men laboring for this development of the Human Race, for in Humanity God is finding and expressing Himself and conquering himself. In man's intellect God has found that with which He can direct his own high forces.

By "heart" I mean Man's appetites, aspirations, hopes, fears, desires, aversions, etc, etc. Man is of value to God in that through Man God has become first possessed of these feelings (the remark above anent the lower animals holds here to?) Through Man's intellect God becomes cognizant of these feelings and directs them; strengthens some, eliminates others. In Man's love God loves; in man's hate God hates, and so on as far as you care or wish to carry the list.

After this let us take up the question of the practical value of the Idea of God to man and the mutual value of God to man and man to God. This can be best done by contrasting the two views of God, the idealistic and the evolutionary.

The value of either of these will be determined in each individual case by the individual temperament. We can roughly divide men into two classes which we may call the (1) active, and (2) the passive types of men.

1. The active man is the man whose whole soul is wrapped up in achieving. Not achievement, but in achieving; not in the completed deed but in the doing. For him the main thing is the attempt, the struggle, the climb, the fight. He sets a goal towards which he strives, not for the sake of the goal itself, but in order that he may obtain a position high enough so that he can start off for higher things. The goals are not places where he

can lay down his arms, but only breathing places where he can tighten his armor. The active man has a horror of calm; an intense distaste for inaction; a constant desire to be up and doing. Immortality means to him, for example, not a state of absolute or even partial calm and rest, but a condition in which he would find so much to do, so much to accomplish that his every nerve and sinew, spiritual and otherwise, would be straightened to the uttermost. His prayer, if he prays at all, is not for peace, rest, pity, but for courage, strength and grit, and labor. He asks nothing for himself except the ability to give and to achieve for others. He desires not completion but endeavor; not certainty but risk; not the prudent and the safe but the daring. He wants in a word, --Life.

2. The passive man is the direct antithesis of the active man. He wants rest and peace. A goal achieved means for him something done; a place where one may rest upon his laurels. He is willing to work and work hard, provided he gets his rewards at the end, in the cessation of all labor. He wants not risks but certainty, not daring, but prudence and safety. He urges himself toward a goal for the sake of the goal and not for the sake of the urge. Immortality would be for him a state of eternal rest and calm. All perplexities would be solved; all riddles answered; all doubts dispelled; all fears allayed; all hopes achieved, all dreams realized, all pains assuaged, all suffering soothed, all battle ended, all strivings ceased; he wants not life but death.

These two, I say, are the types of men we meet. Occasionally the passive man has moments when he feels the value of work for work's sake, but it is of rare occurrence. The active man, too, has moments when he despairs and is depressed, moments when life seems a hollow mockery, a useless striving, a delusion and a snare. But these moments, too, are rare. The balance in both cases comes to a rest, the needle swings true to the pole-star of their lives.

With this value of temperament in mind let us look at the two conceptions of God we have mentioned.

The absolute idealist's God is easily seen and known. He is the God of the Hegelian and neo-Hegelian conception. God is an Infinite Absolute Intelligence in whom there is neither variableness or change. As He was in the beginning, so is He now and always shall be. He is the completion of all completeness; the fruition of all things; the beginning and the end; the promise and the fulfillment, the endeavor and the endeavored; the striving, the striver and the strife. God no sooner desires anything than he no longer needs to desire it, for it is instantly accomplished; nay the very act of desiring is the actualization of the desired. All things utterable or unutterable, thought, or unthought, possible or impossible--are. Things never change, never become, never advance or regress--they just are! The achievements of man are not of the slightest real value to God. For it is but the attempt to achieve that which has already been accomplished in the being of God. Things man strives for he is not really striving for, for the very striving is done away with. "Man is only a poor deluded creature" thinks God, to toil so, when if he but only knew all things were already done, finished and ended." God has no real use for man. Man's discoveries are but the revelations of God to man of that which has already been completed and made whole and perfect.

To the passive man such a God is the ideal God. He knows that in the end all things are completed. He need not worry, he need not strive, he need not exert himself. What is the use? It is all done. Of course, if he cares to, he can play at doing something, but what is the use of even that? Does he create something? Nonsense, he has ^{not} created it. It was already there, he merely discovered it. Does anything need to be done? It is only a seeming need. In reality the need has already been satisfied. There is no need to bother about evil and pain and sorrow--for they have already been swallowed up in God--who is neither sorrow nor happiness, pain nor joy, good or evil, this or that, but a something, a someone who is above and yet is all and in all, and more and everything and nothing! Of course to the passive man

the seeming evils are sometimes painful and he tries to do away with them so soon as he can, but it is in spite of his belief and desire. The passive man likes ~~likes~~ to believe in such an Idealist God, for it means certainty, security, peace. The whys and the wherefores never bother him; he leaves them to the Infinite Absolute Intelligence of God.

But to the active man such a God is a constant horror and challenge. If such a God does exist the active man knows that He has no real use for him. Man's struggles do not count; it is useless, worthless endeavor; and this knowledge is heart-rending. The why of it all, the whence, the whither, come hurtling in and demand answer and solution here and now--and demand in vain. Again this eternal calm arouses in the active man an intense, itching desire to wake up this brute quiescence; an indomitable will to fight this gigantic, brute dead-weight is aroused; for his own soul is active, in spite of all seeming to the contrary; it does crave action; it does want to do, to accomplish, to strive, to advance, to achieve. The idea of such a world-soul, of a God of completed, absolute infinitude, is repugnant to the active man.

The Infinite Absolute Intelligence has not any use for man. The passive man yields to the embrace of God such a God; the active man is repelled by and abhors such a God.

The evolving God is the opposite of the Idealistic God. He is an eternal change, an everlasting growth, a ceaseless advance, an unending strife. He is alive and not dead; dynamic and not static. From a blind, unconscious striving Will-to-Be, he has evolved and developed from star-dust to planet, from protoplasm and jelly-fish to man, from brute power he has achieved to intelligence, from blind indifference to love.

For the passive man God has no real use, for the slogan of the Deity is "Onward and Upward Forever." No rest such as the passive man desires, no dead completion, only eternal achieving life.

The active man God needs and uses. He pours his strength and power

into him. He purs in his strength to be guided in the right direction ; His power to be molded for higher and ever nobler deeds. Through the mind of the active man God learns that there is sin and pain and sorrow and that they are real. He feels them in himself and lends His eternal strength that they may be lessened and wiped out. God knows that the struggle for advance is a real struggle, not merely a seeming one, and he knows that in this struggle, the active man is His Guide, and comrade and true son.

The passive man cannot care for or believe in the evolving God. It makes things too earnest, too strenuous, too uncertain, too nerve-racking to be comfortable; and the passive man does love comfort. He is not the pioneer or the path-finder, he is a camp-hanger-on. God to him is a task-master, a hard-driven, a Being to be obeyed, but without the hope of ever being through his labors.

The active man adores the Evolving God. He sees in him a really advancing power, a really achieving endeavor. He sees in God, a Friend, a Comrade, and a Father, a friend on whom he can rely, a comrade in whom he can trust, a Father to whom he can turn for new and unending strength. He knows that God is relying on him for direction and aid. He knows that his efforts do count in the life of the Universe. He knows that the evils and ill of this world are real; that they are for him to eradicate; that in destroying them he is aiding helping and advancing the life and the essence of God himself. He knows that he counts to himself and To God. He knows that he is worth something to God and that God cares for him. He knows that He faces an unending battle, but he faces it eagerly and yet humbly for he knows that God is with and for him. He glories in God and God in him and together they fight the unending battle for progress, enlightenment, purity and love.

The evolving God is a real process, a real ever-becoming. The passive man does not count in the life of God save as a dead, dragging weight. The active is of prime importance to God and God is of paramount importance to him.

Here we must stop. We have come a long way. Beginning with a brief description of the ideas of God as held by Kant, Fichte, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche we saw that God's existence can never be rationally proven, though we do feel ^{him} as a pulsing activity within us; which activity we can assert or deny, and for the development of which we ought to strive.

We then saw that ultimate truth, ultimate knowledge, is not yet attainable by us, but that the religious experience is valued in spite of its lack of cognitive content; which experience, however, we do try to explain. In our attempted explanation we took our start from the concepts of science which teaches us that God is a growing Being who has developed from primal star-dust to man, and who shall continue to develop forever if we do our part.

APPENDIX A.

THE SELF : A PLATONIC EXPERIMENT.

"What am I?" is the question which every serious person asks himself at some time or other in his life. The more one is interested in the real things of existence, the more the query is forced in upon him. Is the "Ego" the same thing that sits and eats and drinks and talks to other things that talk to it, or is the "Ego" the something or other that comes to light only at rare intervals, and which is entirely inexplicable? If the real "ego" is not the historic self, but the so-called sub-conscious self, is it something distinct in itself or is it part of the larger ego the "It" of all existence? Am I something distinct and withing something else, and dependent upon something else, or am I the something, the "it" ?

Plato says that the real thing is not the thing which we see but that which is left after all that is comceivably non-essential is taken away. Therefore, to get at the real ME, I have only to take away the part of me which is not absolutely essential to my existence. In the "Phaedo" he says that all one needs to do is to get rid of the eyes and ears of the body, which he (the philosopher) conceives of as only a disturbing element, hindering the soul from the acquisition of knowledge; "while in company with body the soul cannot have pure knowledge"; "when the foolishness of the body shall be cleared away, we shall be pure and hold converse with other pure souls, and know of ourselves the pure light everywhere." How much truth is there in this statement? Can one strip oneself of his material parts, and then have anything left? An answer to this question I tried to find by undertaking the following experiment.

I sat down in my study and tried to strip myself completely the large evergreen tree which grows in front of my window. I looked at the tree and saw that it was a pine tree. What made it a pine tree? Evidently

the shape, color, cones, branches and their arrangement. What could I take away and still have a pine tree there? Obviously I could conceive of a pine tree that was shorter and thinner and less bright, or dark in color and of one that did not have any cones on it. But I could not get away from the fact that a pine tree, in order to be a pine tree, had to have the general arrangement to which men have agreed to give the name of pine tree. From this I could not get away, try and try, though I did. Then I tried to strip any tree, and found that to have a tree at all, I had to have the branches, etc. that go to make up the tree; otherwise I had absolutely nothing.

Then my eyes being tired from so constant a gaze I shut them, and behold the tree had disappeared so far as I was concerned. The thing I had tried desperately to bring about was accomplished by merely shutting my eyes. Yet while the tree had disappeared so far as I was concerned, there was something which I had that was the tree. Not a mere after-image of the tree, but a concept of the tree. I renewed my attack and managed to get rid of that particular concept and then found that I had a feeling of tree in general. This I attacked in its turn, and--here came a question and doubt. Did I really get rid of this "feeling of the tree in general"? or had I merely hypnotised myself; for, when I opened my eyes after having as I think, rid myself of the feeling of the tree in general, I did not see the tree that I knew must still have been there in front of my window. Three hours later I repeated the process, and the following night I did the same; and in all the cases I did not see the tree after I had cut away the feeling of the tree, though I was looking at the place where the tree was, and although within a very few minutes the tree was there again. Did I open my eyes and not see the tree or did I think that I did open my eyes when I had not? Had I really stripped the tree of all that it was, and found nothing which I thought was, or had I been a victim of self-hypnosis?

I don't know.

Leaving the tree I turned my attention to myself. I asked "can I get rid of all there is of me? that is non-essential?"

I discovered two years ago, or so, that I had the faculty of practically forgetting that I had a body and would amuse myself from time to time by "getting rid" as I called it, of my hand or leg or foot, or even of everything but my head. Then by focusing my attention upon any particular part of my body, I would bring it back into my consciousness. Let me make this somewhat clearer. I sit down in a comfortable chair, close my eyes and relax. Then I think hard about something or other for a little while, abstracting my attention as far as possible from my body. Then I discover that I am not really conscious of the whereabouts of my different-bodied parts. My hand may be in my lap, or it may be hanging by the side of my chair. My foot may be on the ground or on the foot-rest, I am in the habit of using. My legs may be crossed or uncrossed. I don't at that time know. Then I focus my attention on what I call my right hand or foot or leg, and after a while I know where it is and what it is doing. During this time (i.e. the time I am focusing attention on hand or foot) I may be conscious of other parts of my body or not. Here again the question arises whether I really do this or think I do. Is it a game in which I am self-deceived, or is it really ability to forget for the once my body?

Be the answer to this last question as it may, in this attempt to find the real ego, I strip myself of my body and (perhaps, I am not sure) of a large part of my head. But there was one thing of which I was constantly conscious, namely that it was I who was doing the stripping, and try, though I did, hard and earnestly, the thing which was doing the stripping could not get rid of itself. Basing my judgment upon this experiment, I should be compelled to say, then, that the real "ego" was this something which stripped everything away but itself. But there have been rare, very rare occasions when even this "stripping something" went. Into what and out

of what, I do not know. I refer to mystic experiences when I have passed out of my "historic self" beyond what I call the x-point, into the --what? Let me try to make this clear.

In the stripping process above described, a point (this point of transition I call the x-point) is reached when the stripping something vanishes, and I, as a distinct, self-conscious personality, am not. Yet something must be there, though I am not conscious of it; for after regaining self-consciousness, I feel that a terrifically intense something had gripped and swept through me. I am not exhausted or weakened in any way. I have had this experience only three times. Twice the after effect was, in addition to the one just described that all was well, and good, and joyous. The third time the after effect was that everything looked dark and gloomy and horrible.

These then are the possibilities: the real ego is the thinking, stripping me, and it passes beyond the x-point into IT; or that which is after the x-point is passed, is the real ego, and it communes with the it which is something else; or that that which is after the x-point is passed is the IT.

Which of these possibilities is real I do not know? I cannot say whether the real ME passed the x-point or not. I cannot say that the stripping me is the real ME, for the other ME may be the real ME. If Plato had an experience or several experiences, which enabled him to know definitely what and who he really was, he had knowledge I as yet am unable to acquire.

The result of this experiment, then, can be summarised thus!
The real Ego is,

1. The thinking, stripping ME, or
2. The ME which passes beyond the x-point, or
3. The ME which is after the x-point is passed, or
4. The IT, or
5. Any or all of these put together.

I am unable to say which of these five points is true, which false. All may be true, all may be false. I do not know.

APPENDIX B.

A. There are four ways in which we can consider God as related to the Universe.

1. God as outside the universe.
2. God as inside the universe.
3. God as both outside and inside the universe.
4. God as the universe.

1. If God is really outside the universe, nothing that is characteristic of God can be known for we know only the universe, (unless indeed God is like though outside the universe, in which case we construct God as being part of the universe--i.e. represent 4) In this case the existence or non-existence of God is a matter of practical importance.

2. If God is inside the universe then we can hope somehow to discover something concerning the nature of God. He may be the force we call the laws of nature. He may be the hopes and aspirations of men. It is a matter of practical importance to us men to know, to search for God. He may be like the universe or unlike it, although in it. It makes some difference. He may be in hell, he may be in the stars, or in the spaces between the stars. It would be a perplexing problem to determine his relation to man and the universe.

3. If he is both inside and outside the universe then the problem would be more complicated, for we would have to discover which part of him was in and which without the universe. Also the relation of the part without to the part within. If the part without the universe affected the part within the universe or otherwise it would be a matter of primal importance to man. For if the part of God within the universe did not effect the extra-removed part of God then we need not really bother about God. If it does then it is a matter of some concern to us. And vice-versa.

4. If God is the universe then we need consider nothing outside the universe. All we can know and say about the universe would be what we

know about God. His relation to us and ours to Him would be the relation of the universe to us, and our relation to it, or the relation of the universe to itself-- for we are part of the universe and therefore a part of Him.

B. The idea of growth must be real or unreal. If real then it implies a general development from a lower to a higher form following the laws of evolution. If unreal then we should avoid the use of a term which connotes a thing we do not mean.

C. Is God finite or infinite? I do not know. Man seems to be pointing toward a finite universe beyond the borders of which there may be empty space. (Two arguments for finity of universe 1. Law of gravitation. 2. Laws of Light)

In regards to the affections, infinite would only be a relative term, for they do depend on the bodily structure to a great extent. For all practical purposes God is infinite in body and soul.

D. Definition of God as the entire universe.

E. Use of science as means of explanation.

F. Belief in God a matter of subjectivity.

G. The Value of the Ought (in the Ideal) is our idea of God

H. The Value and Influence of Temperament in the acceptance and construction of an idea of God.

I. The meaning of time and space for God.

J. The Mind a stream of electrons shot from the brain.

K. To show that
To show that the problem of evil is the central theme of every philosophy of religion--and determinism the idea of God.

L. The value of the creative imagination in religion.

M. Evil is the remnant of a lower state of evolution.

The higher the development the less the extent of evil.

- N. The immortality of the Self--and the immortality of God.
- O. Great men are the supreme achievement of God's soul, to the level of which He tries to develop the rest of humanity.
- P. The place of animals in the body and soul of God.

APPENDIX C.

The reasons why God should be looked upon as being the entire universe are these. First from an empirical standpoint he would have to be taken as that for ultimately there is no difference in kind, but only a difference in degree of development between the dead stone and a thinking brain. God, for practical religious purposes, may be conceived of as being a spiritual entity somewhat similar in a vague way to what we term the personality of a man,—that intangible something or other that attracts or repels us when we meet a stranger. As a matter of religious aesthetics there would seem to be a dis—ing process in giving a bodily existence to God. But looked at more closely does not the high immensity of the universe give us just this same aesthetic value? Who can look upon the star-decked heavens, a vast expanse of heaving sea, stand by the down-pouring Niagara, and not be caught up out of himself and flung into communion with the larger power of God. The spiritual existence of God, which we demand is dead, is it not, to the feeling that somehow I as I am a different something from my five feet ten inches of flesh and bone. We have the feeling—due to our training, education, environment, and often of our desire—that even though our bodies are destroyed, our souls, our real selves are eternal and shall continue on for ever. We like to feel, too that God somehow is unconditioned by time and space, and is independent of his created world. But is not that due to the fact that we ultimately are not desirous of real struggle or real fight? We as human beings do have our greatest battle because of the hindrance of our bodies. It is a common place saying that physical suffering is just the thing that causes the greatest development of soul. It is the mind giving victory over the body by many above its pains—not that the pains are no longer there but because we can and do bear them with fortitude—that makes the development of the soul. True that there seems to be a needless wear about suffering that no amount of specious rea-

soning can explain away--and this suffering is due to no cause very often of our own--yet the suffering does produce development.

Now if God is to be an infinite soul (and you may use the term infinite in any way you please) (infinite in extent or infinite in intent) there must be a something that will be large enough to give this soul a real task--a real battle--if real development is to come. The largest, the most extensive of all objects we know is the physical universe. If the soul of God is within the universe--then the physical universe must be the body of God--or else if God is really to develop he must have a body elsewhere and this immanence in the world is of no value to Him. And further more, if the universe is of no use to God--for science is here irrefutable--and says we are part of the universe) God could if he were able (and we cannot discuss the validity of the ideas of the omnipotence of God here and now) leave the universe and be the worse off--and be absolutely unconcerned about the universe and its existence or non-existence. Now you may say that the universe is in existence for the glory of God, or for the use of man, or for a host of other reasons that have been advanced by the theologians from time immemorial--but in all this you are usually trying to save a conception of God that you wish to be true. There is no evidence, no proof in favor of your idea. All that can be known is the universe. What is outside us not known. The attributes we apply to God are attributes that we possess or want to possess. An extra-universal God is really of use only as a figure who is altogether unlike us, and if so, then incapable of development--as we understand the term. To be like us God must be like us. There is no method short of sophistry that can change a thing into something entirely different and still leave it unchanged. If one grants that for the sake of development, there must be a real battle, a real struggle of spirit against flesh--of soul trampling over body--but wants this body to be a spiritual non-spatial, non-universal body, then we cannot say anything against it excepting that we have left the field of empiricism. Anything can be believed provided we

shut up our reasoning processes.

To shut God out of the universe--the so-called material universe is shutting God out of the greatest things we know. If he is--as some will contend--greater than the universe and not at all like the universe, then he is outside of our human sphere of influence and value. If he is less than the universe then why call him God? He then would not be the being "than whom nothing greater could be thought."

But it may be urged that to confine God to the universe is to make Him finite. Well, does God, I ask, need to be absolutely infinite? Is not the extent of the physical universe--though probably finite--^{practically} infinite? Is there not enough of bodily extent to gratify any of our longings for spiritual largeness? Surely there is! Besides is not the Soul of God and its manifestations almost literally infinite? Think of the love of one man, of the effectiveness of one man--multiply that by the total number of human beings, add to that the emotions of so-called lower animals--and put all this the extent of the universe and its powers and you have, have you not, and almost literal infinitude?

Take the yearning of one man for justice and righteousness, say, now intensifying this to the extent of the cosmic forces--can you want a more literal infinity?

By taking the idea of God to include the entire universe you are taking all that there is. Everything that there is in the heavens above, the earth around and beneath us, and all mankind--and saying--Behold your God! Is he not sufficiently infinite in grandeur of stature and of soul--for you? He is for me.

APPENDIX D.

The Problem of Evil: The Crux of any Theology.

It is very evident that the very heart and center of any system of philosophy of religion, or theology, is the problem of evil. What is evil? How will one account for it? What is its relation to God? Why did he permit it? Can he or will He permit it to remain? Why is it not done away with by God? These and many more questions must be raised and answered by any system of thought--and the manner of their answer shows the kind of philosophy that will be evolved.

There are two methods of approaching this question of evil. First we may get a conception of God and try to square the existence of God with this conception, the said conception of God having been arrived at with the existence of evil being taken into consideration. For example, the Ante-Nicene Fathers had their idea of God as absolute omniscience, eternal perfection, etc. Says John of Damascus: "We believe in one Father the beginning and end of all, begotten of no one, without cause, or generation, creator of all, etc." and also "we therefore know and confess that God is without beginning, without end- everlasting, unchangeable, omniscious, omnipotent, eternal, with this conception of God in mind let us examine the question of evil. How did evil come to be? Why is it permitted? We need take into consideration only three attributes of God. Omniscience, omnipotence, and His all-lovingness. God being omniscient knows that evil exists, being omnipotent he either created evil himself or permitted it to be created, and also he is able to eradicate it now if he wants to. Evidently He doesn't want to eradicate evil for evil is still present. He permits it to be then because he is omnipotent, and wants to be despotic, or because He so loves us that he wants to purify us through suffering. Without the cross he cannot give us the crown. The first of these two views no one would accept. God, hardly anyone would believe, is just a despotic cruel tyrant. God in his great love for us wants us to be perfect, perfection comes through

suffering and sin, so we, must suffer and sin. But at this point a question arises, why perfection through suffering only? Surely if God is omnipotent and also all-loving, and also omniscient, he surely knows of some method of perfecting man other than through suffering, and would also (being infinitely loving) bring about this perfection via pleasanter, less painful ways. It was just, it seems to me, on account of this dilemma that the doctrine of the first and second Adam really arose. They had to keep the sheets of God clear of anything smaking of pollution, so now comes the formula "In Adam's fall,

We sinned all."

But in saying this we only push the matter a step further back. Adam sinned. Why did not God prevent his sinning? He could not, or would not. Could Not? Then not omnipotent. That won't do. Would not? Then not all-loving? That surelt won't do. If the question of free-will is here brought in it does not alter the problem. Man was created with free-will to good. Then why was not the free-will made so as to act only for good? God couldn't or He wouldn't. If now one says, "that free-will that had to do good and good only would not be free." Then we reply that God gave men the choice and because he took the choice he punished man for taking the choice. If the question is one of obedience to command, then we ask why was not he made strong enough to resist evil? Somehow there seems to be a lack of justice in the arrangement. Here some one would object and say that human ideas of justice are not divine ideas if justice. We might retort, how do you know? But whichever way it goes it is clearly seen that the problem of evil is the central problem of any system, even if we approach it with a pre-conceived idea of what God is. This is equally true even if we start with another extreme view, namely, that the only perfect attribute of God is Love. And your problem of evil is still the central thing and modifies even your idea of God. An all-loving God could not be omnipotent. Hume settled that once for all time, it appears to me. And so on, whatever conception of God

you start with it is bound to be modified somewhat by the existence of evil--granting of course that evil is real. If you say that evil is not real and practical but only seeming and merely good in the making, then you can have any idea of God you please.

Now the other method of connecting evil and the idea of God is by starting with the existence of evil as a moral and strenuous thing, and taking it into consideration in building up your conception of God. Evil from this point of view may be a permanent fall from a previous state of perfection, or an innate everlasting quality in man, or it may be a quality in man that he can outgrow.

The first of these views is no longer accepted by any but the most orthodox religions. The second is too much akin to Augustine's "predestined for damnation" idea, to be very acceptable, and we can eliminate it. The third, in these days of belief in evolution, seems to make better connections with our idea. Evil would be a remnant of pre-existing conditions, i.e. a state we had not yet outgrown, and is due to incomplete development. Now the question is what kind of God can we have if we admit the existence of sin and also the theory of evolution? You see hereagain the question of evil is central to the idea we may have of God.

The theory of evolution and the relation of evil that is compatible with almost any idea of God that does not make God both omnipotent and all-loving. I mean of course, logically compatible. God could have started the world process and now is unable to stop it. He may be part of the world process and cannot get away from it. He may be the whole world process and so has evil in Himself. It will be noticed that I insist upon God being love. To my mind that is the central thing in the life of God. Not a weak namby-pamby sort of love, but a strong, virile love. Some people may shrink from the last idea of God having evil in Himself. Then they will have to unify their idea of God. The idea of God and the idea of evil are ---determinable. It seems impossible to separate the two ideas. They hang together.

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